

# MILITARY REVIEW

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NUMBER II



# COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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# ECONOMY OF MEANS

Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, USA-Ret.

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

AYAS

SINCE the seventeenth century students of peace and war have probed the past for principles or lessons to guide statesmen and soldiers in the conduct of affairs. Grotius and De Vattel were civilian scholars, not soldiers, and, as could be expected, studied the problem largely from the point of view of the civilian. Grotius perhaps thought that his work, *The Law of War and Peace*, published in 1625, might help statesmen avoid war. De Vattel, in *The Law of Nations*, published in 1758, attempted to develop principles that should guide statesmen desirous of re-establishing a firm peace at the conclusion of war. These works have been neglected by both scholars and statesmen and are rarely understood and seldom read by military men. Succeeding scholars have failed to build upon the foundations which Grotius and De Vattel laid or, at the most, have built imperfectly. On the other hand, the soldier-philosophers of later days have done better in their own field.

## Soldier-Philosophers

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries soldier-philosophers have studied assiduously the campaigns of the great captains and of many lesser ones as well.

During the nineteenth century three minor military figures, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan, did most of the historical work from which was developed the principles of war.

These principles, somewhat differently expressed and emphasized in the various nations, have been guides for the conduct of military operations in the great wars of the twentieth century. They are still the guides in current instruction. The theories of two later military scholars, Douhet and Fuller, also had an important influence on operations in World War II—Douhet on the conduct of war in the air, and Fuller on land operations.

Both Generals Clausewitz and Fuller frequently reached a level above operations in their thinking. In recent times Fuller has been most effective in clarifying certain principles governing both statesmen and soldiers. His work, *The Foundation of the Science of War*, is one of his best and is worthy of careful consideration in these troubled times. As an example of the depth of his thinking, consider the following statement written in 1923:

... Industrial endurance forms the staying power of war, and, as it can never be excessive a wise Government should see that during war this wealth is squandered neither by civilian nor by soldier, and that war expenditure is remunerative in the fullest meaning of the word, namely that it could not have been more profitably spent.

In these words Fuller was, in effect, stating a principle of war of greater significance in this industrial age than ever

*Military planners must be reasonably correct in their estimates and assumptions and must avoid waste and nonessential utilization of effort and resources if this nation is to attain its maximum strength*

before. It is a principle which must be understood by statesmen, military men, and the American people alike because it must determine the national policies of the United States in peace and in war, if our republican form of government is to survive the deadly challenge of world communism. General Fuller's statement has been recast and for the lack of a better name entitled *Principle of Economy of Means*. As here suggested, the principle would read as follows:

#### ***Economy of Means***

*Manpower and industry together with the resources upon which they feed and the rate at which munitions and trained troops can be created largely determine a nation's staying power in war. In order to accomplish the national objective in war it is imperative that neither manpower, industrial capacity, nor resources be squandered by either civilian or soldier on anything not contributing to the successful prosecution of the conflict.*

Whether this suggestion is accepted or not is immaterial for the principle is operative regardless of authority because it is of the very nature of things.

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#### **Historical Background**

Throughout history war has been the ultimate arbiter of political disputes, and nothing has happened to indicate that it will not be the final arbiter in the future. In the past, war has been conducted with all the instruments which human ingenuity could bring to the conflict. From clubs and stones, which were once equal to all needs, mankind has progressively adopted more complicated and deadly instruments until at last some peoples have acquired the means of operating in three dimensions, beyond the speed of sound, and have stockpiled the atom bomb and, perhaps, the hydrogen bomb as well. There are others in remote places, however, who are still in the club and spear stage of evolution. Along the road of this progression the more advanced peoples have abandoned many weapons for more efficient ones, but none of those discarded can be totally eliminated from consideration. At some future time they may be revived again as mankind descends the ladder of progress after having used up the resources stored on the earth during the geological past.

#### **Modern War**

Modern war or the war of the advanced peoples is total and is predicated upon ample manpower, industry, and resources. It is no longer possible for a people, however brave and enduring, to conduct modern warfare without an adequate base of manpower, industry, and resources. And other things being equal, the party which makes the best use of these basic means will have the greater chance of victory. If one of the contestants is inferior in any of the basic means, he must make better use of what he has or lose the contest.

In the realignment of power that has resulted from the unfortunate political decisions of the immediate past the United States finds itself in a most complicated situation. The complication is still further intensified by problems that inevita-

bly arise in a coalition or a series of somewhat conflicting alliances. Never before has the *principle of economy of means* been so vital to our nation. The violations of the previously unstated principle during World War II have accentuated the current danger. It would be impossible to enumerate all serious violations of the principle during World War II without enormous research and that is not possible at this time. Nevertheless, there should be enumerated here a few historical examples of the mistakes that contributed materially to the expenditure of 332 billion dollars, the loss of 234,874 men and the wounding or injury of 592,170 others during World War II. It should be noted in the examples that follow that, although every civilian and soldier might have violated the principle since it is applicable to all, the serious violations were in the realm of leadership, both civilian and military; and the effects of those violations were progressively more serious in the ascending scale of leadership.

### Munitions

The availability of munitions of war decisively influence the speed of mobilization and the training rate of the armed forces. In a country which maintains minimum armed forces in peacetime and depends upon enlarging them only in an emergency, the rate of production of munitions of war is of transcendent importance. Anything that retards production constitutes a grave danger because under a military policy of expediency it is possible for a country to be defeated before resources in men and munitions can be assembled and joined and trained forces prepared for conflict.

It is worse than useless to mobilize men when arms and supplies are unavailable. In any emergency it is, therefore, of greatest importance that nothing should delay or interfere with the production of essential munitions of war. But many

things did hinder production during the emergency incident to World War II. Among these was an estimated loss of 895,200,000 manhours of labor due to strikes between 1 January 1939 and 31 December 1945 alone. Although admitted that this loss never represented in any one year more than 47 percent of the total working time, it is serious. It is even worse when we take into account numerous slow-downs, upon which there are no statistics, and the shut-downs in other fields that were caused by the strikes. The United States can no longer afford such a squandering of means—our present enemy has narrowed the gap in production too much for that.

### Civil Defense

Civil defense became a political football long before Pearl Harbor. Although little thought was given to Japanese capabilities, a great deal was given to Germany's capabilities. A war psychosis had to be built up in America to sustain the Administration's political aims in the rising tension with Germany. To accomplish this every artifice had to be utilized. A complicated nation-wide civil defense was created under political control and the War Department was prodded into activity in this field. Ultimately, many, many manhours and dollars and considerable material were diverted to this effort and it was not fully abandoned until long after the possibility of an air attack upon this country had disappeared. In fact, the military intelligence agencies were fully cognizant from the beginning that only the airplanes of one crippled and well-guarded German carrier could possibly make an important air raid upon America. Germany had no land-based airplanes that could accomplish more than a nuisance raid upon our country. Consequently, from the moment that Japan lost the ability to launch a carrier attack on the West Coast all civil defense effort should have been

discontinued instantly and the means thus saved diverted to something essential to the national war effort.

And yet at the same time when an air attack upon military installations in the United States had become highly improbable, labor, wealth, and material were expended on camouflage projects. These unwise projects constituted another example of the violation of the *principle of economy of means* because all of these resources should have been diverted to other things really essential to the war effort. It is to the credit of the armed forces that the military aspects of civil defense were practically discontinued after 1942.

### Emergency Projects

When Japan became a positive threat in the Pacific, and particularly after Pearl Harbor, the necessity for developing Alaska as a base became imperative. The Chief of Staff had recognized this possibility and some plans along this line had been made before Japan struck.

In due time the Canadian Oil Project, Alaskan-Canadian Highway and other projects were initiated and pushed with utmost vigor. However, when American naval power had compelled the Japanese to abandon their threat to Alaska and to fall back westward, all work on these expensive projects should have been halted and the labor, wealth, and material thus saved, turned to more important war tasks. But this was not the case and the projects were continued in violation of the *principle of economy of means*.

### Antiaircraft Project

Because of a possible air threat to the United States and of the uncertain air situation in prospective theaters of operations, the War Department established a very ambitious antiaircraft project even before Pearl Harbor. Apparently, however, this program was not adequately co-ordinated with the Air Force plan and with

war plans which contemplated American air supremacy. If successful, these offensive preparations would eventually eliminate the requirement for antiaircraft artillery. Therefore, a secondary artillery and antitank role or a conversion and retraining plan for this arm should have been prepared very early in the war and should have become operative as indicated by the situation. Eventually this was done but probably not in the best possible way. Again this resulted in needless expenditures of labor and resources and represented a violation of the *principle of economy of means*.

In World War II the military intelligence services of the old, established governmental departments of the United States mushroomed quickly into vast agencies. At the same time new intelligence agencies entered the field with powerful political backing. Eventually a constellation of intelligence agencies functioned at or near the top, competing with each other for personnel and money. Jurisdictional competition and jealousies arose. Accordingly, there are many who believe that much effort and wealth were squandered by American intelligence agencies in World War II.

### Service Wastefulness

But even the soldiers in the theaters of operations cannot feel too proud of the way they adhered to the *principle of economy of means*. They were wasteful of rations, of clothing, of ammunition, and of equipment. Too frequently, they thought nothing of losing equipment when, in fact, even a canteen at the end of a 6,000 to 12,000 turn-around-miles from the United States represented a manhour and a monetary value which was hard to determine.

However, wastefulness was not confined to the troops. Numerous "overstuffed" headquarters, abandoned republican simplicity for luxurious living and contributed their bit to the mounting total, making

official admonitions concerning supply economy seem a little ridiculous. This wastefulness in theaters of operations led to a serious drain upon the national economy.

Coming closer to the homeland, however, it might be noted that the principle was violated at every military and naval installation from the simplest to the Pentagon itself. There was a squandering of manhours of labor and resources upon the maintenance of quarters, upon entertainment and clubs, and upon the embellishment of headquarters and offices that represented a squandering of labor and resources on inconsequential activities. These lost means, although trivial as compared with others, could have been better spent on things essential to the prosecution of the war. An austerity program at the rear probably would have been duplicated by American troops everywhere.

### Executive Decision

But the most serious violation of the *principle of economy of means* can be traced to the unilateral decision of the President at Casablanca when he announced to the world that the war aims of the United States were unconditional surrender. This decision made it mandatory that the war be fought to the bitter end with all the attendant losses in men and equipment and in the destruction of the enemy and intervening countries as well.

When at last the enemy was beaten into surrender, allied troops were in a conquered land which they themselves had destroyed and which had to be rebuilt and the population had to be fed largely through American financial and material assistance. In other words, the United States, in addition to its own losses in men and resources, had to contribute enormously to the reconstruction of the very country it had destroyed in carrying out the Casablanca decision—thus con-

stituting a double violation of the *principle of economy of means*.

There is little use of extending the story. Examples can be called to mind by anyone who had the slightest powers of observation during those war years. Violations of the *principle of economy of means* were common at all echelons from the home front to the most distant front-line units, but the disparity in the living conditions at the two poles was far too unfavorable to the men who shared the bleak and bloody comradeship of battle.

### The Future

The United States can never again afford the luxury of such waste. In spite of an enormous productive capacity, it cannot have unlimited quantities of any and every weapon or gadget which may conceivably serve some useful purpose in war. Neither can it afford a wartime economy based on a night club standard of living either in the armed forces or on the home front. The United States must, on the other hand, formulate and keep up-to-date a reasonably accurate strategical concept and concentrate on the development and production of equipment and weapons essential for the successful execution of that concept to the exclusion of the nonessential.

Everyone in America, civilian and soldier alike, must become economy-minded and every useless effort, thing, or adjunct abandoned and ideas leading to extravagance suppressed, if the fundamental institutions of the United States are to survive the next great conflict. Our country can no longer support loose thinking, such as prevailed in relatively high places during World War II, which held that mass production without regard to quality would win. As expressed in one high level conference, "We are not trying to win the war with brains but rather with weight.

We should stop trying to think these problems out and put on the pressure. We are going to smother the enemy to death." This indicates how thoroughly permeated the staff was with profligate extravagance and how little room there was for wisdom, prudence, frugality, and *economy of means* in the government during the last great war. The violations of the *principle of economy of means* that occurred in World War II could have been responsible for our defeat had the balance of power between the Axis and Allies been more closely drawn than it was.

### Dangers Involved

There is a danger in the *principle of economy of means* that should be noted in order that all may understand its correct employment. It is well to remember that war is not an economical business. An overemphasis of economy or a misguided parsimoniousness could even result in the loss of a war with all the calamitous effects that this implies. Those who have witnessed the destruction of a nation have some idea of what the loss of a modern war means, even when the loss is to what one might call an enlightened power. The facts are, however, that the loss of a war can mean enslavement and death to all those not acceptable to the conqueror, even the extinction of whole groups of people and the confiscation of their property by the victor.

When Carthage, for example, lost the Third Punic War to Rome, it disappeared from history as a political entity and the dispossessed Carthaginians disappeared with it. There are forces loose in the world today possessed of all the techniques and power necessary for the extinction of whole peoples and civilizations. The ethical standards of the men commanding these forces are so unenlightened that such a program is possible and even probable,

if the United States should be vanquished.

Another danger to be anticipated is inherent in strategical planning and in preparation for national defense. Inasmuch as strategical plans and preparations for defense are predicated upon assumptions or estimates, it is quite possible that they may ultimately provide additional historical examples of a violation of the *principle of economy of means*. The skill or stupidity and the potentialities of the enemy or potential enemy can never be determined accurately and the most careful estimates can, therefore, be wrong. Nevertheless, overcommitment to one strategic concept or the expenditure of labor and resources on organizations, research, and equipment that later events may prove erroneous, unemployable, ineffective, or inadequate is a danger to be reckoned with by military planners and their civilian superiors.

There has already been too much certainty expressed concerning push button, atomic war by air force enthusiasts and political-minded scientists. If they should be wrong, which is not at all unlikely, their irresponsible statements will not bring them disgrace at the time of failure but the military men—who happen to be in command, whether or not they have followed their lead—alone will bear the consequences.

### Conclusion

So there should be no parsimoniousness in applying the *principle of economy of means*, but a generous individual and collective giving to all that is essential for the development of America's maximum strength. *In order that maximum strength may be attained, however, there must be no waste or nonessential utilization of effort or of resources and the military planners must be reasonably correct in their assumptions and estimates.*



# WATCH YOUR LANGUAGE, SOLDIER

Colonel C. H. Blumenfeld, *General Staff*  
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B911B

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

**W**HEN General Washington issued his anti-cursing order to the Continental Army, he established one of the most fundamental doctrines of the Armed Forces code of conduct. General Washington was no prude. His repugnance to profanity did not outlaw its use in those cases where an expletive of not too vulgar antecedence was indicated; rather, he was concerned with its habitual employment as a normal conversation piece. The order reflected his conviction that the constant use of profanity demonstrated incompetence or, at the least, indifference in relation to the art of proper expression.

The effectiveness of this general order of our first Commander in Chief has been variable, depending from time to time and from unit to unit on the emphasis which commanding officers attach to this problem. All too frequently, commanding officers themselves are the principal violators, considering profane explosiveness to be a soldierly attribute which contributes to the creation of color and legend in which the rank and file are so prone to enshroud the "Old Man."

The dash and elan of General George S. Patton and General Ernie Harmon, for ex-

ample, were by no means lessened by their ability to mouth an oath of appropriate color and selection when the occasion presented itself. Staff officers, with some notable exceptions, do not, as a class, employ this device with the frequency found in field commanders. This is not offered as an apology for the virility of staff officers; it is merely that they are further removed from the receptive audience which a unit commander has available to him at all times. In fact, staff officers, when rotated to command duties during the process of a career management program, usually demonstrate that their fallow years behind a desk have not diminished their ability to readily employ profanity as befits the best hell-for-leather cavalryman of the old school.

This discourse is not intended as a diatribe in favor of profanity. Most of us share General Washington's aversion to indiscriminate profanity, but I must confess that I, personally, would not give two cents for an officer, be he staff or field, "Who wouldn't use strong language when he felt like it." I sincerely believe that the sterility which surrounds the output of some staff officers would be immeasurably lessened if they resorted on occasion to an appropriate expletive of proper radiance. I feel confident that such an outlet might serve to eliminate or certainly minimize the gibberish and jargon which they all too frequently employ in their staff productions.

*The function of a staff officer is, in the final analysis, to serve units in the field. This mission can be accomplished best by couching directives and orders in simple, clear, concise, and understandable language*

### Stultified Staff Style

And this leads to the text for today, "Would that the good and farseeing General Washington had directed his general order rather against the employment by staff officers of the hogwashed gobbledygook which has become the traditional style of the modern United States staff officer." I hold the firm conviction that this evil currently surpasses profanity as a disease in the National Military Establishment.

How often has it been possible to understand what the author was trying to say after the first reading of some lengthy staff study or discussion? Modern staff procedure in these most complicated and difficult times—in this best of all possible worlds as Voltaire's *Pangloss* was wont to announce—calls for the most direct and simple expression that can be employed. The problems themselves are most frustrating to say nothing of the procedural restrictions imposed in the course of completing a staff action. How is it then that we make our work even more frustrating by employing the most stultified and artificial language that man has ever devised? I dare say that one cannot read through any staff document currently circulating through a headquarters without running across at least 2 "cognizances," 3 "resultants," and 4 "consonances." I understand we are indebted to the Navy for "cognizance," just as during the late World War II we, in the United Kingdom, were indebted to the British for "implementation."

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*He served in the Quartermaster Corps from 1949 to 1950. Colonel Blumenfeld is presently serving as Chief, Operations Branch, G4, Logistics, Headquarters United States Army, Europe.*

### An Example

In reading the introduction to a staff document it is not unusual to uncover such profound pronouncements as:

The significance of the assigned responsibility areas by no means militates against the cognizance imposed under the general framework of this command's terms of reference. Therefore, as a point of departure, and mindful of the implicit caveats inherent within this study itself, it is evident that the implementation of the basic concept motivating this headquarter's course of action must be retributively observed at the outset in delimiting the ramifications attendant upon the attainment of any finite conclusive position correlated uniservice-wise. In consonance with and by no means antithetical to the prescribed course which initially suggests itself as the least infeasible action, there must be borne in mind that the explicit objective of the current mission encompasses and presupposes a unified and co-ordinated supporting approach; this is so in order that the entire matter can be synchronized in terms of absolute synthesis lest the overriding precept attainable during such an exploratory exercise denies the resultant fulfillment in all its conglomerate portents.

The fundamental flat motivating documents of this character prevents further amplification; however, TAB A is appended hereto for a more complete exposition of the introductory background essential to the comprehension of this deliberately brief preliminary announcement.

Admittedly the example is an exaggeration but there have been passages contained in official documents which do almost as much violence to the English language. The style in many of these documents indicates that no human being—not even a staff officer—could originally compose such a mess of gibberish and rot without a studied effort. Perhaps what the author does is to write the original draft in simple, straightforward English and then translate it into this so-called literary staff style. Unfortunately the product is three degrees below the sophomore level. There can certainly be no objection or criticism to original style but the primary object in staff studies and communications of all types must continue to be brevity and clarity.

There is nothing of originality or style in a ponderous exposition which borrows



every hackneyed and stultified expression from prior documents in the same insidious manner in which chain letters are routed about. Most staff problems currently faced in military headquarters are sufficiently complicated in terms of substance without the additional complication achieved by employing, in all too bad text, a repetition of meaningless phrases and multisyllabled words.

Perhaps staff officers cloak their work in the mumbo-jumbo in an effort to convince their more earthy comrades in the field that staff duty is a highly complicated and mysterious profession; much in the way a physician prepares a prescription, since apparently a doctor's professional stature is presumed to be in direct proportion to his illegibility. If this be the motivating influence, it is well for staff officers to undeceive themselves. Most officers, by the time they attain command of a battalion, have already served their staff apprenticeship and have been selected for command assignment largely on the basis of the successful accomplishment of staff duties elsewhere. Moreover, nothing is more irritating to a field commander, engrossed in his day-to-day problems and responsibilities which are infinitely more real and pressing than those of most staff officers, than to receive some cumbersome directive or staff edict written in this artificial staff style.

Staff officers and the functions they discharge are designed in the final analysis to serve the field units and to facilitate their work. The best way to achieve that objective is to spare them the frustration which the reading of cumbersome and ponderous orders and staff pronouncements creates.

#### Literary Achievement?

It is of course very popular these days to fancy oneself a facile man of letters and to visualize each staff document as a masterpiece, not only of substance and

logic but of literary achievement. Now that Sir Winston Churchill has been deservedly selected as the Nobel Prize winner—partially on the basis of his inspirational speeches and writings while wartime Prime Minister of Great Britain—it is disquieting to consider how the present-day staff gibberish may rise to even more superlative levels as each action officer contributes his own *bon mots* to military literature.

The unfortunate conclusion remains that most of us are imitative little beasts. We have neither the aptitude nor the courage to express ourselves clearly and simply.

We fabricate our writings and declamations by borrowing—usually with poor taste and with an even poorer regard to the resulting style—every shopworn cliché to which we have been exposed.

When the present Duke of Windsor abdicated his throne some years ago, his retirement announcement broadcast personally over a world-wide network contained the unusual expression, "At long last." The phrase struck me as very appropriate and well suited euphonically to the Oxford accent of the retiring king. While new to me at that time, I am sure I would be a millionaire today if I had one dollar for every public address I have heard since that time which has included at least one, "At long last . . ."

President Roosevelt—who was a master of the well-turned phrase—made popular such expressions as "Death and destruction," and "The destiny of the common people." These and others which the president used were ideally suited to his style, his perfect diction, and elocution. He also made superlative use of many other devices of alliteration and onomatopoeia. It does not follow, however, that such expressions are suitable in a staff paper. If an officer were to prepare a staff study considering, for example, the subject of support responsibility in the Paris Metro-

politan Area, it would be nothing less than absurd for him to conclude, "At long last the decision must be reached that mindful of the death and destruction implicit in the destiny of the common people, the Army should take over the responsibility for service support in Paris." The nursery rhyme might just as well read, "Hickory, dickory, dock, at long last the mouse ran up the clock; the clock struck one and down he run, thereby avoiding death and destruction to the common destiny of fellow mice, hickory, dickory, dock."

I am reasonably confident that I will never fill the exalted position of Chief of

Staff of the United States Army and I will, therefore, never have the opportunity which presented itself to the peerless General Washington. Were I ever to attain that rank, however, one of my first acts would be in emulation of the distinguished Father of Our Country. My first general order would provide in clear, unequivocal terms that staff language will henceforth be couched in basic English; that multisyllabled jargon will have no place in military conversation or writing, and that officers who employ it will, like Abou Ben Adam, head the list—for departure from the Army.

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## NEXT MONTH

The March issue of the MILITARY REVIEW will feature the article *A Solution to the Infantry Replacement Problem* by members of the Staff and Faculty of the Command and General Staff College. The authors of the article point out the deficiencies, weaknesses, and inadequacies of our present system and offer, as an alternative, a combination of both an individual and unit replacement system.

*Asiatic Pivot*, from the "Australian Army Journal," will be included in the Foreign Military Digests section of the magazine. While operations being conducted in Malaya can be considered little more than a police action in comparison with those conducted in Korea and Indochina, the outcome is of greatest importance not only to the security of the British Commonwealth and to the British situation in Asia, but to the influence of the West upon the Asiatic peoples. The author discusses the rapid spread of communism in Asia during the past 7 years and also the fact that the main resistance to the pressure of communism stems from the British presence in Malaya, Borneo, and Hong Kong, and the French in Indochina. The author emphasizes the importance of Malaya and what its loss could mean.

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# Evaluating the Military Instructor

First Lieutenant Carl M. Guelzo, *Transportation Corps*

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

**H**OW good a job does the military instructor do?

No matter what the teaching situation may be, whether it be from a platform before a group of advanced officer students, or from a tree stump before a platoon of basic trainees, an evaluation of the performance of the instructor has always been of importance. An instrument or procedure to produce the evaluation needed has been sought by military and civilian schoolmen alike with but meager success. The observer report described in this article, while not the precision device desired, may serve to help in filling the gap between no evaluation at all and the detailed measurement which is still unobtainable.

An instructor may be evaluated in any one of at least three ways. Each separate basis requires a different measuring instrument.

First of all, an instructor may be evaluated on the basis of his personality. The task of compiling a list of attributes—both personal and professional—considered desirable and essential in the competent instructor is not impossibly difficult. However, experience has shown

the work to be of little value, since no way yet exists of determining the precise relationship between these attributes and student performance.

## Measurement Methods

Measurement of the end product may be used in evaluating an instructor. The simple expedient of giving a survey test at the beginning of a course of instruction and a comprehensive examination at the end would serve as an indication of the improvement made by students during the course. However, no method is yet known of determining how much of the improvement was due to the efforts of the instructor and how much may be attributed to such exterior influences as the general environment of the school, out-of-school activities, and general background, experience, and aptitude of the student. The common practice of having classes meet with many different instructors during the course of a single day makes even more difficult the task of evaluating the influence on student improvement of a single teacher.

## Observing Performance

It would appear that more significant results will be obtained by using a third method of evaluation: that of observing actual performance. Unfortunately, no significant statistical correlation can be obtained between student achievement and the best-known measures of instructor ac-

*A generalized approach to evaluating the worth of a military instructor appears to be the most valid approach available when it is used with caution by persons aware of the subjectivity of their own evaluations*

tivity; but emphasizing the *instructor* by evaluating his performance seems more productive of potential results than attempting an evaluation of the *instruction* by long and involved tests and statistical procedures.

Admittedly, rating scales, because of the impossibility of obtaining a truly objective evaluation, have been suspect in the past when used in an attempt to obtain absolute ratings. However, in the use of the observer report described herein I should like to make a distinction between *rating* and *evaluation*. In the use of an instrument, such as an observer report, the term "rating" implies a detailed, discrete classification of the instructor against an absolute or relative scale. In view of the many defects in scales, an attempt at such a rating is highly inadvisable. Instead, an "evaluation," implying an appraisal of the entire performance of the instructor, is more nearly possible of achievement.

Even in seeking an appraisal of the over-all performance of the instructor, the observer report is essentially an aid in calling the attention of the observer to some of the desirable characteristics of an instructor and channelizing his thinking toward those indications commonly accepted as either essential or highly desirable in the successful teacher. No such report can be accepted entirely at face value simply because it is neither an exhaustive list—which would make use of the form complex and unwieldy—nor a means of producing a precise rating.

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*Lieutenant Carl M. Guelzo served as an enlisted man in World War II. He later attended the University of Pennsylvania and graduated with a degree in Business Education.*

*He was recalled to active duty as a first lieutenant and attended the Artillery School. He served with the 3d Infantry Division in Korea, and the 2d T Major Port in the Far East. Lieutenant Guelzo is educational advisor in the Technical Training Department of the Transportation School.*

### The Danger

The use of this or any such report should be approached with critical caution because so much of the evaluator himself appears in the appraisals. The cruder a tool, the more skill required in making effective use of it; and the less skilled the observer in ferreting out those attributes which contribute to an effective instructor, the more minute must be the descriptions on the report. However, a blank form can go just so far before some balance must be sought between a conveniently usable instrument and a hopelessly long list of adjectives. The opinion, then, of the evaluator is almost as important as the report itself.

Even the use of an observer report simply as a guide to evaluation has its pitfalls. The evaluator is strongly influenced by what he considers important in an instructor or a presentation, or in what he considers relevant in a particular situation. Brilliantly polished shoes or a blown fuse, yet unreplaced by Post Engineers, that prevents showing of a training film will vary in importance between observers. Just exactly what an observer will look for as vitally important is almost impossible to predict in every situation; a report form can only point the approximate way. However, in the absence of any better instrument of measurement, the observer report can be of considerable value in giving an over-all appraisal.

### Over-all Performance

Emphasis, I believe, is far better placed on over-all performance rather than on mere mastery of platform techniques. Mechanical procedures are easily measured but really indicate little more than an ability to follow the letter of the rulebook while permitting the spirit to wither and die. In striving for an appraisal rather than a rating, I have avoided the use of point scores. The temptation is great to assign point values to each attribute and

## OBSERVER REPORT

Instructor				DATE	
Subject			Subject code		TIME
	Item	Ex	S	U	Remarks
General	Voice: weak—clear—confident—loud				
	Enthusiasm for subject				
	Enthusiasm for job				
	Bearing and gestures				
	General appearance				
	Eye contact				
Presentation	Introduction				
	Clarity of presentation				
	Use of blackboard				
	Use of training aids				
	Logical sequence				
	Smoothness of presentation				
Class	Summary				
	Attitude of instructor: rude—positive— hesitant—unsure—hostile—firm— confident—impatient				
	Attitude of class: negative—bored— hostile—interested				
	Timing of lesson				
	Response of class: frivolous—serious— no response				
	Questions by instructor to determine extent of learning				
	Adequacy of presentation				
	Adherence to lesson plan				
Over-all Observer Evaluation					
Evaluation	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. One of the best instructors I have ever observed. <input type="checkbox"/> 2. An excellent instructor thoroughly grounded in his subject and teaching methods. <input type="checkbox"/> 3. A competent instructor. <input type="checkbox"/> 4. A fair instructor capable of a satisfactory performance. <input type="checkbox"/> 5. A poor instructor whose performance leaves much to be desired. <input type="checkbox"/> 6. An inadequate instructor unfit for teaching duties.				
	Comments				
Classroom was adequate		Printed name and grade		Signature	
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No					

thereby arrive at a numerical rating by a simple process of multiplication and addition; but a procedure thus followed implies a set quantity of ability for each measurable level of performance. I do not believe human behavior can be either measured or categorized quite that finely.

To make the descriptions more meaningful while skirting the dangers of distinctions too finely drawn, certain adjectives of generally accepted definition—to ensure, as far as possible, uniform interpretations—have been added to various items on the report. Adjectives considered appropriate are circled or underlined as the form is filled out. Recognizing the fact that evaluations of human behavior by other humans will be highly subjective in nature, no discrete “rating” is assigned to an item. Rather, the following generalized appraisals are recommended:

*Excellent*: the trait or attribute is present to such an unusually high degree that the lesson is eminently successful.

*Satisfactory*: the trait or attribute is present to such a degree that the presentation at least satisfactorily achieves the lesson objectives.

*Unsatisfactory*: the trait or attribute is lacking to such a degree that the presentation might fail to achieve the lesson objectives or learning may be seriously impeded.

#### Point Scale Undesirable

A strict point scale is particularly undesirable as an instrument of evaluation because an instructor's performance may show up very poorly as he violates many of the commonly accepted procedures considered essential in the military instructor, but still manages to turn in a highly respectable over-all performance. Even on the generalized scale described above, individual shortcomings in various mechanical procedures may be indicated for what proves to be a highly superior over-all performance.

To offset misinterpretations that may result from itemized evaluations, an over-all evaluation has been included. Here the excellent job will be recognized in spite of the mechanical failures in platform technique. The correlation between the itemized and over-all evaluations probably will not and really need not be especially high. We are, after all, seeking to build as complete a picture as possible of the individual on the platform as an instructor without regard to those elements which may have little or no bearing on his performance. For this reason, no attempt is made to evaluate the detailed appearance of either class or instructor, or the purely physical or janitorial aspects of the learning situation.

#### Qualifications versus Conditions

The observer report described herein attempts to separate the qualifications of the instructor as a teacher from other conditions over which he may have little or no control. The cleanliness, lighting, or ventilation of the classroom are important; but, since they are not indices to the quality of the performance of the instructor while before his class, have been omitted except for a single general statement of adequacy at the bottom of the form. This statement is not a part of the over-all evaluation and is even a more subjective statement of opinion than any other item on the report.

Characteristics of good instruction which are only occasionally applicable are also omitted. The adequacy of practical exercises in the classroom is almost impossible to evaluate because of the highly individual nature of the work between instructor and student, and is omitted. Once numerous exceptions must be made on the form, it becomes more difficult to use and less a true measure of what is intended. Adequacy of the report is no less important than simplicity and ease of usage, because the observer should be

free to devote the greater part of his attention to the instructor and less to what his pencil is or should be doing.

The number assigned to each of the six statements in the over-all evaluation section should not be interpreted as point ratings. Numerals are used simply as a convenience in referring to specific statements and, because of the lack of correlation between individual item evaluations and the over-all appraisal, cannot with justification be used to describe the level of ability of an instructor. For example: An instructor is never regarded as "worth a 3," but rather is considered competent. Use of these numbers as ratings re-creates all the errors of thinking and all the inequalities that accompany attempts to segregate humans into neatly labeled bins. It is fallacious reasoning of a most dangerous and insidious order that implies successful classification of instructors on the basis of the many intangibles inherent in a teaching situation. Rating scales that attempt to assign scores or "points" as indices of instructional proficiency are quite properly regarded with a considerable degree of suspicion among instructors, and their teaching loses thereby.

Supervision of instruction, however, can-

not be regarded merely as a means of appraising instructors, but is also a highly useful tool in the improvement of instruction.

Observing is a useful activity in improving the instructional ability of both the instructor on the platform and the monitoring personnel because of the insights given in improving and correcting personal techniques.

The observer report is an aid to the supervisor in critiquing individual performance and should be discussed with the instructor as soon after the class period as possible.

The value of the critique in correcting specific faults decreases as the impressions recorded on the observer report grow cold.

### Conclusion

The generalized approach to evaluation outlined here, using a report form as an aid, seems to be the most valid approach available until something better comes along. Used with caution by persons aware of the subjectivity of their own evaluations, some index of the need for improvement and the value and the worth of the job done by each individual instructor may be secured.

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To give an impression of strength, an officer must consider his personal appearance, his physical condition, his tone of voice, his method of life—all of which give an impression of his character to the soldier. This does not mean the development of an artificial personality.

*Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor*



# BEAR FACTS

Colonel John A. Gavin, *Infantry*  
G1 Academic Staff, Command and General Staff College

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

THE author must admit candidly that the title of this article is a "steal." It was the name of the regimental newspaper of the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division—the regiment which it was the author's privilege and honor to command in Korea during late winter and spring of 1950-51. The story which follows concerns itself with the problems relating to the rehabilitation of that fine regiment which had been through *hell*—a story concerning an incident in the history of the only regiment in the United States Army which has never set foot on United States soil and which received its nickname—The Polar Bears—for its achievements in Siberia following World War I.

Had it not been for the selfless assistance rendered to the author by his staff, commanders, and key noncommissioned officers at all levels this story would never be told. The assistance cannot be over-emphasized, because if it were not for the wholehearted loyal support received, the job could not have been accomplished successfully in so short a time.

## Chosin

The author came into the picture suddenly and unexpectedly. He had returned to his billet in Japan on the night of 4 December 1950, to find a note under his door which read: "Call G1 Section, GHQ,

at once." Upon making that call, he was instructed to take the courier plane to Headquarters X Corps, Hamhung, Korea, at 0600 on the following morning for assignment as a regimental commander. Following his arrival, and after being interviewed by the Commanding General, X Corps and the Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, assignment orders were published assigning him as the Commanding Officer of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Division. He was told that his predecessor was *missing in action* in the fighting against the Chinese Communists at Chosin Reservoir. He had been a fine soldier and a gallant leader. This fact is attested to by the commendations from the corps and division commanders concerning the action of the 31st Regimental Combat Team at Chosin which he had so ably commanded (see Page 21).

## Orientation

Upon my arrival at the command post of Headquarters 7th Division in the vicinity of Hamhung, Korea—at about 2000 on the night of 5 December 1950—I received my first orientation on the status of the 31st Infantry. The facts presented to me were as follows: the 1st Battalion was attached to the 17th Infantry and was working its way south along the east coast of Korea from the vicinity of the Yalu River to Hamhung. This battalion was due to arrive in Hamhung within the next 2 or 3 days. The remainder of the regiment, less small elements of the headquarters and service companies, had been attached to the 1st Marine Division at Chosin Reservoir and were fighting their way



back to the Hamhung area. All elements of the regiment contained approximately 50 percent Republic of Korea personnel. The division commander, with deep emotion, told me that the 3d Battalion had suffered severe casualties and that the 2d Battalion also had been hit quite hard in the fighting at Chosin. My initial job was to receive the outfit as it came "off the hill," and to rehabilitate it just as quickly as possible. At that time the decision to evacuate the Hamhung perimeter had not yet been announced. Accordingly, it was expected that the rehabilitation would take place in the vicinity of Hamhung. As I recall, we did not learn of the planned evacuation until about 9 December.

Early the next morning I sent for the regimental executive officer who had assembled small elements of the regimental headquarters and service companies in the Hamhung area. On his own initiative he had set up a receiving center to take care of any of the men wearing the 7th Division patch who arrived from the Chosin Reservoir area. He had established a tent camp, set up two or three kitchens, and was prepared to feed any or all elements of the division as they arrived in the Hamhung area. This temporary establishment served a most useful purpose and was commented on most favorably by all elements of the division which made use of it. That same morning we visited the area selected previously by my executive

for shelter. These buildings were badly battered with windows shot out, and with no heating facilities. However, it did present possibilities and it became our job to prepare it to take care of the regimental units as they arrived in the area. Later during that same day arrangements were made to move the headquarters and service elements from their temporary camp area to the new area which had been selected.

It was now time to take stock and find out what was needed to make the troops as comfortable as possible under prevailing conditions. Over half of the men available at this time were needed to provide a 24-hour perimeter guard of the new regimental area. The remainder of the men, under officer supervision and reinforced by local civilian labor, were utilized to clean up the area. This job in the main consisted of nailing boards across windows to keep out the cold air, sweeping out the accumulated trash, and securing stoves (at that time we did not have the gasoline stoves we received later) and the multitudinous other details concerned with preparing the building area proper.

A borrowed bulldozer leveled two rice paddies for tent camps. Each individual tackled his assigned task with determination because all concerned wanted to make the site selected as comfortable as possible for the men who had been subjected to bitter fighting. While these housekeep-

***The tasks involved in reorganizing and re-equipping a unit which has been heavily engaged in a retrograde movement over an extended period must of necessity include instilling a renewal of confidence in its members***

officer for billeting the entire regiment. By United States standards the area was not suitable, but, by Korean standards, it did meet minimum essential requirements. It was an area adjacent to a Korean village which had several small buildings which could be used by troops

ing functions were being accomplished, consultations were held with various members of the division staff in an attempt to do everything possible in the interests of the comfort of the men coming "off the hill." The S4 was put to work trying to locate blankets, warm clothing, individual

mess gear, post exchange supplies, letter writing supplies—at a premium at that time—razors, and sufficient mess equipment to enable us to feed the regiment when it arrived in the area. Recognizing the fact that the bulk of the regiment had been engaged in severe continuous combat for over 2 weeks, fighting a retrograde action, we knew that all nonessential, individual and organizational equipment would have been cast aside and that it would have to be replaced. We also knew that the men had not had an opportunity for a bath in more than a month, and that for the past 2 weeks they had merely existed and fought on the rations and ammunition that were air dropped to them.

We were successful in locating a bath unit in the area and arranged to have priority for its use by our men when they arrived. The two things which were given top priority were hot meals and sleeping accommodations ready for the men when they arrived. We pointed our efforts in that direction and were finally able to locate some extra blankets and battered-up stoves that were needed so badly. It was foreseen that most of the mess gear would have been discarded prior to their arrival in the new area and that the men would possibly have little equipment left with which to eat. Accordingly, the problem presented itself of trying to locate sufficient mess gear and canteen cups to feed the troops a hot meal. Somehow, somehow, the S4 section solved this problem.

*Colonel John A. Gavin is the author of "Reflections of a G1" which appeared in the July 1953 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.*

*During World War II he served as Commanding Officer, Harmon Field, Newfoundland; Assistant G3, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and as Executive Officer, G3 Section, Headquarters, Europe. He served in various capacities in the Far East Command from 1950 until 1951. Upon his return to this country, he attended the Army War College, and is now serving as G1 Academic Staff, Command and General Staff College.*

The assistant S4 performed miracles in those early days which I will never forget and will be ever appreciative of.

As the division commander had predicted, the 1st Battalion arrived in the Hamhung area about 8 December. They arrived sometime in the middle of the night. As soon as this outfit was nearing camp, I hopped in my jeep and went out to meet them and lead them back to camp. In the meantime the executive officer arranged to have a hot meal prepared and means available to bed them down for the night in reasonable comfort. This unit had had a hard rough trip coming down from the Yalu River. The battalion was in very good shape although many were suffering from exposure to the subzero weather. At least this element of my command had all of its weapons and most of its personnel. The frostbite cases were taken care of promptly and sent to the hospital. A medical inspection of every man was conducted during the following day by the battalion and regimental surgeons to determine whether medical care was needed to take care of any frozen limbs.

The men of this battalion were processed through our improvised processing center also. This installation consisted of a series of tents where units of company size were taken to be re-equipped to the greatest extent possible; to receive post exchange supplies, clean clothing and extra blankets; and then proceeded to the bath unit for a much deserved shower.

The 1st Battalion arrived in the area at a propitious time. It provided the regiment with more working people who were able to prepare the remainder of the regimental area within a very short time. This pool of personnel was short-lived however, as within 2 days, the unit was given an operational mission in connection with the defense of the Hungnam Perimeter, which now is history. This was the only element of the regiment so committed.

HEADQUARTERS  
X Corps  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 909

AG 200.6 (23 Dec 50)

23 December 1950

SUBJECT: Action of 31st RCT in the Chosin Reservoir Area

TO: Commanding General  
7th Infantry Division  
APO 7

By their gallant and heroic actions in the Chosin Reservoir area from 28 November through 10 December 1950, the men and officers of the 31st RCT with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry attached, have merited the admiration and appreciation of the United Nations Forces in Korea, and in particular, of the X Corps and myself.

With an undaunted spirit and the will to win, these men fought ceaselessly in the face of overwhelming forces, sub-zero weather and rugged mountainous terrain. Although isolated and cut off from normal logistical support, and suffering cruel losses, they regrouped and reorganized successfully on the east side of Chosin Reservoir. Then, after fighting their way back to the Hagaru-ri area, these men of the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry and 57th FA Battalion were still able to form the left column in the attack south to Koto-ri. Here, joined by the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, they continued in a stubborn rear guard action until the column was safely withdrawn within the X Corps perimeter. In these twelve days of continuous combat, there has been eloquently written a record of courage and devotion to duty that established an example for military men for the years to come.

X Corps is honored to have had this gallant regiment as a part of its fighting team. I have the highest praise for these officers and men of your command.

/s/ Edward M. Almond  
EDWARD M. ALMOND  
Major General, United States Army  
Commanding

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Action of 31st RCT in the Chosin Reservoir Area

HEADQUARTERS, 7th INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 7, 30 December 1950

TO: Commanding General, 7th Division Artillery, APO 7  
Commanding Officer, 31st Infantry, APO 7  
Commanding Officer, 32d Infantry, APO 7

1. I am honored to pass on to you these words of praise from the Corps Commander which you so richly deserve. In addition I wish to pay tribute to the officers and men of Company B, 31st Infantry for their gallant action in the vicinity of Koto-ri during the same period, where together with a company of Royal British Marines, they successfully fought off the attacks of the enemy and succeeded in joining up with the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry.

2. Such actions as those displayed by the officers and men of all participating units are in keeping with the traditional fighting spirit of the division and the examples of courage and spirit can be looked upon with pride by all members of this command.

/s/ David G. Barr  
DAVID G. BARR  
Maj Gen, USA  
Commanding

### The Job Ahead

At about this time we began to formulate the general plan for rehabilitation of the regiment. It was known that the 1st Battalion was roughly at full strength, the 2d Battalion had suffered moderate casualties and that the 3d Battalion had suffered very heavy casualties. Reports further indicated that only about half of my regimental staff was present for duty and that the headquarters and service companies were seriously depleted. The regimental tank and heavy mortar companies were in fair shape. Another big loss was the regimental files and records which had to be destroyed in the area of Chosin Reservoir. The losses in authorized equipment were startling, and roughly compared—percentage-wise—with the personnel losses suffered. After evaluating all of these factors, a plan of action to rehabilitate the 31st Infantry was formulated.

In determining the best course of action to adopt in rehabilitating the 31st Infantry, consideration was given to rebuilding all elements of the regiment utilizing the personnel remaining in units as a basis for expansion.

Another idea was to keep the 1st Battalion at full strength as a fighting unit, and to equalize the strength of the 2d and 3d Battalions by redistributing the remaining personnel of these units "across the board," so to speak, and to build up these battalions to full strength.

The remaining course of action considered equalizing the strength of all units throughout the entire regiment by a reassignment of all combat experienced personnel remaining in the 31st Infantry—both officer and enlisted—and then rebuilding all units back to table of organization and equipment strength.

It was my decision to adopt the last course of action. I did not want the 3d Battalion to be known as "the late 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry." It was consid-

ered only fair to spread the wealth of combat experience and to give every unit of the regiment its fair share of the combat experienced personnel who were available. This action worked out well as will be discussed in more detail later in this article. Of no small import also was the challenging need to re-establish a regimental staff and the regimental headquarters and service companies. It was necessary to obtain the needed key personnel from the battalions.

It was decided to adopt a similar line of action in respect to the redistribution of authorized equipment. It was realized that all requisitions for shortages could not be filled overnight and that in retraining the battered elements of the 31st Infantry, it would be necessary to provide each of them with a fair share of the equipment that was then available in the regiment. This applied in respect to all types of equipment such as signal, ordnance, quartermaster, and the other critical items needed to support the regiment.

In brief, the job ahead consisted of rehabilitating, reorganizing, retraining, re-equipping, and instilling a renewal of confidence throughout the command.

### Home

Although careful plans had been laid to meet the 2d and 3d Battalions when they arrived in the Hamhung area, they did not materialize. These elements of the 31st Infantry were inadvertently sent to the assembly area of the 1st Marine Division. It was necessary for the 31st Infantry representative there to divert the column and send it to the regimental assembly area. As the communications were out, this word could not be passed on to us at the command post. Hence, during the evening of 11 December 1950, the leading elements of these two battalions began to arrive in the regimental area unannounced. It did not catch us entirely unprepared, however, as all the stoves had

been laid for firing and food was available in all company kitchens ready to feed the units when they arrived. We turned everybody out, got them busy lighting fires and preparing the food post haste. Truckload after truckload of men began to arrive within the area.

Never in my life will I forget that night. Never before has any infantry officer ever felt so humble and yet so proud in meeting his newly assigned combat soldiers for the first time. By God they *were soldiers*, every inch of them—American soldiers, combat infantrymen. Picture, if you will, groups of soldiers stumbling into a mess tent in the middle of the night—half frozen, glassy-eyed with fatigue, filthy dirty, unshaven for 2 or 3 weeks—and about to receive their first hot meal in all that length of time. These men had been surrounded by the Chinese; with the odds against them sometimes as high as 20 to 1, had fought their way out of a tough situation in weather from 25 to 30 degrees below zero, over some of the roughest terrain in the world, and with the determination befitting the typical American soldier, had made their way back “home.” Home in this case, was their regiment. I have never observed such a spectacle and have never felt so proud as I did that night realizing that these were the soldiers of my command.

Despite their condition, on being fed the hot B ration and hot coffee, they were able even to smile. I talked with many of them and told them how glad I was to see them and that they had come through safely. Invariably they would look at me and say, “Colonel, we’re damned glad to get back.” There was not much talking and their faces reflected the hard times they had been through for the past 2 weeks. They were utterly exhausted. After eating, guides were appointed to lead them to either heated buildings or tents where they could sleep the clock around if they

wanted to. No reveille formations were held for the first 2 days.

The commanding officer of the 3d Battalion had been evacuated directly to Japan from Chosin as a casualty. The regimental S3 had assumed command of his unit. The Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion arrived with his battalion but he had to be evacuated medically within 2 weeks. This posed another problem—to find suitable replacements for these key jobs. This was resolved finally by an intra-regimental transfer and by securing the services of a young, outstanding officer from the division staff.

On the morning of 12 December, the division commander visited the regimental command post and went with me from billet to billet to talk to the men of his division. The “Old Man”—and I say that respectfully—told the men how proud he was of them. He told them they deserved to be at the Waldorf-Astoria instead of in these ill-heated buildings in Korea. He said that we would do everything possible to make them comfortable and to get them back on their feet. He talked of their bravery, of their individual deeds, of their spirit and fight in being able to overcome overwhelming odds and make their way back to the Hamhung perimeter. His voice broke as he spoke—he was a commander loved by all.

#### Evacuation From Hungnam

Immediately prior to the arrival of the 2d and 3d Battalions in the regimental area, the regiment had been informed of the planned evacuation from Hungnam. It had been indicated that the following units would receive high priority for this evacuation: 31st Infantry (less 1st Battalion); 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry; and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion. These units were the ones which had been engaged in the fighting at Chosin Reservoir, and were slated for rehabilitation. In view of the early move, it was stipulated that

major shortages in equipment and personnel would not be made up until after our arrival in the Pusan area. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry was designated as part of the Hamhung defense perimeter force and remained behind under division control. Accordingly, preparations for the evacuation had to be initiated prior to the arrival in the regimental area of the 2d and 3d Battalions. The assigned mission was a dual one—to rehabilitate the units coming “off the hill” insofar as possible and, concurrently, to prepare for the evacuation from Hungnam. It would be an understatement to say that this was a busy period for all concerned. On 12 and 13 December, the following were the principal activities of the 31st Infantry:

1. A limited issue of individual equipment and warm clothing, exchange supplies, and “A” bags (which had been sent for prior to the arrival of the units) to the 2d and 3d Battalions.

2. The scheduled use of the bath unit by the 2d and 3d Battalions.

3. Medical inspection of all personnel of the 2d and 3d Battalions.

4. Continued packing and crating in preparation for evacuation from Hungnam.

5. A re-sorting of personnel to parent units and designating cadres for units of the 3d Battalion.

6. The dispatch of an advance party by air from the airfield at Hungnam to Pusan.

7. The breaking up of camp and the move to the dock area at Hungnam.

In retrospect, it turned out for the best that these men had to be kept extremely busy during this period. It assisted in helping them forget—at least for a short time—the experience that most of them had had at Chosin.

During this period there was a terrific let down in supply discipline. The men had developed “battle habits” which

needed prompt correction. On one occasion I observed a noncommissioned officer throwing blankets and individual equipment on a huge bonfire that was burning in the area. In the process of “raising hell” with this particular sergeant, I realized that he did not appreciate fully what he was doing inasmuch as this type of incident occurred many times over up north where equipment and supplies had to be destroyed to avoid falling into enemy hands.

### *Hungnam to Pusan*

On 13 December 1950, the 31st Infantry was notified that it would proceed on the following day to the dock area at Hungnam for evacuation to Pusan. This move was made without incident. From the dock area the regiment was moved via various small shipping such as LCVP, LCU, LST, and DUKW to the navy transport awaiting us in the harbor. The sea was rough, and considerable difficulty was experienced in completing the movement to the transport because of the heavy sea which caused small craft at shipside to rise and fall 15 to 20 feet. It meant that all men had to exercise due caution in climbing up the rope ladders to avoid falling into the sea or being crushed between ships. Because of the crowded conditions, men had to sleep in three shifts which was known as “hot bunking.” However, they were very happy to receive the hot A rations provided by the Navy and there were no complaints registered throughout the voyage.

### *Hungnam to Yongchon*

We set sail from the harbor of Hungnam on the morning of 15 December 1950, arriving at Pusan approximately 24 hours later. On arrival, information was given to us to the effect that further movement to the north would be delayed for at least 24 hours. Every available train was being used to assist in moving troops and sup-



plies of the 1st Marine Division which had arrived ahead of the 31st RCT.

On 17 or 18 December, arrangements were finally completed and the 31st RCT (less the 1st Battalion and the regimental tank company) departed the Pusan area and headed for a town named Yongchon, about 25 miles east of Taegu. It was decided to leave the tank company in Pusan for approximately 1 week so that it could receive needed maintenance in the ordnance shops that were available in that area.

The train trip seemed long and tedious, as we had to move at a very slow rate of speed over a considerable distance in unheated cars. On arrival at the railroad station at Yongchon, we were met by the advance party and oriented concerning the area selected for the regiment to occupy. Unit commanders were instructed to have their executive officers move their units out on foot after being fed. My executive officer, battalion commanders, and S3 accompanied me to the new regimental area. Battalion areas were selected which could be rather easily defended and which offered nearby training facilities for small unit training. Buildings were made available for headquarters installations, but instructions were issued to the effect that units would go under canvas.

#### Yongchon Area Problems

For the first 24 hours all units were kept busy getting shaken down in the new area and getting started cleaning up, both from an individual and unit viewpoint. My newly appointed S3 published a training schedule which accentuated the following: advanced individual training, small unit training, firing of all infantry weapons, and strong emphasis on disciplinary subjects.

On the evening of the second day I called my first commander's meeting. Prior to scheduling this meeting I gave it considerable thought. I tried to place myself

in the role of one of these commanders who had just recently returned from Chosin and was to meet officially his newly appointed commander for the first time—a commander who had “not been there.” It seemed to me that a challenge of sorts was present and that discretion should be employed in what was said and in how it was said. It was not that I had any reservations about the subject matter to be covered, but I definitely wanted my subordinate commanders to be on my side and not cause them to adopt an antagonistic attitude toward me by an ill-considered comment or two. Inasmuch as many of the commanders, and in fact many of my staff, were new in their assigned roles, it was my thought that the remarks should include my personal views on the responsibilities of commanders, noncommissioned officers, and staff officers. The meeting was opened by paying personal tribute to the accomplishments of the regiment in the fighting of Chosin Reservoir and to the individual accomplishments of all personnel who were present at the meeting. I told them that I thought they had done a tremendous job under most difficult and trying circumstances. Emphasis was placed on the *esprit* of the 31st Infantry as it had been demonstrated in the combat actions of the past few weeks. Recognition was then directed to the magnitude of the tasks ahead of us.

It was made perfectly clear that it was my personal view that none of the tasks were insurmountable and that there was no problem facing us that could not be accomplished by good hard work on the part of all concerned. I told my commanders that I expected their loyalty and wholehearted co-operation and that I had utmost faith and confidence in their ability to get the job done. I gave them my promise of unqualified support. With this introduction, the meeting was conducted, the high lights of which follow.

First of all, a summary was given of

the problems which the regiment must solve within the next 2 weeks. These were:

1. Administrative problems. The regimental adjutant and commanders were told to get busy immediately and prepare all recommendations for awards and decorations for deserving individuals. Comment was made on the prompt verification and submission of casualty reports and letters of condolence.

2. Clean-up period. Instructions were issued that all men would be cleaned-up and made to feel like human beings again. The proper care and cleaning of individual equipment and weapons was emphasized.

3. Across the board redistribution of officers and enlisted men was directed. The necessity for this action was carefully explained and commanders were asked, in turn, to ensure that the explanation was passed on to all concerned. All were advised to be prepared to properly orient and integrate replacements into units of the regiment.

4. Equipment shortages. Instructions were issued to submit requisitions immediately to bring all units up to authorized strength in equipment.

5. Training. Unit commanders were told to study in detail the training program previously published and to commence training the following morning.

6. Messes. All units were instructed to take steps to improve unit messes and to make the B ration palatable for troops by improvisation.

7. Military discipline and courtesy. The laxity in military discipline and courtesy that had been observed was mentioned with instructions to bear down on all aspects of these subjects right away.

8. Driver discipline. Battalion commanders in particular and the commanding officer of the service company were told that driver discipline must be improved. In this connection it was pointed

out that proper economy in use of vehicles would be given top priority.

9. Leadership. All commanders were cautioned that they must take hold now and follow through on all directives that were issued. *Supervision* was high lighted as the "key word" in this respect.

10. Promotions. It was announced as policy that only fully qualified noncommissioned officers and officers would be recommended for promotion and that seniority would be the determining factor, all other things being equal. In this connection, it was stated that reasons must be included in all recommendations submitted which called for exceptions to this policy. Commanders were cautioned that they must either reduce or get rid of any unqualified noncommissioned officers who may be assigned to the regiment. Stress was placed on the fact that we could not condone inefficient leadership when American lives were at stake. Wholehearted command backing was assured. It was emphasized that every individual must pull his weight in his job and that any laziness, indifference, or sloppiness on the part of any individuals would be cause for corrective action by commanders at all levels.

11. Maintenance. Emphasis was placed on getting the regimental vehicles back in shape. Maintenance first and then cleanliness.

12. Supply discipline. Attention was called to the fact that at that moment supply discipline was considered to be very unsatisfactory. It was stated that we must salvage or repair every item of equipment on hand. It was announced as policy that statement of charges or courts-martial charges, if considered appropriate, would be preferred in future cases of loss or willful destruction of government property. All units were told to get rid of any junk or excessive impedimenta that had been accumulated, and that we would travel "light" from now on.



In an endeavor to further accentuate some of the above points, comments, along the lines indicated, were made on the subjects listed below:

### ***Personal Appearance***

Men must look like soldiers at all times, must have hair cuts, be cleanly shaven, wear no sideburns or chin beards, must wash frequently, and carry authorized equipment only. A list of equipment to be carried on the person was specifically prescribed in order to keep all men loaded down to the minimum extent possible. I told commanders that I would not tolerate filthy language. Attention was called to the responsibilities of squad leaders knowing their assigned squad members and the condition of their equipment and weapons at all times. Amplifying remarks were presented on the subject of military courtesy as a general buck-up medium. Commanders were enjoined to build up the dignity of the officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the regiment. The point that good discipline makes for a good army was emphasized.

### ***Noncommissioned Officers***

Squad leaders are the backbone of the infantry. It was pointed out that they have a definite job to do in looking after the assigned members of their squad. This includes a check on personal cleanliness, quarters, equipment, inspection of feet, inspection of weapons, and a check on completeness of equipment. It is the job of squad leaders to pass on justified complaints (and not "gripes") to their platoon leaders. They must follow up and correct injustices when they appear. Squad leaders must know each man by name, must know his weaknesses and his good points, and he must lead and not drive his men. It was stated that platoon sergeants, mess sergeants, supply sergeants, all must energetically take their respective activities in hand and strive to make them the best in the 31st Infantry.

### ***Company Commanders***

The company commander has one of the most important jobs in the army. He is charged with the welfare, feeding, discipline, health, training, administration, and supply of his unit. Accordingly, he must possess understanding, compassion, force, sound judgment, proper initiative, and ingenuity. He must be personable and selfless. It is the company commander's job to set the example for his enlisted men. He must know his men by name, their weaknesses and good points, and counsel them accordingly. Primarily, he must know his job, all aspects of it, from a professional point of view. He must know how to employ his company tactically and utilize all weapons effectively. He must know all there is to know about the transportation, mess, ammunition, and supply of his company. He must recognize and reward good work and must not condone any laziness or carelessness on the part of any members of his unit. The men must always come first in his thoughts and actions. He must see to it that his platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and squad leaders do their fair share of the work. He must *earn* the respect and confidence of the men he will lead in battle.

### ***Battalion Commanders and Staffs***

The infantry battalion is the basic fighting unit of the infantry. It was expressed that the battalion commanders must know their jobs and how to perform them with minimum guidance. The battalion commander must be aggressive, understanding, must possess determination, and he must be selfless in all his efforts. With the assistance of his staff, he must direct the components of his battalion and attached units into an unbeatable fighting team. He is charged with co-ordinating the fires of supporting weapons and supporting air. He must always know how his battalion stands in regard to personnel, vehicles, petroleum, oil and lubricants, ammunition, and rations.

### Regimental Staffs

The sole reason for the existence of Headquarters 31st Infantry was to render assistance to subordinate commanders in every way possible. In the presence of these commanders, I told my staff that this co-operating attitude would be displayed at all times. The point was made that every one was human, had human failings, and that if we did fall down once in awhile, to report that fact to my executive officer or to myself. A summary was then given of the principal duties to be performed by each of the regimental staff officers. The staff officers were informed that they would be expected to make frequent visits to units with the view of *assisting* the units, and not for the purpose of turning in "skin sheets."

### Vehicles

Proper maintenance and command control of vehicle dispatch were pointed up. The principle of sending one vehicle to the rear instead of three or four, where one could accomplish the tasks involved—such as picking up laundry or mail—was announced as policy. Some of the drivers had obviously accumulated excess personal equipment which had been tied to the fenders of trucks. Corrective action was directed. A campaign to reduce speeding was announced. I expressed my view of drivers being kept busy when their vehicles were parked. They can be checking the tire pressure, motor, and battery, or cleaning the windshield. I told them that the man who does not do this would be awarded a new MOS, be issued a rifle and sent up on the hill. Instructions were issued that basic loads would not be exceeded and that all junk would be disposed of immediately. Trucks would be used only for purposes for which they were designed.

In closing, the Special Services Officer was instructed to get hold of some magazines for all units, and to beg, borrow, or

acquire in some way a movie projector or two for the use of the regiment.

### Getting the Job Done

Beginning the following morning, we went into high gear. Everyone tackled his assigned task with determination. Principal staff members made frequent visits to the battalions and separate companies to assist them in every way possible. The assistant regimental adjutant was assigned the exclusive job of rewriting recommendations for awards. Teams were appointed to gather the necessary information from units on which to base these recommendations.

Arrangements were made to have the regimental personnel section sent to the 31st Infantry Command Post. I personally addressed this section and explained carefully the magnitude and importance of the tasks ahead—to rehabilitate the records of all individuals; to evolve new morning reports for those missing at Chosin; to prepare casualty reports promptly and accurately based on factual knowledge or on verified information obtained from units of the regiment; and finally, to be prepared to process the records of hundreds of new replacements expected within the next 2 weeks. While admitting the enormity of this administrative task, it was made perfectly clear that although it would not equal the combat jobs performed by the 2d and 3d Battalions, it was very important to the *esprit* of the 31st Infantry. The officers and men of this section pitched in and performed admirably, working well into the early hours of the morning checking and rechecking and straightening out the terrible mess involved. The new adjutant rode herd on the section and achieved superior results.

Adhering to the time proved principle of delegation of authority, the follow-up action on all administrative problems was turned over to the Executive Officer. He

was instructed to see that all equipment shortages were made up, that a division ordnance team repaired or replaced all faulty weapons, that personnel records were made ship shape, and that vehicular maintenance and control of vehicles were taken care of properly. This was a big order it was realized, but never too big for a man who did the "doing" always—and did it exceptionally well.

It was his added responsibility to keep me informed daily of progress made and to point up areas which needed command attention. When bottlenecks arose, a visit was made to the 7th Division's Chief of Staff, who was entirely sympathetic to our problems and did everything possible to assist us.

Perhaps it would be well to point out one significant problem which caused us no end of immediate concern—the eternal headache of trying to "outguess" the technical services on the proper procedures to be used for requisitioning needed equipment. First of all, the reader should realize that we had no regulations to guide our actions as all records had been destroyed or lost at Chosin. We never knew whether to re-requisition for unfilled parts of requisitions. It seems that one service, under such conditions, required a complete re-requisitioning while another would consider the unfilled part as still "on requisition." It is *hell* to have to fight a paper war under rather grim conditions. This deficiency should be corrected promptly. We should all be on the same track at least.

### ***Duty at Yongchon***

The first week at Yongchon was a busy period for all. Training was in high gear throughout the regiment. My daylight hours were spent in visiting my battalions and separate companies. One company, for example, would be busy getting cleaned-up with the assistance of local Korean barbers and improvised bath and laundry fa-

cilities (oil drums fired with wood). Another would be firing rifles, BARs, and machine guns on an improvised range. Still another would be conducting small unit problems (platoon and company) firing ball ammunition and utilizing the supporting fires of mortars, recoilless weapons, and machine guns. On the spot critiques were made following each phase of these "canned" exercises. Elements of all of these units would concurrently be employed in active patrolling activities and manning positions on the perimeter defense. On one occasion it became necessary to kick a company-size unit out of a Korean village where it had bedded down contrary to my orders. I wanted my men under canvas and not holed out in the shacks which invited slovenliness and disease. It became habit to have lunch with my battalion and company commanders. In that way, I got to know my officers and key noncommissioned officers better—and it gave me the opportunity to check on the quality of food turned out by the units concerned.

### ***Replacement Orientation***

Each day about 1600 I personally addressed the newly arrived replacements. These groups varied in number from 50 to 200 officers and enlisted men. It was my responsibility to talk to them man to man and tell them that we were happy to have them as members of The Polar Bears. The main points made in my address were:

1. You are now "home" and are members of a fine regiment, The Polar Bears.
2. Your lot as future combat infantrymen mark you as soldiers in every sense of the word.
3. You are joining an outfit rich in tradition and history, as had recently been exemplified by the actions of the 31st at Chosin Reservoir.
4. You are joining a team—the 31st Regimental Combat Team. Your leaders are combat experienced—listen to them and seek advice.

5. You will be treated fairly and justly at all times, and will be expected to pull your share of the job ahead.

6. You can see me at any time if you have a problem which cannot be resolved by your company or battalion commander.

I interviewed each officer personally, invited him to dinner with us, and gave him his assignment. These officers usually stayed overnight at the command post and departed next morning for their units.

### *Housekeeping*

Throughout this shake-down period, equipment of all types and description arrived and was distributed according to plan. No favoritism was permitted, and "an across the board" balance was maintained insofar as possible.

I attended awards ceremonies and pinned on more medals for heroism during this period than I ever will again. In addition to our combat infantrymen, it was my privilege to honor combat medics, members of signal wire teams, and chaplains. This was a duty in which I took great pride. It is realized that many heroes of Chosin have not received full recognition for their deeds due to missing witnesses—that is one of the ironies of war—its unsung heroes. The saddest duty which never failed to cause me personal sorrow was to affix my signature to the letters of condolence to wives, sweethearts, and mothers—these in my opinion, are among the unsung heroes of the Korean conflict—the loved ones who had to sit home and wait and hope and pray.

It was interesting to observe the reactions of individuals who were transferred within the regiment to provide the required balance of combat experience. At first, many officers and key noncommissioned officers felt that an injustice had been done to them. However, the word soon spread as to *why* these lateral transfers were necessary for the good of the

entire regiment, and that each man was being reassigned to fill a key spot which needed his particular background and experience. Accordingly, the initial attitude of resentment changed to one of acceptance and gradually to a determined attitude to get the job done in the most expeditious manner. The value of keeping the troops informed of the *why* paid huge dividends.

Although it may appear insignificant, a most serious morale problem presented itself in the lack of writing paper. Although determined efforts through Red Cross and Special Services channels resulted in a meager supply being made available, many men had to resort to writing letters home on toilet tissue. In an attempt to resolve this problem, we ordered huge quantities of Polar Bear stationery through our good friends, the "Veterans of AEF Siberia 1918-20," the distinguished alumni of the 31st Infantry of World War I. The situation was not alleviated for several weeks despite all efforts made to correct a bad situation. It must be recognized that the transportation facilities were tied up for the most part moving beans and bullets; however, in my opinion, the stationery should have been handled as an item of distribution with the ration. It is a "must" to the combat soldier.

### *Christmas 1950*

On Christmas Day 1950, training ceased at 1200 and the regiment partook of the first A ration meal since Thanksgiving. Rather than just a meal, it should be classed as a *feast* as it consisted of a complete turkey dinner with all the trimmings. I spent the entire afternoon visiting unit messes and talking to my soldiers. There were no absentees at chow on that afternoon, and the food was delicious. Following the meal, we broke open the beer. As I listened to the community singing and horseplay in the various units, I at last knew that the 31st Infantry was

once more a team of fighting men which could be depended upon for any job. Hot food was carried to the men manning perimeter defenses on the hills, and their ration of beer was saved for them.

An incident occurred on Christmas Eve which, to me, shows that there is a spirit in American troops which just cannot be beat. I was sitting at my desk that night when suddenly a choral group was heard singing "Silent Night." I could not believe my ears. As I looked out of the window of our schoolhouse command post, I saw a group of soldiers with one of my battalion commanders—all holding lighted candles from the supply room and singing their hearts out. I put on my parka and cap and went outside. In the middle of the group was one of my Republic of Korea soldiers who had a very beautiful tenor voice. In fact, he led the singing and the other seven or eight American soldiers harmonized with him. Perhaps it is not soldierly to become emotional, but there are times when nature takes over. I talked to them later, thanked them for thinking of the "Old Man," and told them I was proud of them individually and for what they stood. When a group of enlisted men will turn out in sub-zero weather and unsolicitedly sing Christmas carols—I submit that such an outfit has high *esprit*.

On Christmas night, following a social gathering of available officers, the author was stricken with pneumonia. I stayed in

my sack for 4 days and was treated with the wonder drug—penicillin. It made me mad not to be able to get out and my executive officer had to pinch hit for me—a chore which he enjoyed thoroughly. In fact, I think he was almost sorry to see me get well. He was a fine field soldier and did not enjoy being chained to a desk.

On or about 28 December, the corps commander called for a full field inspection. Prior to this time the 1st Battalion and the regimental tank company had closed in the area and were also subjected to this inspection.

We got by in good shape except for some shortages for which requisitions were still outstanding. Needless to say, with the corps commander's backing, we promptly received the sorely needed remaining clothing and equipment.

#### Up the Track

By 2 January 1953, our training program was completed and we were ready to proceed again "up the track" as everyone called it. Within 48 hours, orders were received which moved us north again in the direction of Tangyang, where we again faced the Chinese Communist forces and fought our way back to the 38th parallel. And so ends my story of an incident in the life of one of our nation's fighting units—perhaps a small one in the over-all picture but a very real one to all personnel involved.

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We view our Nation's strength and security as a trust, upon which rests the hope of free men everywhere.

*President Dwight D. Eisenhower*

# MEDITERRANEAN THEATER-- THE IRON CURTAIN BYPASS

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*The views expressed in this article are the authors' and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

THE place assigned the Mediterranean area in the NATO military structure is that of a secondary theater of operation rather than a prime factor in world strategy. The North Atlantic Treaty powers have presently established three separate military commands: Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR; Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic—SACLANT; and the Channel and Southern North Sea Command—CINCHCHANNEL. The Mediterranean area is partially placed under SACEUR with the unintentionally revealing title: The Southern Europe Command.

Throughout the last war the Mediterranean was recognized by the allies as a separate military theater, although the strategic possibilities of its "soft underbelly approach" were never fully exploited. Today, with the power centers of aggression discernibly vulnerable to counterthrusts from that region, the Mediterranean is set up as a military appendage to

the European theater, not even a major command in its own right.

Military postures generally mirror the politico-policy attitudes they are expected to support. Thus NATO's military organization becomes a matter of deep concern by implying high level strategic concepts at variance with current military realities. The Southern Europe Command headquarters at Naples functions—primarily through the Italian Army and the United States Sixth Fleet—under the distant control of SACEUR. Its gaze is mostly skewed northward, to the neglect of the east and south where, respectively, Turkish armies and North African air bases constitute vital elements of strategic power. The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from such an arrangement is a NATO strategy which proposes to meet a possible Soviet onslaught principally through a head-on encounter in the region of the German plains. This territory, where the allies find themselves at the worst disadvantage if military logic is seriously weighed, is the inescapable scene for a determined holding action. It should never be regarded by NATO as a theater of decision.

The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is precisely such a theater. Repeatedly, classic struggles between East and West have ultimately been decided by campaigns for control of that sea and its strategic triangle—the Turkish Straits, the Isthmus of Suez, and Gibraltar. Potent factors



again forcing the Mediterranean onto the central stage in world conflict are: it offers the best flanking position from which a Soviet advance into Europe could be assaulted from the rear; it is indispensable to Anglo-American sea power; it can become a highway for the invasion of Western Europe from the south and east.

The Mediterranean contains that corridor into the Soviet heartland which can be exploited best by sea logistics. Its famed triangle influences the application of military power throughout half the world.

The military potential of the region demands examination in some detail. Such an examination will not only reveal its immense value to the free world but the necessity of regarding the Mediterranean as an integral strategic entity, at least equal to SACEUR itself, if that value is to be exploited.

#### An Allied Lake

The ancient waters between Europe and Africa, scene of so many decisive campaigns, constitute the one avenue through which the air and sea power of the United States can be projected directly toward the Soviet heartland, and thus, under relatively favorable conditions, counter the superior land power of Soviet Russia. In order to exploit this capability, the United States must, with the aid of allies in the

quickly and unfavorably resolved by reverses at these places. As long as the Eastern Mediterranean remains a base from which allied aerial, amphibious, and airborne attacks can be launched on the soft underbelly of the Communist empire, the chances of the Soviets winning domination over Eurasia are slim indeed.

These facts inspired General Eisenhower's comment on the Middle East. "There is no more strategically important area in the world." NATO's military organization, no less than NATO strategy, can afford to slight that region.

#### An Avenue of Conquest?

So long as Soviet power can be bottled up in the Black Sea, the problem of containing Communist aggression is manageable. If it penetrates into the Mediterranean, the difficulties of counteraction are magnified. If it ever spills out into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the task may well nigh become impossible. Just as three points determine a triangle, possession of the three outlets to the Mediterranean decree which contestant shall control that sea's contribution to global strategy.

Judging from the record of Russian history, the Mediterranean's Middle Eastern shores from the Dardanelles to Suez may suddenly emerge as the main effort of Soviet aggression, particularly if the defenses of Western Europe develop depth

***If full advantage is to be taken of the Mediterranean potential, it must be detached from SACEUR and developed as a separate theater, including only those NATO countries having a strategic interest there***

Arab world as well as in NATO, turn the Mediterranean into an allied lake.

If there be a Soviet Achilles' heel, it will be found among the oil wells of Baku and the rich granaries of the dissident Ukraine. The Kremlin knows the issue of a future war can be, for them, most

and hardness. Russia has gone to war with Turkey five times in the last 200 years for the unabashed purpose of seizing the Dardanelles and the Balkan Peninsula. During the nineteenth century British foreign policy regarded the Russian surge toward territories which threatened the

Empire's Suez life line as the greatest menace to peace.

For two centuries Russian pressure to control the Turkish Straits, linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, has been a significant factor in every European war and "peace" settlement. This much-contested passageway, consisting of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, is about 200 miles long and only a mile wide at some points. It gives egress from Russia's southwestern territories to the Mediterranean Sea, but without Suez and Gibraltar the way is still barred to the oceans and continents of the world.

Rugged terrain plus the entire territory and vitality of Turkey guards the Straits from the east. The direct sea route from Crimea depends upon sea power, never a striking achievement of Russia. Consequently, the easier western approach, via the Balkans, has been the Soviet Union's favorite route.

Balkan satellites of the Soviet Union are no new creation of communism. Ever since the Greek struggle for independence, Czarist emissaries or covert missions have actively fomented strife for Muscovite ends. In 1876, spokesmen for all Slav peoples, except the already conquered Poles, were present at the Pan-Slav Congress in Moscow to expound the theories of Pan-Slavism; freedom of all Slav peoples from foreign yoke, under the "benevolent guidance" of the Soviet Union. The Soviet's support of Serbian resistance

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against the Habsburg ultimatum was the spark that kindled World War I.

Muscovite policy toward the Middle East goes even farther back. It was bluntly stated in the famous Political Testament of Peter the Great (1689-1725), that Czar ranked, by the Soviets, among the most famous personages of Russian history: "Work toward Constantinople and India. He who holds them will rule the world. . . wage constant war against Turkey and then Persia . . ." This remarkable document ends with a prophecy of the conquest of Europe when "powerful (Russian) fleets manned with Asiatics passing through the Mediterranean will attack France from one side while Germany is overrun from the other." Recent evidence of Soviet concern over the Middle East-Mediterranean can be discerned readily, for all that it is less blatant, in the Communist line adopted from North Africa to Iran.

Soviet control of the Mediterranean would accomplish multiple goals of the Kremlin:

1. Alleviate the Soviets' most critical raw material shortage—oil.
2. Outflank allied strength in Western Europe.
3. Isolate India from the Middle East and Europe.
4. Open the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to Soviet submarines.
5. Bring North Africa into the Communist camp and thus neutralize United States air bases. In short, a Soviet victory in the Mediterranean would pave the way for domination of Europe, Africa, and Asia, after which world conquest looms inevitable.

### Strategic Mediterranean

Mahan wrote:

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it and the



strife still goes on. Therefore, a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the same amount of effort expended in another field.

How timely these observations ring to-day!

The strategic Mediterranean now comprises more than Mahan's sheet of water. It is the sea and the region surrounding it; water and land. It includes a magnificent waterway stretching some 2,000 miles from east to west, but occasionally so narrow and tortuous that movement upon its surface can be blocked by hostile air established along the shore. If its predominant feature—a water-corridor to the east—is to be exploited, there is an obvious need for friendly aircraft operating from bases along the North African littoral and friendly possession of the three peninsulas jutting south from Europe. The loss of Greece, for example, would be a strategic disaster to Turkey. The loss of Italy and Sicily would sever the Mediterranean, while the loss of Spain would block the highway at its entrance. Our total strategy must obviously provide for the security of these three peninsular countries, possession of air bases in North Africa, and retention in our or allied hands of the Gibraltar-Suez-Bosporus triangle. The military organization of this region, its component parts formed into blocks with which the military organizer can build, must be designed to implement this strategy.

The area under consideration is the Mediterranean Sea, its islands, and littoral—excluding France, which falls primarily in the category of Western Europe. From a strategic point of view there are three interrelated blocks: the Western Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, and the Middle East. How do these regions fit into allied strategy today?

The western block, comprising the western half of the Mediterranean Sea, its

European and African shoulders, has two segments: Spain, Morocco and Algeria in one; Italy, Libya and Sicily in the other. A glance at the map shows how each segment controls a bottleneck in the seaway.

Today's dangers are least, while still not negligible, in this block. Spain, although bargaining over the price, is not a member of NATO but, under her present regime, certainly no friend of communism. Whatever her politics, Spain occupies one of the world's truly strategic positions especially in connection with naval operations. Italy, the sole purely Mediterranean country in the original NATO, concentrates upon her northern defenses and by so doing indirectly contributes her best to the security of the southern sea. In North Africa, where United States air bases are burgeoning, signs of the unrest affecting nearly all the one-time "colonial" world are evident.

### The Balkans

Southeastern Europe is the area bounded on the west by the Italian and Austrian Alps, on the north by the Danube River, and to the south and west by the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. Taken together, the countries embraced by the geographical term Southeast Europe—the stormy Balkans—present one integral approach to the soft Black Sea underbelly of the Soviet complex. Turkey offers the other. Currently a political hodge-podge, the Balkans will remain in that unfortunate state as long as Soviet policies prevail. A Balkan federation, desirable for defense, essential for economic welfare, will continue a political impossibility for the same reasons, on diminutive scale, that Communist influence prevents a federation of Europe. The Soviet Union engulfs many satellites and gives every indication of willingness to swallow more, but any close rapprochement between several satellites is effectively discouraged. Today's Balkan line-up favors—but is not wholly devoted to—the Soviets. Greece has valiantly preserved

her freedom with United States aid and is the only Balkan representative of NATO. Yugoslavia, expatriate of the Cominform, eyes NATO assistance despite ideological differences. Her cleavage with the Kremlin, although fundamentally different in origin, parallels that of Spain. No collusion with the Soviets is possible for either while existing regimes desire to continue in power.

The rest of the Balkans are completely under Soviet domination; will probably furnish Soviet military contingents of doubtful effectiveness. But of them all, only tiny Albania, surrounded on land by Yugoslavia, has a Mediterranean sea coast, an ill-concealed secret nest of Kremlin submarines and air bases of more nuisance than strategic value.

### The Middle East

This discussion adopts the territorial limitations established by W. B. Fisher in his book *The Middle East* for the extent of the third block: Cyrenaica, Egypt, Cyprus, the Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and Aden. The term "Middle East" denotes, according to Fisher, a single geographical region with certain marked features of natural and physical unity. Cyrenaica forms the western boundary for geographical, ethnic, and economic reasons.

Fisher contends that the desolate belt of mountain ranges and salt steppes establishes the effective eastern boundary of the Middle East region, and thus includes Iran whose "interests are closely bound up with those of Turkey, Iraq, and Russia rather than with India."

In the Middle East, only Turkey is a full-fledged NATO member, yet NATO nations have commitments of long standing there, as Great Britain in Egypt, the Arab Peninsula, Suez, and Aden; and France in Syria. The recent clashes in

Iran and Egypt, the unrest in Syria, render doubtful whether those traditional "interests" are a source of strength or weakness.

Reviewing the three blocks as they comprise the whole Mediterranean region, four full-fledged NATO members are noted, two in the western, one each in the other two blocks. To date, the allies are not properly organized either to defend this region against creeping aggression or to exploit its strategic possibilities in the event of war.

It seems paradoxical that we continue to regard as secondary an area which so many competent strategists hold decisive. F. O. Miksche—a penetrating strategic thinker—asserts confidently:

No matter how great the Soviet success in Western Europe, or elsewhere, so long as Moscow does not control the Mediterranean, the final victory will be denied them just as it was denied to Hitler. Gibraltar and Suez are the two most important positions for both the Allies and the Soviets. While Western powers dominate these two points, they can prevent the Soviets developing a world strategy in the absolute sense of the word.

Miksche's picture is completed by including the Dardanelles. Taking these three positions, the strategic triangle, into account certain strategic generalization is permissible. If the Soviets can seize the Dardanelles (implying defeat of Turkey), they can threaten the Suez and Gibraltar. Under such circumstances the Mediterranean would itself become the major battle zone. On the other hand, if the NATO alliance was able not only to successfully defend the Turkish Straits but also to move in force into the Black Sea, any Soviet threat to either Europe or India could be neutralized from the outset of a war. The capability to accomplish such a move can therefore be converted into a major deterrent to war.

Thus the Mediterranean emerges both as a crucial area in the successful execution of a positive containment policy and the strategic base region of any foreseeable

ble war. No base can, however, be regarded as an element of either defensive or offensive strength until armed forces are either stationed there or available nearby to operate from it.

### Problems and Promises

Despite rich strategic promises which the Mediterranean offers the non-Com-

Defense Organization. The proposed membership would include the United States, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Arab nations. Whether this group could be welded into anything resembling NATO is problematical for the political tensions crisscrossing the Mediterranean are as prevalent as its proverbial blue color.



FIGURE 1.

munist world, there are insufficient forces in sight to redeem them; furthermore, there exists no agreed upon strategic concept around which the security of this region can be fashioned. Militarily the Mediterranean remains an incomplete and duplicating organization.

There is under serious consideration, however, the formation of a Middle East

Middle Eastern countries are, without exception, experiencing some degree of sociological-political turmoil. Several of them are passing through a phase of near revolution, while simultaneously, as in Iran and Egypt, anti-Western, particularly anti-British, sentiment flares. France is historically distrusting. Even among themselves a dozen major or petty feuds tend

to make enemies of neighboring peoples. Ignoring for the moment the fact that Yugoslavia and Spain, at opposite ends of the political spectrum, are isolated from NATO, the complex issues blocking a sound security organization for the Mediterranean are predominantly found in the Arab sector.

While this stretches from Morocco to Iran, its criticality rises the nearer Soviet borders are approached.

### Allied Aim Stymied

Thus the allied global aim, to create a stable international military and political situation which can stem the tide of further Soviet aggression, is stymied at the outset. Attainment of such a military and political situation in the Middle East will be no easy matter—nor one for secondary attention. We must recognize as a major objective of American policy the necessity of preventing, in the Middle East anchor of the Mediterranean, the further development of the chaotic situation which, even without overt action by the Kremlin, is capable of losing this area to the free world.

Today, the Mediterranean is no secure base area. Internal turmoil and international disagreements operate to prevent its becoming one. Worse yet, neither NATO nor United States unilateral policy is adequately defined and emphasized to make it one.

The situation in the Mediterranean directly threatens NATO interests and offers opportunities for Communist exploitation. The Soviet Union possesses the capability, by instigating local aggression in this region, to force the Western powers to choose among three undesirables:

1. Suffering the loss of the area by default.
2. Fighting defensive local actions for limited objectives, or
3. Treating local aggression as a cause

for general war. And this in the face of the pronounced possibility that Soviet grand strategy may make Central Asia and the Middle East the vital area in a world struggle. Europe and the Far East, although important, may actually play a secondary role.

United States and allied policy, political and military, needs re-evaluation with regard to the Mediterranean. Western actions there have been characterized too long by lack of positive purpose. Policymakers should always seek a tenable military position in any locality as vital as the Middle East, avoiding the fatal error of considering political and military aims separately. Political aims cannot be disassociated from military objectives, or vice versa.

### Corrective Steps

Inducing the Arab countries to willingly participate in regional security planning will require wisdom and high diplomatic skill. Yet there is no region where our policy decisions have been more diffused by relatively trivial factors damaging to our real objectives. The policy that has evolved to date has been ambiguous and vacillating, characterized more by hindsight than foresight.

Except for the limited assistance given Turkey, the emergency rescue of Greece, and the not too fruitful ventures with North African air bases, United States emphasis, like NATO's, has been on the Rhine. Yet, upon NATO power in the Mediterranean may depend the entire hope for preservation of peace or, should the Soviet Union strike, for an allied military success. The area is certainly defensible provided a definite policy for its security is established in time and is soundly executed. The NATO position in Turkey is not only the bastion of the Middle East but, by its counterpunch potential, one of the best assurances of maintaining world peace.

The admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not diminished the Soviet's centuries-old determination to expand her power into the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin.

Nor have these additions to NATO ranks yet compensated for the decline of British might, long the dominant factor in Middle Eastern affairs. The Middle

### British Policy

Great Britain's traditional policy of shoring up the old Turkish Empire to exclude the Soviet Union from the Mediterranean has its modern counterpart in this country's economic, technical, and military assistance to the Turkish Republic. There, as in Greece, it has been in the United States' interests to assume British obligations. The path through the Turk-



East Defense Organization group, when established, can scarcely fail to grasp the need for filling this deepening power vacuum. But unless they propose prompt, adequate measures, the burden falls upon the United States as in the instance of military aid to Greece. That emergency was squarely met, although in keeping with the majority of crash plans, it proved more costly than an equally efficacious action initiated before the situation had so far degenerated. The outlook in Turkey at the present time offers the one bright spot for the Western World.

ish Straits remains the favorite route of the Soviets. Elsewhere prospects are far from bright. Iran balances precariously on the fence with a damaging fall in prospect. Egypt's anti-English bias seems momentarily less violent but the Arab states react characteristically to the disappearance of British uniforms from their midst.

It is true that Great Britain still holds the Mediterranean exits at Suez and Gibraltar, but those vital points can merely limit the extent of the disaster if the Middle East falls into hostile hands. Their function should be rearward *points d'app*

*pui*, not advanced bases. Every consideration confirms the strategic import of the northeastern Mediterranean. We, as a nation, have not, as yet, fully recognized either our responsibility or our opportunity, both of which demand a comprehensive policy toward that region and accepted leadership in inspiring an obviously needed allied military organization. A "negative and defensive" employment of the Mediterranean highway is no longer acceptable. Prompt action is required if the Middle East is to be preserved as a stalwart outpost of freedom. Allied strength there will be a major deterrent to a third world war. But the task of holding the Middle East in the Western orbit will require a concentrated, intelligent effort of all countries concerned, but especially that of the United States.

#### Arab-Mediterranean Policy

Today's issues in the Middle East-Mediterranean region seem predominantly political but behind them are military stakes of vital import—possession of the world's key strategic areas. Thoughtful students of the Arab race, whose territories comprise the heartland of this region, assert that the Arabs regard strength, power, and traditional authority with genuine respect and admiration. They have no use for vacillation or weakness.

Policies wisely conceived and honestly pursued can win their regard for traditional authority. We have many obstacles to overcome, but they are readily recognizable however difficult to solve. Itemized they include:

1. Anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and generally xenophobic attitudes being exploited by indigenous Nationalists and by Communists.

2. Divergent policies between United States, Great Britain, and France with respect to the area, and absence of a clear understanding of respective British and United States roles and responsibilities.

3. Decline in British prestige and influence in the area, and in British ability to fulfill its historic role in defense of the Middle East.

4. Failure of the Middle Eastern states to develop responsible government; economic and social backwardness, dynastic rivalries, and competing nationalism.

5. Prevalent fears in the Middle East—internal strife, rapacious neighbors, suspicion of Western imperialism—diminish or wipe out comprehension of the Communist threat among the masses.

6. Cynicism and disillusionment over the disparity between United States policy toward the colonial powers compared to Middle Eastern nations and confused application of the principle of self-determination; for example, Libyan independence, Algerian retention under French rule.

7. Vacillation of our national policy with respect to the area.

8. Strategic vulnerability of the area, in conjunction with the weakness of the military and internal security forces of the Middle Eastern states. Limitations on commitment of significant American forces and matériel in support of Middle Eastern defenses.

Significantly the bulk of these problems are of the mind, not the flesh. We can achieve much by merely deciding we shall do so.

The Arab-Mediterranean world has repeatedly, in the course of history, been inflamed by ideas.

#### Future American Policy

United States policy should provide for strengthening the Arab states, politically, economically, and militarily, in order for them to resist penetration no less than open aggression by communism. It must promote social and economic betterment in North Africa and Egypt to nullify subversive action. In general, sound policy calls for an acceleration of military, eco-



conomic, and technical assistance. The situation demands intelligent intervention, economic and political, to prevent catastrophe rather than frantic, hopeless military intervention after disaster strikes. Our reluctance and our concern with unobtrusive and "tactful" actions have led us to inconsistency.

Uncertain of the efficacy of our methods, if not of our aims, we tend to allow matters to come to a head and then meet the emergency with a "crash plan," hastily improvised.

If the United States combats the false alures of communism by economic-military aid of the nature accorded the resolute and independent Turks; aid which improves living conditions while it strengthens defense yet without tending to reduce the recipient to subservency, Soviet infiltration will encounter stone walls.

Convincing the Turk was no easy task after his experience with German "missions." Beginnings had to be on a small scale, and prove themselves. But the Turks, like the Arabs, are no decadent peoples, no seekers after alms.

Once the *spirit* of the giver was recognized, the response was immediate, and cumulative.

Nowhere in our military aid program has the principle of self-help been more effectively displayed than in Turkey. Nowhere have so many done so much with so little. Although Arabs are a distinctly different race from the Turks, they have one potent common tie in religion. Mohammedanism is, like Christianity, the antithesis of communism. Our success in winning Turkish esteem and friendship can serve as a guide for contacts with Arab nations who are all keenly aware of Turk-American relations.

Current United States' pessimism regarding the chances of Middle Eastern unity is unfounded for a nation whose policy actively supports the Herculean task of European federation. The Mediterra-

nean-Mohammedan world has been united, Europe has not. If the former is even more split into sections impossible of survival politically, economically, or militarily in a modern world, the fault is at least partially due to the attitude of Western nations whose interests, real or fancied, opposed every move for unification by the Arabs, or among Arabs and other Mohammedan peoples.

A uniform policy of sincere friendship on the part of the United States would make great strides among the proud, if small and scattered, Arab nations. Vacillation, temporizing either with local factions or NATO nations' selfish interests in the various territories plays into Communist hands and lends credence to the anti-colonial, anti-white race propaganda already rife.

Unification must be preceded at considerable distance by unilateral, equally just, treatment of each Arab grouping. But a common tie of respect for, and friendship with, the United States would automatically promote a degree of unification, especially in a common defense against an aggression which threatens all.

Understanding of United States ideals and global motives is an essential step in portraying the Communist danger to peoples who have so many other threats in their very midst.

A keen insight into the diverse localities' immediate problems will determine where military steps should have precedence, where economic or political measures should open the desired series of contacts. Everywhere the ideological rapprochement must be stressed; never alone but hand in hand with practical matters.

By their works ye shall know them is understood in more than Christian communities.

Then, too, certain general steps can, and should, be expedited to bolster United States influence in the Middle East and North Africa.

The creation of a Mediterranean Command under United States sponsorship would be a psychological triumph as well as a highly practical military move, particularly the recognition of the Middle Eastern "block" of that command as its advanced headquarters.

This could set the stage for unobtrusive, but effective, ways to "show the flag" by means of which Arabs could view at first hand the sea and air might of the United States and our allies.

### *Acts of Friendship*

Simple acts of friendship devoid of any taint of bargaining, such as the Air Force services to the pilgrims stranded en route to Mecca, should be normal practice, not exceptional occurrences. Visits by senior American military personnel, devoid of every trace of patronizing, would react favorably among people accustomed to read of such visits only to Europe. The whole concept must convince the Arab world that we do not regard the Middle East-Mediterranean region as a "side-show." Equal billing on the strategic stage is not merely justified by sound military appreciation of the situation, it is excellent showmanship to turn Arab nations from skeptical observers into a sympathetic audience, an essential preliminary to their participation.

What could be more logical than putting flesh and muscle on the bare bones of the proposed MEDO than by stationing on Cyprus, say, the nucleus of an amphibious-airborne task force? Perhaps a Marine division and an Army airborne division would suffice. The mobility of that centrally located reserve, assured by the Sixth Fleet's guns and carriers, would lend credence to our offers to support Arab states against aggression. No one specific act would be as helpful in expediting invitations from Middle Eastern nations to establish joint bases within their boundaries. Astute statesmanship can point

with pride at results in Turkey, suggest locations for base development which would further the donor-state's economic progress; for example, barren lands now beyond the donor's means to improve.

This is a field for early action. If SACEUR plans are successful, the northern shores of the western Mediterranean are safe from aggression's direct action. The southern and eastern ones must be secured against the unrest and disorder which are open invitations to communism's subversive forces.

We have struggled mightily with defense patterns for Europe under NATO, for the Pacific areas under the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty. There are scintillating prizes to be won from a similar defense pattern which can satisfy the governments of the Middle East for "equality of treatment," in a regional pact. Token United States forces can be invited close behind any such preliminaries; flag showing, visits by dignitaries, and diplomatic "conversations." Once established, United States "ambassadors" of the Army, Navy and Air Force have only to emulate their fine record in Turkey to further the good work.

After sound policies make a conceptual pattern for Mediterranean security possible, we can harvest its rich strategic potential. We can begin to utilize the Mediterranean's peculiar suitability for America's unique form of military power, designed primarily around modern systems of sea and air power. There will be difficulties to be sure, but the strategic necessities compel a diligent study of how to meet them.

On this classic stage an all around sea-air-land strategy can be developed. The basic impulse of this strategy, however, will be naval—since the objective will be to exploit the water corridor to Central Asia. As Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U.S.N., suggests:

"The greatly increased quantity and

complexity of equipment to be used in future wars make sea power more important than ever." In the Mediterranean, more than in other regions, it will be impossible to establish a fine dividing line between the contribution of land, sea, and air elements. All are required to sustain one overriding effort—to move eastward, on water, a decisive concentration of allied power.

### Summary

Examination of the Mediterranean-Middle East region disclosed the present, no less than the historic, strategic import of that area.

Our current policies provide neither the adequate regional defense without which even Europe cannot be securely held, nor the means to exploit the region's peculiar advantages as a counterthreat to Soviet aggression, wherever it may occur globally.

The measure of today's inadequacies is our lack of understanding of the psychological-ideological split between the northern and southern shores of that inland sea; that the defense of the Mediterranean, strategically a single problem, in-

volves diverse solutions of varied local problems.

While we give lip service to the importance of the Mediterranean's sea-highway, we have failed to make good use of its peculiar suitability for United States sea-air power capabilities. The Middle Eastern anchor of the Mediterranean is potentially its most significant sector, yet today's military-political solution which establishes a Middle East Planning Group to be affiliated, but not solidly linked, with NATO can be regarded only as unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of logic, necessity and especially psychologic impact.

If full advantage is to be taken of the Mediterranean potential, this region must be detached organizationally from the control of SACEUR and developed as a separate Mediterranean theater. Arrangements should be made to bring into this theater only those NATO countries located on that inland sea or having direct strategic interest in it. The security of a vital region requires either an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the development of a distinctive Mediterranean alliance parallel to the existing NATO mechanism.

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If we were to abandon Western Europe and the Mediterranean to Russia now, we would probably reduce the possibility of World War III for a time, but we would only postpone the danger until the next generation by which time we would be stripped of powerful Allies and enjoy no favorable productive differential.

*Admiral William M. Fechteler*

# MORALE

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*The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.*

**W**HAT is it that determines our strength during a crisis? How vulnerable are we under the impact of danger? The answer to this can be found in the state of our morale which will imply how we can be expected to react to the dangers of our time.

The rather vague concept of *morale* may apply to a single person or to a group. If the people's reaction is favorable, we usually speak of morale as being high or good; if unfavorable or subnormal, it is called low or poor. When morale is high, there is a feeling of adequate control and self-confidence, a sense of direction and purpose—everything falls into line. This sense of confidence does not depend solely upon external circumstances.

Military and civilian morale both are dependent upon a combination of internal and external factors. Morale may be high in the most difficult and hostile situations. On the other hand, it may be low even in times of apparent peace and quiet. What we call good morale is a quality that is built up from within by faith in one's goals and in one's ability to play a part in attaining it. It comprises mental stability, ego strength, and a stable harmony between instinctual drives and inner defenses against difficulties. This personal well-being comes about when instincts and

yearnings are under adequate control.

The word morale, however, has a number of meanings—some much broader and richer than others. It may refer simply to good team spirit and an ability to play the game with a group. Here it is chiefly the teamwork which counts—poor morale increases the collective vulnerability. But in a larger sense, morale goes much deeper and includes the mental stability of the individual as well as his strength in working with a group.

## Culture and Morale

Culture also determines the meaning of morale. Morale has a different meaning within different cultural groups. In Eastern societies—where the well-being of the group is more highly valued than that of each individual—emphasis is placed on conforming and being entirely subordinate to group habits and discipline—even to the point of total submissiveness.

This contrasts with the Western culture where, for the most part, the ideal of individual freedom and personal responsibility prevails. In societies of this kind, ego strength and individual morale have value as well as social discipline and conformity.

## Discipline and Morale

While all good morale implies mental strength and self-discipline, it may not necessarily imply a set group discipline in a political or military sense. For example, good morale was one of the needed qualifications for taking part successfully in the underground during the last war.

The partisans, working secretly—now here, now there—relied, in their lonely combat, on their individual initiative as much, if not more than, on the distant leadership and discipline of one of their number. On the other hand, it is possible to have extreme discipline—an imposed discipline—without good morale. This might be called a kind of “stand-by” morale, the kind which is obtained in jails or concentration camps.

Nevertheless, there is an inner relation between discipline and morale. Only when a certain amount of disciplinary training is given to youngsters or soldiers, are they well conditioned for that inner strength which is based on self-confidence and trust in the group as a whole, together with its authorities. Only discipline which develops gradually can lay the basis for inner freedom. This rule has been forgotten by many educators. The subtle relation between discipline and freedom starts in the cradle under the auspices of loving and interested parents. They are the first to build morale.

In an article of this kind it is not possible to analyze all the various social and cultural attitudes toward the concept of morale.

However, a further understanding of these attitudes is important for an evaluation of the inner strength or vulnerability of the various cultural groups. Where too much discipline—or even slavery—pre-

dicts who—without any tie with the mother country—stuck to their lonely posts for years after the war, as though the emperor and his generals were still looking at them.

### Race and Environment

One or two factors which influence the vulnerability of special collective systems must be mentioned. There exists a peculiar racial factor through which the individual toughness makes a man much more apt to adapt himself to difficult circumstances.

I cannot help thinking of the way Chinese and Hindustani, in tropical colonies, have been able to adapt themselves better than white people to minimum standards of life. Yet gradually, because of their greater morale, they have worked and trained themselves to a point where they have risen to the highest income brackets of those countries.

During the last war, by studying statistics of treatments given for head and brain injuries in the Soviet Army, we were amazed to find how great the toughness of the Soviet soldier was and how short was the period from injury to cure.

On the other side, we have to be aware of the fact that soldiers coming from a culture with too luxurious a pattern of life, or from homes where they have been too pampered and protected, lack the stamina and resistance needed for the harsh and lonely circumstances of war.

***Today there is a marked tendency to deny reality and to deceive ourselves. If we would avoid panic during a crisis, we must confirm our knowledge of the relationship between danger, panic, and inner morale***

vails, the cohesion of the group will be very different from that of a group respecting and holding the individual in high esteem. Nevertheless, even in the armies of totalitarian systems, we have experienced men who exemplify high morale. I call to mind those Japanese sol-

The same may be true in relation to the greater vulnerability of towns. A community built in large dimensions, where people take care of heating and water in individual homes, will be much less vulnerable to bombing than a metropolis having a concentration of population. In such a

city, the mere cutting off of electricity will stop more than half of the heating systems and nearly all of the elevators.

These are only examples to prove how the morale and vulnerability factors are dependent on several environmental factors.

### Morale and Danger

The word morale has come to be associated particularly with periods of stress and danger. When things are going along in a quiet, normal way for the majority of the population, the newspapers seldom mention morale. However, even in such times, we might find good cause to speak of the morale of a minority group or of a small opposition party. That is because minorities are presumably under stress to maintain themselves—although political victory may also have a demoralizing effect.

In times of stress and calamity, people begin to test each other's vulnerability and weakness. This is the case during a cold war with its continual attack on the morale of both sides. It is, of course, even more acute during a hot war.

However, in whatever sense we use the word, whether for the individual, the group as a whole, or the army, it implies a choice between hard duty or concentration upon self-protection. Man must decide between accepting responsibility and fleeing from it.

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### Group Morale

In every group situation, morale refers to the degree of cohesive strength of the members and to the amount of loyalty toward the group and its goals. Morale may, or may not, imply an *understanding* of the goals. In Western culture a much deeper knowledge, understanding, and consideration of goals are implied than are implied in a totalitarian state. In the latter case the threat to morale—the loss of political morale—when the dictator or leading group fails, would have a more disintegrating effect than an attack on the morale of a democratic society whose members usually have reached a higher degree of self-determination and governmental skill.

Thus, we see that morale includes the matter of how much people can endure physically and mentally, and for how long. "Stand-by" morale, based on fear, as in a prison, may disintegrate at the least sign of weakness in the leader, or when the individuals have not as yet been sufficiently indoctrinated with the discipline expected.

The *kamikazes* were thoroughly indoctrinated with their ideology, and their morale, as shown in the late war with Japan, might be said to have been high—in an Oriental sense. Here discipline had become so automatic that life was of no importance either to the individual or to the group. The only thought was to keep going and beat the enemy. This kind of morale is dependent mostly on obtaining a frenzied desperation—a kind of suicidal rage—in pursuit of the goal.

### External and Internal Dangers

Freud has directed our attention to the peculiar interplay between external and internal dangers. In man, the dangers from within—from frustration, feelings of guilt, mythical horror fantasies—often make people much more vulnerable than the dangers threatening from outside.



Indeed, in the last war we learned that the loss of love and affection and the breaking of family ties affected children more than the other aspects of war. The evacuation of their homes, leaving their parents, disruption of their accustomed daily life—these things upset the children and often broke their morale.

Objective, recognizable dangers, such as floods or even bombing, stimulate the psyche to become alert and to set up defenses. But imaginary or unseen dangers—such as mythical fantasies, horror stories, or rumors—overshoot the mark; they are exaggerations and stimulate the formation of neurotic defenses and fearful anticipations.

They cause man to be continually on the alert and so make him more vulnerable. Such inner fears are very often related to the fear of one's own repressed drives and to hidden feelings of hate, guilt, and aggression.

In our civilization, there is a tense equilibrium between internal and external dangers. "Stop and go" signs become confused since so much is artificial and so many diversified confusing choices are left to the individual. Sometimes the dammed-up aggressive forces may burst out beyond all control, even when there is no real danger. Sometimes the danger from outside may be so very great that it tears through all our mental defenses, and we break down.

However, psychiatric experience leads us to believe that what often breaks man down is the lack of inner stability and control, although the disaster of war may provoke and touch off such internal disturbances as we see in battle neuroses.

As an example of this, during the last war, an extremely courageous fighter pilot asked for psychotherapeutic treatment because he found himself trembling and overcome by fear. He had flown more than 40 dangerous missions without feeling at all afraid. However, during his last

furlough to town he had to hide in a shelter because there was an air alert. It was this unforeseen sojourn with panicky people in a small shelter that had completely broken him. In the course of discussions with him, the fact emerged that all kinds of personal conflicts had brought him to his point of sudden breakdown. A conflict with his commanding officer, a sexual conflict with his girl friend the previous night, having been thrown together with other persons who were anxious and trembling in a small dark shelter—all these things had aroused deep, hidden fears which were apparently only slightly related to the real danger of the moment.

### Factors of Danger

What inner factors make use of external dangers as justification for breakdown? This is not a cynical question. The weakling may use every outside danger to become a dependent infant again. We so often experience outside catastrophe only actually as a trigger or spark setting off hidden tensions and emotions so that they rise to the surface.

In the course of war experience, I have been able to distinguish three paradoxical occurrences in the outbreak of such panic reactions and sudden breakdown of morale.

### False Anticipation

The false anticipation of danger is often more fear-arousing than the danger itself. The uncertainty of the moment of impact provokes fantasies of helplessness. In a war the bomber crew, during its long flight to the target, is in a state of continual tension and alert, yet there is only a short moment of battle action, and then the long flight back to base begins again. This is why we found more anxiety reactions among bomber crews than among the more active fighter pilots during the late war.

This disastrous effect of prolonged and

fantasied anticipation is made use of in the war of nerves. During uncertain anticipation, inner hell may break loose. The cold war centers its attacks largely on the morale of the weak. The amount of rumor and fantasy formation in a collectivity determines its reaction to psychological attack by an enemy.

### *Incubation*

Danger and fear do not act immediately on man unless the calamity is overwhelming. People are pretty well prepared for sudden dangers and catastrophes. Most people will act adequately and courageously in a sudden accident. Yet afterwards, the repressed fears and tremblings remain active under the conscious level of the mind until they may suddenly come to the fore. Most of the time there is no outward recognizable reaction after a catastrophe, but in certain cases where connection is made with hidden unconscious material—with childhood fears—a real anxiety neurosis may break out. After the bombardment of Rotterdam—where there had been no immediate panic among the population—we experienced an outbreak of nervous breakdowns and typical fear psychoses for months after the catastrophe.

To the therapist, fear incubation is important in his plans for first aid. After acute dangers and catastrophes, such as bombing, we have to be sure to treat jittery, panicky victims as soon as possible. Through mental first aid behind the battle line and eventual further treatment, we can prevent this "underground" connection with older, troublesome, emotional material. Battle neuroses become fixed if they are not treated as soon as possible.

### *Paradoxical Outbreak*

It is not always the danger itself which arouses fear reactions and nervous breakdown—it may be the halting of danger. During a period of tribulation, people are

frequently tense and self-composed, but suddenly, after the danger and tension are gone, the situation permits them to let themselves go—like helpless, crying children. A good example of this occurred in Dover, England where a general nervous "let down" of the population took place. This happened after 4 years of shooting and war tension was terminated by the allied armies after they had cleared the opposite Belgian coast of the enemies who had been firing on the town.

The same breakdown of morale may occur in a victorious army which is no longer prepared for action. Napoleon experienced this after the battle of Jena.

### *The Breaking Point*

*What is the straw that breaks the camel's back?* This is a key question in the problem of morale. Our confused fighter pilot—unafraid of his dangerous work, but unhappy about his personal relationships—was suddenly struck by fear in the shelter. In normal life he had been a rather withdrawn young man. In the shelter, suddenly with a frightened group about him, he had been contaminated by the fear of other people. The strange situation found him unprepared to put up his inner defenses and so he broke down.

No one can tell how he will behave in times of greatest danger. Many will accept the challenge. Some overdefensive, compulsive individuals will welcome the test. Still others—who are already unstable—will misuse the new situation as an excuse to break down. This last reaction occurs especially in certain abnormal individuals, let us call them the fear fetishists, who use every outside danger and tension as justification for becoming a wailing, dependent infant again.

From military experiences we know that the soldier who does not know how to cope with his own problems, and who is easily disgruntled or thrown into a rage, has a bad influence on the morale of his unit.

His tension and alertness are communicated to the group, and make everyone less tolerant of outside irritations. Self-control is needed in cold and hot war alike. We become more vulnerable and less self-confident in proportion to the amount of rage and anxiety that is aroused within us.

Breakdown also may occur among some pathological individuals with latent ideas of persecution. They have, as it were, been waiting for the enemy all their lives. Sometimes we find that the external danger fits well into such an old morbid expectation. Still other egocentric types of people who experience every outward challenge as a personal offense, will also break down. These are only a few of many examples that could be given.

It is important to realize that we expect more panic in others when we, ourselves, feel jittery and insecure. In the last war, there were many sensational forecasts of panic that did not materialize—such as Dunkerque. Man is often mentally much stronger than we expect him to be. Of all the animals, he can suffer and take it best—provided he does not weaken himself by his belief in the supernatural terror stories nor become unnerved in a cold war.

### Factors Endangering Morale

In psychological situations, it is often easier to say what is bad than what is good for something. The limitations of our human concepts are often clearer than their cores to us.

We do know various elements that endanger individual and collective morale. Let me mention just a few of them. False anticipation of danger—a badly informed and unprepared army or population is full of fears which find expression in the most fantastic rumors. Poor information creates feelings of uncertainty and apathy, for all information is a token of belonging together.

Lack of sleep, or hunger and cold will have some influence on how we react. Bad leadership—confused, uncompromising leaders who themselves may be panicky—weakens the morale of the group.

Sometimes lack of a definitive discipline upsets the young soldier by placing too much responsibility on him. Young soldiers need strong paternal attitudes and guidance. The same is true for lack of discipline in an eventual plan for civil defense.

Sedatives usually break down ego strength and the will to resist. Alcohol, especially in times of stress, is the worst stimulator of morale. People in anxiety often respond pathologically to alcohol. The best stimulators after a catastrophe were found to be cigarettes and food—coffee and hot soup.

In describing what further stimulates good morale, we come to theoretical and practical difficulties because the positive aspects of morale are more difficult to formulate than the negative ones. Nevertheless, I will mention a few stimuli. Good morale is stimulated in our country by good, democratic leadership provided by leaders who represent our ideals and to whom we can trustfully transfer our needs. With such leadership, there must be discipline.

If we care for our form of democratic government, we must believe in its soundness and have faith in it. There must be mutual loyalty, friendship, and mature responsibility. To the extent to which we have conquered our ambiguous attitudes toward parental figures, to that extent will we succeed in maintaining our personal morale and carrying our share of responsibility by giving ourselves fully to our duties. We must be mentally alert, emphasize individual initiative, individual stability, and agile adjustment. This will help us toward adequate preparation and co-ordination of moral and material defenses. Through all there must be a sense

of belonging. This is an important psychological factor representing the sense of love, affection, and acceptance in a group. Withal, there should be good internal propaganda—a deep concern for our interpersonal communications—which eliminates sensational rumors and fear of unknown dangers.

### Morale and Leadership

We are becoming more and more aware of how important central leadership is in boosting morale. The leader is the embodiment of the multitude of valued human relationships for which we are willing to offer our energy and even, when needed, our lives.

The leader himself is in a difficult position. He must be many things that may seem to contradict each other—he must represent the paternal authority, as well as our ego, our conscience, and our ideals. He must relieve us of our sense of guilt and anxiety, and he must be able to absorb our needs for strength, affection, and dedication—our transference needs as expressed in psychological terms. He must be able to create group action and motivation and at the same time increase the individual's self-esteem. At times we may want him to be a tyrant, so we can be relieved of our personal resentments and responsibilities. Sometimes we want to compete with him as we competed with our fathers. At other times we want affection from him. The leader must be both a scapegoat and a giant.

In a democratic regime, the leader is a lonely man because he is the center of many different feelings which are transferred to him. We have various contrasting feelings toward him, but we need him to direct our common action. Later, if necessary, we can vote him out of office and select a new leader.

Our own inner strength will grow, depending on his inspiring and leading personality. While we may never love him completely, we will use him to grow or decline in our morale.

### Panic and Morale

Today the words *panic* and *morale* are often used as magic catchwords behind which we may hide—not from outside danger or inner psychological turmoil, but from the danger of unexpected human and political reactions. We ask ourselves "What will happen to the world?" without realizing that our concern for it may, in a small way, determine its situation—that our personal morale and vulnerability could conceivably contribute to the world chaos.

Morale is primarily dependent on inner strength, on ego strength, on self-knowledge, and simple self-confidence. People are able to stand the greatest danger if they no longer feel the need to regress or to revert to infantile fantasies or to escape into disease and dependency.

Today, there is a marked tendency to deny reality and to play hide-and-seek with ourselves.

This denial of reality is dangerous because of the close relationship between outside danger, panic, and inner morale. We should make the public aware of possible dangers and inform them about their responsibilities. For by facing reality and becoming accustomed to the thought of potential danger, we reduce the possibility of danger.

We grow stronger through the knowledge of our inner self as a part of the surrounding reality.

The formula for boosting morale is the old formula the Oracle of Delphi gave to mankind: *Know Thyself!*

# MALAYA

*This article has been digested from "Background," Department of State publication 5061, Far Eastern Series 57.—The Editor.*

Many people think of Malaya merely as a source of tin and rubber. But it is more than that. It is important to the free world politically and strategically, as well as economically.

Malaya, a part of the British Commonwealth, is the scene of a long, drawn-out and bitter struggle between the supporters of freedom and those who would impose communism. The fate of the Malayan peoples and the stability of Southeast Asia are directly linked to the outcome of that struggle, and free nations everywhere cannot help but be affected by it.

The native stock of the country is Malay, but the Malays only make up about 43 percent of the total population. About 44 percent is Chinese, while there are sizable Indian and Pakistani minorities, and smaller groups of Europeans and Eurasians.

As the southernmost part of the Asian mainland, the Malay Peninsula is the very heart of Southeast Asia—with Singapore, one of the world's great ports and naval bases, at its tip. Malaya is the key to the Indian Ocean and to the South China Sea. Its strategic importance is emphasized by its closeness to other key cities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

A secure and stable Malaya is important. The key to such a Malaya is not an easy one to grind. It must open the door to these two minimum objectives: (1) ef-

fective self-government, and (2) the defeat of Communist terrorism, a major barrier to full self-government.

Self-government at the grass-roots level was instituted in 1951-52 with the holding of elections for councils in most of the major municipalities and in some villages. Similar elections are now being planned for councils in all villages and towns, as well as at the state and settlement level.

Rice is a constant economic problem directly associated with the Malayan standard of living. As in many other areas of the Far East, rice is a basic staple of the Malayan diet. However, Malaya raises only about 40 percent of the rice it requires, despite the fact that it is a predominantly agricultural country. The remainder must come from imports.

Malaya's ability to import is directly related to earnings from exports. Rubber and tin are basic to the Malayan economy. As they go, so goes the country.

A number of fishery, rubber, and agricultural stations are experimenting with ways and means of improving Malaya's productive output. Irrigation, electrification, water-supply, and public-works projects are being developed steadily. Agricultural production and marketing co-operatives are being encouraged.

The economic development of Malaya is, of course, closely related to other factors. One key factor is the pluralistic nature of Malayan society. It is not only a question of different ethnic groups thrown together in the same area; it is a ques-

***Malaya has been the scene of a long struggle between the supporters of freedom and those who would impose communism. The fate of Malaya and the stability of Southeast Asia are directly linked to the outcome***

tion of groups with different languages, religions, standards, fears, and prejudices which make it difficult to develop a common feeling of nationality. Many Malayan leaders, both inside and outside the Government, see education as the most important long-range means of working out these racial differences.

The situation in Malaya poses a complex of many problems. But there is one problem which must be solved before the others can finally be met—communism.

The Communists came out of World War II with the intention and expectation of achieving broad influence in the Malayan Government.

Their aim, during this early post-war period, was to gain power by infiltration and subversion.

By 1947 it became apparent that they were not moving any closer to political control of Malaya.

They changed their tactics. They tried to achieve their objectives by crippling the Malayan economy. Their favorite weapon was the strike, and they used it with telling effect. Posing as humanitarians interested in the cause of the wage earner, they used the wage earner for political ends.

The Government met this problem by having all labor unions register. The Communist-dominated unions refused, and were, therefore, banned.

Then, according to a prearranged plan, the Communist labor leaders and their pro-Communist followers took to the jungle and thus began the Communists' campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The Communists' specific objective now was to destroy the existing political organization of Malaya, to drive the British out, and ultimately to take control of the country for communism.

The British are treating the Communist problem in Malaya as both a military and a civil problem. Militarily it involves hunting down and flushing out the terror-

ists operating from the jungles. It calls for cutting the Communists off from their sources of intelligence and supply in the towns and villages. And it calls for the most stringent security measures in protecting communications, industry, and agriculture.

The forces opposing the terrorists include some 35,000 United Kingdom, Gurkha, and Malayan troops, supported by smaller West African, Fijian, and Rhodesian units; some 25,000 regular police; about 50,000 special constables; and roughly 250,000 part-time and partially trained home guards.

These security forces are backed up by planes from the British and Australian air forces and by naval patrol units. Neither the home guards nor most of the police are available for active offensive operations against the guerrillas.

They are limited to guard duty at rubber estates, tin mines, lines of communication, villages, resettlement areas, and so forth.


It is important to remember, however, that steps being taken to defeat the Communists in the field cannot be separated from measures adopted to foster political progress and to ease the differences among the various communities.

The emergence of a stable and united Malayan nation fully capable of self-government demands the defeat of the Communists. But it also depends upon the ability of the various communities to develop a common concept of nationality.

Guns, planes, tanks, and ships are vital if free men are to defend themselves. But these weapons will be inadequate if they are not coupled with a common belief in a common ideal. A genuine victory cannot be won against the enemy free men face today, unless free men everywhere have mutual confidence and a common belief in the principles they are called upon to defend.



# FEDERATION OF MALAYA, AND SINGAPORE







The key to a secure and stable Malaya is effective self-government and the defeat of Communist terrorism. Above, a Malayan Home Guardsman placing his ballot in the ballot box during the first local council election at Batu Anam. Below, special constables guarding a produce train on its way to a factory.—British Information Services photos.






Many Malayan leaders, inside and outside the Government, see education as the most important long-range means of working out communal problems in Malaya. Above, Malay boys doing exercises in a free, compulsory school in Singapore. Below, a teacher explaining arithmetic to a class in school at a rubber estate.—British Information Services photos.







Malaya's ability to import products from other countries is directly related to its earnings from the exports of its major products, rubber and tin. Above, latex being pumped aboard a tanker in Singapore for export to the United States. Below, baled rubber being hoisted aboard a ship in Singapore for export.—Natural Rubber Bureau photos.






Rubber and tin are basic to the Malayan economy. As they go, so goes the country. Above, a Malayan worker cutting a coagulum of latex into convenient size pieces. Below left, mechanical tin dredges operating at a mill in Malaya. Below right, a hydraulic gravel-pump breaking down tin-bearing soil.—British Information Services photos.






Irrigation, electrification, water-supply, and public-works projects are steadily being developed in Malaya and agricultural production and marketing are being encouraged. Above, modern road maintenance being undertaken on one of the Malayan estates. Below, homes of workers at a rubber plantation in Malaya.—Natural Rubber Bureau photos.







Of all the complex problems which now exist in Malaya, the problem of Communist terrorism must be solved before the others finally can be met. Above, a train derailed by Communist terrorists in the Malayan jungle. Below, Malayan police and special constables guard a terrorist-menaced rubber plantation in Malaya.—Natural Rubber Bureau photos.





The pluralistic nature of the Malayan society creates the problem of different ethnic groups working and playing together in the same area. Above, plantation worker's children playing football. Below left, Malayan natives preparing a rice nursery. Below right, a Chinese rubber farmer tapping a rubber tree.—Natural Rubber Bureau photos.



# MILITARY NOTES

## AROUND THE WORLD

### UNITED STATES

#### **Ammunition Ship**


The first United States naval vessels designed from the keel up as ammunition ships (AE) have been authorized for construction during the coming year. The new ships will have an over-all length of 502 feet and a displacement of about 10,000 tons. The main propulsion power will be supplied by steam turbines. The new AE's are designed to meet the requirements of rapid replenishment at sea and will have elevators for internal handling of ammunition as well as the most modern methods of storage approved by the Bureau of Ships.—News release.

#### **Atomic Defense**

Practical field training for defense against atomic warfare is being conducted for troops in the Third Army area with the use of a radioactive metal, *Tantalum 182*. Capsules containing the radioactive metal are stored in lead pipes weighing about 400 pounds each. These pipes, for training purposes, are then placed in remote spots on the various posts and troops employing radiation detection instruments establish the location of the radiation sources. These locations are then plotted on maps and the simulated areas of radioactive contamination are defined.—News release.

#### **Flying Stiletto**

The X-3 is a dagger-shaped research plane designed to fly 2,000 miles an hour at high altitudes. It has a fuselage length



Dagger-shaped plane gives view of future.

of 66 feet, 9 inches and a wing span of only 22 feet, 8 inches. Viewed from above the plane represents a huge stiletto. Its performance data are still classified.—News release.

#### **Aid Peak**

An all-time record sum of \$7,030,000,000 for foreign aid was paid during the past fiscal year by the United States. This was a boost of nearly 2 billion dollars over the previous year—most of which was in military aid.—News release.

### Supersonic Interceptor

The nation's first delta-wing, supersonic, all-weather interceptor, the *F-102*, incorporates significant improvements in electronics and armament to make possible around-the-clock interception of en-



Artist's drawing of classified interceptor.

emy bombers. The plane is capable of supersonic speeds in straight and level flight. The single place *F-102* is powered by a *J-57* turbojet engine. Performance and configuration data are classified.—News release.

### Distinguishing Label

A bright yellow label reading *U. S. ARMY* sewed on the field uniforms of United States soldiers will allow them to be distinguished from troops of other services, as well as foreign troops receiving American military aid, having field uniforms similar to those worn by the Army. The label will be worn on the upper left breast of field clothing. It will be  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inches in length and  $\frac{3}{4}$  inches in width. The golden yellow block letters will be  $\frac{3}{4}$  inches in height on a black background. The labels will appear in March.—News release.

### Powerful Engine

The most powerful turbojet aircraft engine in the world, the *J-57*, is now in quantity production in the United States. The engine, rated in the 10,000-pound thrust class by the Air Force, is the first to achieve a five-figure power rating. It powers the heavy jet bomber, the *B-52 Stratofortress*, and the supersonic fighters—the *F-100 Super Sabre* and *F-102*. It will also be used in the *F-101* and Navy aircraft.—News release.

### Large-Size Transistor

A large-size transistor with a 20-watt output has been developed for use in the field of automatic controls. About the size of a small thimble, the new transistor is more than 100 times more powerful than the tiny nugget-like transistors now going into "tubeless" hearing aids and radio equipment according to reports.—*Science News Letter*.

### Miniaturization

In order to get more effective results with less bulk and weight, the trend of all electronics instruments and devices seems to be toward miniaturization. The transistor, which led the way in this trend, has now been called too large. Another development is a hermetically sealed sub-miniature resistor which is only  $1\frac{1}{4}$  inches long and  $3/16$  inches in diameter. A miniature gyroscope, used in guided missiles, fire control systems, and aircraft instruments, is only 1 inch in diameter, less than 2 inches long, and weighs less than 3 ounces, yet neither precision nor reliability are sacrificed because of size. The Handie-Micro-Talkie unit, weighing less than 2 pounds, is capable of transmitting over distances up to 2 miles. It uses sub-miniaturized components, including plated circuitry and a self-contained long-life battery. The double-looped antenna serves as a convenient handle to carry the unit.—News release.

### Armored Boot

A new boot weighing 3½ pounds, designed to protect servicemen from small antipersonnel land mines as well as from very cold weather, is being studied by the Navy. A vapor layer around the foot gives some protection against extreme cold. *Dynasorb*, a new plastic that absorbs a lot of energy and is fragment-resistant, provides the bottom part of the vapor layer, just under the outer sole.

Above this white plastic layer there is a layer of green pressure, or blast, resistant material of another plastic that is full of nitrogen-filled bubbles. It looks like foam rubber, but unlike foam rubber, the bubbles are not continuous. Under blast pressure, each of these separate bubbles may expand like a balloon, break, and collapse. As each cell is separate from others in its layer, the cells do not balloon and collapse together. The Navy is experimenting with improved models of the boot.—*Science News Letter*.

### Truck Tires

The synthetic rubber Army truck tire has materially decreased the Army's requirement for natural rubber as well as saving more than 10 million dollars. For a 2½-ton truck size, the mileage has been increased from 16,900 to 26,500 road miles in recent years.—News release.

### Robot Weatherman

The Weather Bureau, Navy, and Air Force are co-operating on plans for operational tests of a weather computer. The robot, a big electronic computing machine, can produce in 90 minutes information derived from millions of mathematical steps—a task which would take a human forecaster about 7 years of pencil work. The robot would make it possible to use far more data than is presently used in preparing forecasts—thus taking much of the guesswork out of forecasting.—News release.

### Jet Transport

A completely new, high-speed commercial jet transport, the *M-186*, is designed to cruise at 570 miles an hour, and will carry either passengers or bulk freight. The transport will be powered by two



Artist conception of *M-186* jet transport.

*J-67* engines and will normally carry 44 passengers. The engines will be located in the wing, slightly aft of the passenger compartment, to minimize noise and contribute to greater passenger comfort.

The *M-186* has a wingspan of 100 feet, a length of 98 feet, 7 inches, and a height of 31 feet, 8 inches. It will feature the "cusp" wing, a hybrid developed from the delta and conventional straight wing, offering increased range from the former and stability at low speeds from the latter.—News release.

### Monazite Supply

Monazite, a mineral used in atom bombs, is being supplied to the United States by Ceylon.—News release.

### Minute Men

The Army recently announced plans to use National Guardsmen in antiaircraft defense of our major cities and industrial centers. Units are to be established at 91 sites, in 26 states, from coast to coast.

National Guard units will be furnished the most modern equipment and will augment regular Army antiaircraft defenses.—News release.

### Rescue Boat

Described as the largest and fastest boat ever built for Air Rescue Service, a 94-foot craft is undergoing final tests. The craft is powered by three 1,500 horsepower marine gasoline engines and is expected to have a cruising speed of 25 knots



Air Rescue craft offers improved service.

and a maximum speed of about 35 knots. It will be assigned to the Air Proving Ground Command at Eglin Air Force Base.

A specially designed timber hull is expected to add increased speed and improved maneuverability. The boat is equipped with the very latest in electronics, including search radar.

A transom gate across the stern, which can be lowered to water level to provide rapid means for rescue of injured survivors, is another feature of the craft. There is also a dispensary with complete medical facilities for immediate first aid care.—News release.

### Health Statistics

The Army has drastically cut the rate of illness and disease due to its preventive medicine program. Disease admissions averaged approximately 852 per 1,000 soldier strength annually during World War I. During World War II, the rate was reduced to 588 and dropped to 468 in the Korean conflict. Analyzed in conjunction with total troop strength, the figures reveal that 41.6 per 1,000 men were not available for duty because of disease during World War I. During World War II, this figure was reduced to 28.5 and 18.4 for Korea.

New procedures and techniques in the care and handling of sick and wounded soldiers has enabled the medical services to reduce the fatality rate which stood at 8.1 percent during World War I to 4.5 during World War II, and to 2.3 during the Korean conflict. New miracle drugs and whole blood at front-line hospitals helped bring about this change. Another aid was the use of mobile army surgical hospitals closer to the front lines than ever before.—News release.

### Soluble Coffee

In an effort to determine how much troops like soluble coffee, the Army Quartermaster Corps is replacing roasted and ground coffee with instant-type coffee in troop mess halls at four installations. The test will last approximately 6 months and will involve about 100,000 troops. The coffee will be prepared in bulk form at the mess halls and no other type of coffee will be served during the test period. A previous survey established the acceptability rating of regular coffee and will serve to determine the relative acceptability of the soluble type. Use of soluble coffee would bring substantial savings as 1 pound of pure soluble coffee is equivalent to about 5 pounds of regular coffee. Normally soluble coffee is used only in operational rations.—News release.



### 'Flying Saucer' Mystery

A double-barreled camera which the Air Force hopes will solve the "flying saucer" mystery has been distributed to about 75 of its bases. It is a simple, 2-lens, stereoscopic camera with a diffraction grating over one lens.—News release.

### Reserve Experiment

A major 6-month experiment designed to bolster its reserve program and make certain that noncombat veterans were recalled to service before men who saw combat was announced by the Army. Ex-soldiers, with reserve obligations, will be given specific assignments after they are released from active service, under the plan.

"Mobilization assignments" with active Army units or installations near their homes will be given to noncombat veterans who must spend 6 years in the reserve. These assignments would run for 1 year if the plan is put into effect permanently. The men would be liable for immediate active duty in event of mobilization during that period. The plan will be tested until June in one military district of each Army area.—News release.


### New Rifle

The search for a new, light rifle for the infantryman has narrowed to a choice between two hard-hitting, fast-firing weapons. One rifle, the *FN*, was developed by the Belgian National Arms Company and the other, the *T-44*, by the United States Army Ordnance Corps. Both .30-caliber weapons are presently undergoing extensive field tests which will require several months to complete.

If accepted, the Belgian rifle might replace such Army weapons as the .45-caliber pistol, the Garand rifle, the carbine, and the small machine gun. It is said to be light, easy to carry, highly accurate, and easy to manufacture.—News release.

### Automatic Interceptor

The all-rocket-armed *F-94C Starfire* is capable of speeds greater than 600 miles an hour. It is armed with 4 dozen 2.75-inch rockets and carries more than 1,200



Cutaway drawing shows the *F-94C Starfire*.

pounds of electronic equipment. The *Starfire* is almost entirely automatic and can track and shoot down a target its 2-man crew may never see, except as a pip on a radar scope.—News release.

### T-10 Parachute

The Army's newest parachute, the *T-10*, which features many safety improvements, is replacing the original pioneer parachute which has been in use since early World War II. Safety records indicate that the injury rate has decreased sharply in units testing the new parachute. With the *T-10*, the rate of descent is 4 feet per second slower than the present model.

It is 30 feet wide at its greatest point and 30 feet wide at the skirt of the canopy, giving it a parabolic shape. It cannot "steal" the air from another parachute, permitting two paratroopers to float to the ground side by side without either parachute collapsing from loss of air. It eliminates almost all the opening shock. The *T-10* is bag-deployed with the risers leaving the closed parachute first and then pulling the silken canopy out of the back pack.—News release.

## NORWAY

### **Dummy Ammunition**

A type of plastic dummy ammunition is being tested by the Norwegian Army. Part of the 600,000 trial production has been sent to other NATO nations.—News release.

## ITALY

### **Electric Power**

Success in the wireless transmission of electric power has been claimed by an Italian inventor. He said that electric energy transmitted without wires operated an electric motor which had been slightly modified for the test. The inventor did not explain how far the receiver was from the transmitter or what kind of equipment was used. The experiments were financed by the Italian government it was reported.—News release.

### **Soviet Pact**

The Soviet Union and Italy, after 6 months of negotiation, renewed the agreement which has regulated trade between the two countries since 1948. Under the agreement, Italy will receive wheat, crude oil, fuel oil, manganese, and chromium in return for citrus fruits, essential oils, machinery, and ships.—News release.

### **Message System**

The only symbol in a new alphabet designed to speed up world telecommunications is a three-sided square. The Italian inventor reproduces the letters and figures of the western alphabet by altering the position of the square's open end in relation to a horizontal line. For example, if the open end faces left, and the symbol is on the line, the letter is D. If it faces the other way, and is above the line, the letter is E. The professor claims his new system has its origins in the Assyrian cuneiform alphabet, which formed its letters from a basic wedged-shaped figure in various positions and angles.—News release.

## SPAIN

### **Technicians**

Technicians will comprise the bulk of the United States forces manning bases in Spain under the new agreement between the two countries. The United States ambassador to Spain said that the bases would be under Spanish command and that there would be no garrisoning of troops in the common sense of the word. United States servicemen in Spain will be mostly technicians such as communications specialists, mechanics, supply men, and others who will provide for the maintenance of equipment.—News release.

## DENMARK

### **Undefended Bases**

A major threat to the entire northern flank of the North Atlantic defense is five big, modern air bases in Jutland, now almost undefended according to high ranking NATO officers. This fear was expressed by NATO officers following a decision by Danish officials that it would not be expedient to allow NATO airmen to man Danish bases.

Denmark has the right to receive help if attacked under terms of the pact, but it is felt that this help would be nullified if it were not requested until an attack had been launched. It is felt that in the event of aggression, the air bases would be the first objectives of the Soviet Air Force, and in their present defenseless condition could be overrun and occupied in a matter of hours. Attacks against Britain and allied shipping could be launched from them.—News release.

## WESTERN GERMANY

### **NATO Base**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's new Spangdahlem Air Base is now in operation. Spangdahlem is one of five bases built jointly by the United States, France, and Western Germany. Construction was begun a year ago.—News release.

## FRANCE


**Jet Interceptor**

A take-off trolley, which is powered by six rocket motors, enables the *S.E. 5000-01 Baroudeur* to takeoff in an exceptionally short distance and also dispenses with the weighty retractable undercarriage assembly needed by most jet aircraft. The pilot controls the trolley, which is automatically braked as soon as the aircraft has taken off, and can be used again for another takeoff.

The French designed plane has skids fitted to the underside of the fuselage for landing. The pilot and the equipment in the aircraft are protected from possible damage by rubber shock absorbers. The *Baroudeur* can takeoff equally well from a rough field or from a smooth runway.—News release.

**Experimental Plane**

The *Leduc 021* is an experimental plane designed for the study of the functioning of the ramjet motor at high altitudes and the perfection of several devices for use




Plane designed to study supersonic flight.

on supersonic planes. It is presently dropped from a mother plane but is capable of an independent takeoff. It is powered by a Turbomeca ramjet engine of 16,530 pounds thrust and is equipped with auxiliary jets.—French Embassy Press and Information Division.

**Small Jet**

The *Sipa 200 Minijet*, designed for the initial training of jet pilots, is one of the smallest jet planes. It is powered by a Turbomeca *Pallas* jet motor of 330 pounds



One of smallest jet planes, the *Minijet*.

thrust and can attain a speed of 248 miles an hour. The mid-wing, all-metal monoplane has a double fin tail unit. It may be used as a liaison plane, also, according to its French designers.—French Embassy Press and Information Division.

**Steering Wheel**

A steering wheel which bends forward in an accident, smashes the windshield outward, and disconnects the ignition system to prevent fires has been successfully tested by the French Army.—News release.

**Deliver Jets**

The French government delivered four *Ouragan* jet fighters, the first of an order of 71 planes under a long-term contract to the New Delhi government, recently. The planes were flown to India by Indian pilots trained in France. About 20 French technicians are being sent to India to train Indians in maintenance and operations of the aircraft, it was announced.—News release.

## AUSTRALIA

### **Nuclear Accelerator**

A machine designed to produce protons—atomic particles—with an energy greater than 10 billion volts is being built for the Australian National University. This would make it the world's most powerful nuclear accelerator as the cosmotron at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Long Island, presently the world's largest, has an energy of 3 billion volts.—News release.

### **Atomic Shelter**

The first shelter in Australia for protection against atomic blast and radiation will be completed soon it was announced. The sub-basement of the Commonwealth Secretariat building in Canberra, only 300 yards from Parliament House, will serve as the shelter. The sub-basement, 25 feet below ground, will provide storage for tons of Commonwealth records as well as providing shelter for thousands of people in the event of an atomic attack.—News release.

## TURKEY

### **Electric Power**

The capacity of the power plant at Catalagzi in northwestern Turkey will be increased from 60,000 kilowatt to 120,000 kilowatt by 1956 at a cost of 11½ million dollars. Three new turbogenerators of 20,000 kilowatt each will be added to the present installation. The plant, constructed at a cost of more than 11 million dollars, burns low-quality, non-marketable coal from the Zonguldak mining area and provides electric power for the coal mines at Zonguldak, for the iron and steel mill at Karabuk, and for northwestern Anatolia in general. A contract for approximately 36 million dollars was also awarded to build a hydroelectric power and irrigation project in the Seyhan Valley area of southern Turkey it was announced.—News release.

## CANADA

### **Jet Service**

Canada will have regularly scheduled jet passenger service within the next 18 months it was announced recently. *Comet* jet aircraft will be used according to present plans.—News release.

### **Blood Donors**

There is the possibility of occasional danger from the use of blood of a universal, or group O, blood donor according to a medical society report. Group O blood may usually be given safely to a patient of the same or another blood group. If the universal donor, however, has had "shots" against typhoid, tetanus, or some of the other diseases for which preventive vaccines are given, his blood may be altered slightly so that it will not be compatible with all other blood groups.—*Science News Letter*.

## JAPAN

### **Guided Missiles**

A guided missiles section to assist arms manufacturers has been established in Japan by a federation of 11 major companies producing electrical equipment, precision machinery, and tools. Several arms manufacturers in Japan are planning to enter the electronic field with the technical aid of foreign companies.—News release.

## GREENLAND

### **Construction Work**

Construction work on the three United States Air Force bases in Greenland at Thule, Sondre-Stromfjord, and Marsarsuak is expected to be completed by next summer it was reported. When completed, it is expected that the bases will be manned by approximately 2,000, 1,000, and 1,200 men, respectively. There are no plans for any additional air bases in Greenland under the NATO defense scheme.—News release.

## GREAT BRITAIN

### Atomic Weapon

The guided missile is a better weapon for tactical atom warfare than the atomic cannon of the United States according to British Commonwealth military leaders. It was announced that Great Britain was not following the lead of the United States in turning out a gun to fire atomic shells.—News release.

### Giant Flying Boat

Envisioning the day of atomic powered aircraft, Great Britain has decided to rejuvenate its giant flying boat project and hopes to have 10-engine seaplanes carrying passengers in 5 years.—News release.

### Caernarvon Tank

The Caernarvon, an experimental tank designed to yield production data for a new heavy tank for British forces, has been described as probably the most powerful tank in the world. The only information available on the tank is that it is an improvement on the *Centurion*, having better armor and a more powerful engine. Its improved suspension and wider tracks



Experimental model for new heavy tank.

will give it lower ground pressure. When the perfected heavy tank is adopted, it will be complementary to, and not a substitute for, the *Centurion*.—British Information Services.

### Guided Rocket

A rocket which will automatically "lock" upon its target, following every twist and turn while traveling at a speed of 2,000 miles an hour, is being sent to the Woormera Rocket Range in Australia for fur-



New rocket flies at 2,000 miles an hour.

ther tests. This latest rocket is said to be superior to previous rockets which have traveled to their targets along a radar beam directed from the ground in that it is unaffected by distance. The nearer the rocket is to the target, the stronger the "scent" becomes.

The new rocket does not have to hit the enemy aircraft to destroy it as it is fitted with a proximity fuze which will detonate the warhead once within striking distance. The initial power for the launching is supplied by four twin-rocket booster engines which fall off once the missile has reached its speed of 2,000 miles an hour. It may be launched from aircraft and ships, or fired from an artillery gun. To reduce weight, plastics are being tested. —British Information Services.

### Tea Powder

A new type of tea powder, containing tea, sugar, and milk, will be tested by troops in Malaya. Army catering experts say that 1 ounce of the powder provides 1 pint of tea.—News release.

## COMMUNIST CHINA

### Strategic Railway

A railway stretching 2,000 miles across the waist of China is being built by Communist China under Soviet supervision. It will provide direct rail transport from Moscow to the borders of southeastern Asia. It will also open up the mineral-rich northwestern province of Sinkiang and will tap the Yumen oil fields in Kansu province. In addition, the line will serve the Soviet atomic energy plants located in Sinkiang's barren wasteland.—News release.

## USSR

### Soviet Navy

A naval building program maintained at peak capacity at all times is underway in the Soviet Union according to Brassey's annual yearbook of the British armed forces. The publication is a nonofficial symposium of news and views by naval, military, and air experts. It indicated that no Soviet building slip ever remains empty and a keel is laid almost immediately after a launching. A steady stream of new ships, mainly cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, is joining the Soviet Navy as a result. The ships of the Soviet Navy, second only to the United States in numerical strength, were considered modern and robust enough to prove formidable adversaries for their counterparts in Western navies according to the report.—News release.

### Bomber Bases

Two atomic bomber airfields, one located at Grossdölln and the other at Vogelsang, both about 60 miles north of Berlin, are reported to be under construction by the Soviets. They will be capable of handling the heaviest atomic bombers. It is also reported that the Soviets are building a third airfield for interceptors at Görlitz on the Polish-German frontier.—News release.

## SWEDEN

### Jet Force

Sweden, with the fourth largest air force, is bolstering the number of her jet aircraft it was announced recently. The major portion of the nation's fighter defense force is already reported to be equipped with 650-mile an hour Swedish SAAB-298(J-29) swept wing jets.

A new 700-mile an hour jet—the SAAB-32 *Lancet*—is presently being flight tested. This all-weather craft is said to be the basis of Sweden's 4-wings (12 squadrons) of specialized attack units.

Estimates place the over-all strength of the Swedish Air Force at about 1,500 first line planes. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain have larger air forces.—News release.

## THE NETHERLANDS

### National Defense

The Director General of the Defense Ministry announced that Holland will have 220,000 trained soldiers by the end of 1954. The national field forces will include 140,000 men, plus 18,000 antiaircraft troops, and 60,000 experienced territorials—all capable of mobilization with 48 hours' notice. In addition, Holland will have an air force of 400 planes and 200,000 men.—News release.

### Shipbuilding

The postwar shipbuilding boom has lifted Holland from sixth to fourth place among the world's shipbuilding nations and has made her the world's leading exporter of ships. The United States, Great Britain, and Germany are the only countries exceeding Holland in shipbuilding. Prefabricated parts are used to a large degree, especially for superstructure. During the past year, 75 ships totaling 304,251 tons were being built for 16 foreign countries, compared with only 74 ships totaling 146,432 tons for Dutch buyers.—News release.



# FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

## North Polar Strategic Cartography

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in "Aeronautics"  
(Great Britain) September 1953.

WHEN Lincoln's Secretary of State Seward agreed to buy Alaska from Russia, he also had in mind the acquisition by the United States of Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland. His object was to protect the United States strategically against attack. Either he was thinking far ahead, into the days of long-range aircraft in which we now live, or he had some other thoughts in mind. It is improbable that he could have visualized the implications of the midtwentieth century. It is more likely that he wrongly imagined that one day the United Kingdom might attempt to retake the United States, using Canada as a base; in that event, the lands he sought would have proved of strategic outflanking military value as bases for American land and sea forces.

### Sea Power

Today, the United States Air Force (USAF) has bases in Denmark's Greenland, and in Iceland. World political developments have procured privileges which, in Lincoln's time, could not even be obtained for cash. Canada is indissolubly

linked with the United States, both commercially and in defense. But England, the former ocean power, is no longer the enemy. She is an ally. The potential enemy is a land power, whose territory juts close to Alaska, but is otherwise geographically remote from the United States, although close in time at jet speeds. As an individual nation, the United States need not fear Soviet submarines or other Soviet marine power; it is only as an ally of Western European peoples, and through her ties in the Pacific that America need make preparation against such potentialities; these weapons might isolate her, but they could not, of themselves, defeat her, as England might once have been able to do through sea power, for the strategic value of surface sea power has declined.

Yet, the great oceans have immense significance in current strategic planning. In the past these wide spaces were the means to extend power outside the state because no state could claim sovereignty over the oceans except by superior force. In the Mediterranean Sea, cradle of western civil-

ization, sea power was used in the time of the galleys as the chief means to establish the relative widths of domain of the littoral states. Greece, Carthage, and Troy disputed, by their proud seagoing galleys, each other's elbowroom and dominion:

The strong-ribb'd bark through liquid mountains cut,  
Bounding between the two moist elements,  
Like Perseus' horse; where's then the saucy boat,  
Whose weak untimber'd sides but even now  
Co-rivall'd greatness?

Words almost prophetic of today, although written 350 years ago of a still more distant period of dim history! The airplane is more than co-rivalling the saucy boat upon its own element.

The rivalry that once existed on the seas has been transferred to the skies. Sovereignty given to individual states in the air space above their domains by international agreement in 1919-22 enables each state to deny the passage of foreign aircraft without its authority given individually, or reciprocally, or through international agreement for the free passage of civil transport aircraft. Military aircraft are barred unless they have specific authority, or have been granted government right to bases, as are American aircraft in the United Kingdom and much of Western Europe, Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft in Holland, Belgium, France, and other national aircraft in various countries of the Western Union.

It is often claimed that the strength of the British Commonwealth lies in the freedom of each member. This may be true politically, but, militarily, an inherent weakness arises from parallel conceptions of national air sovereignty with sequent requests for the withdrawal of RAF aircraft and of bases for them.

#### Air Map

Thus, except when groups of states are militarily (as distinct from merely politically) bound together, pockets of air space are denied to military aircraft.

Therefore, the world air map should distinguish all territory in three colors, representing friendly, neutral, and unfriendly zones, for in the air there is no physical barrier. A fourth color would then represent the oceans of the world, whether frozen or of open water, to show that no sovereignty extends over the air space above them; in this zone freedom of passage exists for all aircraft, military or civil, in peacetime; but in war this freedom is restricted to the superior air power. Thus, the air over the oceans is today almost as important strategically as the waters of these same oceans were when marine power was the great strategic element of military strength.

In relation to air power, the oceans are of importance in war in three ways: first, they afford communicating routes for the greatest volume and weight of materials at the greatest distance from hostile air bases; second, they provide the largest total zone of air space over which no power wields sovereign rights, and which can, therefore, only be gained for strategic use in war by a special form and use of air power; and, third, in some cases they offer the most direct routing for attack against strategically important bases in possible enemy territory.

#### Air Space

The development of oceangoing aviation has surpassed that of oceangoing shipping because of its ability to traverse those oceans which are blocked with ice and so present a permanent barrier to surface vessels.


Because the main land mass of the world lies in the northern hemisphere, the chief restrictions to air passage lie in that hemisphere through the national possession of sovereign rights over pockets of air space. Thus, the ocean zones of the northern hemisphere are the most important ocean air zones for strategic military aviation planning. They open up new

routes to aircraft, and in doing so open up new strategic fronts for air attack. The north polar ocean and its environs form the latest area of strategic preparation for military operations. This development is unique because these preparations must be confined within the perimeter of air strategy, for no other form of strategy is applicable in that region. Already a chain of radar stations runs from Greenland through Canada's northern territories to Alaska, interlinked in a united defense plan which is intrapolar in its siting and intended to give early warning of any aircraft approach from the north polar ocean. Moreover, in this  $4\frac{1}{2}$  million square miles of almost uninhabited land, aircraft are necessary to place, move and supply the radar outposts, change personnel, and transport the sick. Conditions there call for helicopters with a range of between 1,000 to 2,000 miles. Today, weather-reporting aircraft fly regularly over the polar sea. From United States Air Force bases at Ladd, near Fairbanks, in Alaska, and Thule in northwest Greenland, USAF photo reconnaissance and strategic (weather) reconnaissance aircraft maintain regular watch, both visual and radar, over the ice-covered wastes between their bases and the North Pole. Radar and radio stations track these aircraft and maintain contact between their crews and the ground posts in the far northland. Exercises are carried out under ground and air conditions which would have been prohibitive to air activity only a few years ago. Modern civil engineering equipment makes it possible to create an air base anywhere in the world; modern architectural and building engineering developments make it a livable proposition afterward. All three have converted Arctic living conditions to suit man.

At Ladd one can be warmer in mid-winter than on the equator. That would not have been possible 20 years ago.

### New Information

Information has been obtained about the north polar ocean in the years since World War II ended, which was unknown be-



These sketches indicate diagrammatically the principle behind the 'Rotated Mercator' projection, comparing it with the normal Mercator. The conventional Mercator gives an equatorial band of comparatively little distortion. In the rotated projection there is a false equator running through the North and South Poles, and the 'cummerbund' then runs north and south (see Figure 3).

fore, or merely guessed at—and that often wrongly. During several decades of polar exploration, surface explorers have reported islands amid those wastes of ice. Their reports were doubted, for on more than one occasion an island located by an explorer could not be found again in the same geographical position. It has been proved now that these reported islands were huge blocks of fresh-water ice. The reason for their disappearance is now known. The "island" had moved on. The

early explorers' reports have been explained.

Three such "islands" have been discovered by the radar of reconnaissance aircraft depicting echoes representing land when flying over the polar ocean. The first such discovery was made from a *B-29 Superfortress* in August 1946 some 300 miles north of Point Barrow, Alaska. What the radar had revealed with precision was an area of fresh-water ice embedded in the salt-water pack-ice. This huge block of fresh-water ice had broken away from the shelf at the foot of the north shore of Ellesmere Island, which is thought to have been formed by the former Ellesmere icecap of glacial origin. Portions of this shelf break away from time to time, carrying moraine materials, rocks, dirt, earth, and dust, and these constituents, becoming exposed during the Arctic summer's partial surface thaw, give the visual impression of an ice-covered island and produce equivalent echoes on radar screens.

Fresh-water ice is tougher than salt-water ice, and so resists the wearing action of sea pack-ice. Its surface is smooth, and is not broken by the cracks and lanes found in pack-ice.

This makes these "islands" visible from the air when atmospheric conditions are suitable, but they are invisible, except to radar, when the Arctic white-out fades everything from sight in a flurry of driving snow.

It is believed that winds, not ocean currents, are the driving power which moves these ice-islands.

The routes of three have been plotted. They move at an average daily speed of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 miles. They travel westward from Ellesmere Island to about 175 degrees west longitude, where they change course to northwestward for about 500 miles, and then turn north to or near the Pole before moving southward back to the neighborhood of their source.

### Air Bases

These ice-islands make it possible to site an air base nearer to the North Pole than was formerly thought possible, for their surfaces (unlike that of the pack-ice) are suitable for landings. The first USAF ice-island air base was 100 miles from the North Pole during part of its occupation. The first landing was made on 19 March 1952, and the ice-island was occupied from that time on, and through the succeeding winter nine men lived there. Its surface measured 9 by 4 miles, and it had a depth of about 150 feet. Supplies, living quarters, snow tractor vehicles, and scientific instruments were flown in. Two landing strips, a main camp, radio, weather, and hydrographic stations, and radio homing-beacons were set up on its surface. The party maintained contact with the outside world by radio and aircraft. One United States Navy aircraft force-landed on the occupied island last year with engine trouble; a new engine was flown there and installed so that the aircraft got away again. Had it not been for the occupation of the ice-island, a special rescue mission would have had to have been organized to rescue the stranded aircrew from the Arctic.

These ice-islands are large enough for semi-permanent airfields, but it is probable that they would be vulnerable to air attack during war. Nevertheless, it is certain that their possession would be disputed and fought for should war come between East and West, for they provide weather stations, emergency landing fields, and advanced radar warning posts. In a less permanent way these Arctic ice-islands can serve the same purpose as Guam served in the strategic bomber operations against Honshu from Tinian and Saipan in 1945. They might be of immense value in war as navigational aids when training time has to be compressed, and when the navigational problems of the Arctic Ocean air routes would have to be solved by the


inexperienced many instead of the highly skilled few who tackle them today. If occupied in war, these ice-islands would have to be stoutly defended. What might happen to them in the searing heat blast of a fission detonation might require an empirical test to disclose.

### North Magnetic Pole

The north magnetic pole is located on the eastern shore of Ommanney Bay in Prince of Wales Island at approximately 100 degrees 30 minutes west and 73 degrees north. For a wide area around that position the vertical component of the earth's magnetic field overrides the horizontal component, so that the latter is too weak to give adequate compass control. Moreover, as maps are drawn relative to the geographical pole, which lies 17 degrees farther north, it is clear that any horizontal direction centering upon the north magnetic pole would be at wide variance with map co-ordinates, and serious navigational errors might result. Directional gyros without other navigational aids are not a sufficient answer, for they are subject to precession, and without a datum from which to reset them, an aircraft might be deflected from its intended course. Maps of the island archipelago between Greenland and Alaska are sketchy, and the visual appearance of the terrain may alter from time to time because of snow and ice changes; both radar and visual fixes are, therefore, difficult.

The nearest permanent air base to the North Pole is Thule at just over 76 degrees north and 68 degrees west (on a normal projection). There is a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) base at Resolute Bay at 74 degrees 50 minutes north and 95 degrees west. The RCAF and RAF cold weather testing station is at Churchill on Hudson Bay at about 58 degrees 30 minutes north and 94 degrees west. Ladd Air Base is 65 degrees north and 147 degrees west. When flying up to the ice-

island from Thule, the USAF aircraft had to steer partly by celestial, but more by dead reckoning, navigation. The *C-47 Dakota* which was to land did not pick up the ice-island, but one of its two accompanying *C-54 Skymasters* located it by radar. The *Dakota* then made the world's first landing on such a base.



A diagram indicating how the Rotated Mercator can be used for navigation. Every straight line passing through the True North Pole is a great circle. Direction can be read off readily as a measurement of arc from true north by taking the great circle line passing through the point of departure as the datum north line. This datum line can quickly be obtained by drawing upon the chart the line connecting the point of departure and the True North Pole. The straight line from the point of departure to the destination is a rhumb line when it departs from the great circle.

To complicate the work of the navigator flying over the North Pole there is the added difficulty that there is no longitude,

and hence neither east nor west. There is only one cartographical direction—south. The puzzle is, which south should be selected to reach the desired location? When they are visible, the sun, moon and stars provide the necessary data for position fixing, just as they do elsewhere; but they are often invisible through weather, or the prolonged twilight when the sun is below the horizon but the sky is too bright to see the other celestial bodies. A necessary corollary to these difficulties is the need to carry ample fuel supplies to allow time for navigational search flight; moreover, sufficient survival supplies must be stowed within the aircraft against emergency.

### Cartograph Difficulties

The question of cartography remains. The ordinary Mercator projection is useless because the mathematical projection it is based upon—when starting from the equator—reaches infinity at the Poles. The most usual north polar regional map, a conical projection centered upon the Pole, is also useless, because it affords no index from which to give steering directions, since all its radial lines run south.

The RAF has developed a grid system to overcome this problem of orientation at the North Pole. The Greenwich or Prime Meridian is taken as a datum line, and lines parallel thereto are drawn on the grid, together with another series of lines running at right angles. On this grid, north is assumed to lie at infinity beyond the Pole along the antemeridian to the Greenwich half meridian. The North Pole thus apparently lies south of Wrangel Island, Churchill lies almost due west, far away Calcutta is almost due east. By superimposing this grid upon the usual polar projection, an artificial means of defining direction is devised and the aircraft can be steered along its course by celestial fixes.

This cartographical artifice is a con-

venient enough solution of his mental problem for the skilled air navigator and captain, who follow imaginary cartographical courses until they fly out of the difficult area. But it is not a convenient device to use for strategical examination of this area, nor is it a useful way to examine the military problems of the opposing land masses which enclose the north polar ocean.

### Recommended Solution

Many years ago the author suggested in a navigation lecture before the Royal Aeronautical Society that a north polar map drawn on the Mercator projection but with an artificial equatorial base would provide cartographical data of the north polar areas which could be obtained in no other way. In collaboration with the author, this projection has been calculated and drawn by Denys Baker, of the staff of *Aeronautics*, and is now presented to our readers as the first known attempt to produce a new form of polar map. Although the projection distorts the land masses into somewhat unfamiliar shapes, these are soon quickly recognizable after a little study, and the whole area becomes readily comprehensible to the eye, unlike the flattened-out orange-top of the usual map of the region, which has to be turned around and around to read the names to discover the various countries.

In order to dispose the main American and Asian industrial centers within the zone of least distortion, the selected equator lies upon the 75 degrees east and 105 degrees west meridian; it passes through Regina and Denver in the occident and Lake Balkhash in the orient. The two hemispheres are thus shown separated by the north polar ocean, and the prime meridian passes through the North Pole at its intersection with the imaginary equator.

This projection needs no grid for the purpose of north polar navigation. It is,





A Rotated Mercator projection is shown with false equator passing through the North and South Poles. In the ordinary Mercator, the distortion increases rapidly toward north and south. In this projection, distortion increases toward east and west, so that a series of maps is best used, each with its false equator at a different longitude. The map reproduced here shows well the opposed land masses of North America relative to the Soviet Union and the relationship between bases and industrial areas on either hand.

in itself, inherently the same as the combined overlay grid and map used by the RAF, if it is orientated so that north is taken to lie at one end of the prime meridian. If our prime meridian were to pass through Greenwich and our equator through 90 degrees east, the map reproduced with this article would have exactly the same navigational value as the RAF dual map and grid. The RAF grid serves for air navigation direction when flying south into the western Europe, Greenland, western America area. The map reproduced here serves equally well for navigation in any direction. Moreover, this Mercator projection, in common with all others of its kind, has the advantage that straight navigational lines drawn upon it are either great circles or rhumb lines. For navigation the central portion could be produced upon a bigger scale.

This Mercator projection of the top of the world shows more clearly than any other north polar projection, I have seen, the facts of the strategic military situation of Canada and the United States relative to that of the Soviet Union. These two territorial groupings are thrown into the vivid reality of their strategic juxtaposition. The reason for the siting of Thule Air Base is at once evident in its strategic relationship to Leningrad and Moscow. The value of ice-islands that pass at a distance of several hundred miles out to sea parallel to the frozen ocean frontage of the North American Continent and orbit back in close proximity to the Pole is clear, for they halve the distance which separates the two continental masses, and so form strategic outposts. The Soviet Arctic coast line throws off no known equivalent floating bases, so that America has the advantage here.

The relative situations of the opposing continent's industrial zones is also seen, and shows that here, too, the advantage lies with America, whose industry gravi-

tates farther from the Arctic than the Soviet Union's.

### Summary

However, the North American Continent is short of strategic bases in the central area of the Far North between Thule and Ladd. The difficulty of logistics in this area of the continent no doubt explains this lack. One must assume that the establishment of the radar chain is but a first step which will lead to the creation of strategic bases between these two main terminal air bases of today. The situation disclosed by this map is sufficiently grave. It indicates that the air operations which would be conducted over the top of the world, if war were to come between the two continental groups, would be mainly strategic bomber operations. The relative scarcity of air bases within the northern territories would restrict the volume of these operations. Hence it would be essential to pack the greatest possible punch into each bomber. The targets which would be aimed at would, in the main, be industrial, with the intention of crippling the ability of the opposing group to continue to wage war upon a major scale. The territorial and geographic conditions of flight and operational volume suggest that to derive real benefit from such over-the-top attack it would be necessary to employ fission weapons. If non-fission weapons were employed, the indications of this theater of operations are that the weight of attack would be too small to have a strategic value, other, perhaps, than that brought about by drawing off for defense purposes an undue proportion of the fighter and static forces of the opponent into an unprofitable zone. Man being what he is, and with things as they are, the evidence points to polar routing for fission attacks. It is the shortest delivery route to certain important targets in the hearts of both continents.

## The Spanish War Potential

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major E. O'Ballance in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) July 1953.

*This article was written before the signing of the recent treaty between the United States and Spain under which the United States will receive the use of military bases in Spain in return for arms and economic aid. The article has been digested for use in the MILITARY REVIEW because of the excellent manner in which the Spanish war potential is treated and the discussion of the possible help the Western powers can expect from Spain in the event of another war.—The Editor.*

OF THE Western European nations, Spain has long been left out in the political cold, but recently there are signs that the stern, censorious attitude of the Western democracies toward its regime is slackening. It, therefore, does not take a great deal of imagination to foresee that it will not be long before Spain is fitted, in some form or other, into the pattern of Western European defense. Assuming, then, that Spain may possibly become a military partner of ours in the future, it may be of more than passing interest to examine her war machine as it is now, and perhaps to speculate on any possible role she may be able to fulfill.

### Military Organization

First let us examine the lay-out and the Spanish Order of Battle. The Army was reorganized in July 1939 and again in 1944. Since 1944, Spain has been divided into nine military regions, each, with one exception, the headquarters of an army corps.

The eight regions are Madrid, Seville, Valencia, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Burgos, Valladolid, and Coruna. The other military

region consists of Granada, Malaga, and Almeria and is occupied by only one division. These eight corps each consist of two divisions. There is also an armored division and a cavalry division at Madrid.

In addition, there are two more corps, one at Ceuta and one at Melilla in Spanish Morocco, each consisting of two divisions. Also in Spanish Morocco there are an armored and a cavalry brigade. The two independent commands of the Canary and Balearic Islands probably each have troops organized on a divisional basis.

The normal strength of a Spanish infantry division is usually listed as between 12,000 and 14,000 men. It consists of three brigades, two infantry and one mixed. The infantry brigades consist of two regiments (battalions, as we would call them), while the mixed brigade is composed of two artillery regiments, one light and one heavy, and units of signal corps, engineers, quartermaster corps, and transportation corps.

The organization of the cavalry divisions is more elastic, and they vary in strength depending largely on the degree of mechanization. A cavalry division may consist of anything from three brigades to only three regiments. There are also a few special troops, such as mountain units, antiaircraft units, and artillery and engineer units, but none in any appreciable number.

Probably the most amazing feature to an outsider who lives in a democratic country, is the size of her regular army and the large numbers of reservists she claims to be able to raise at short notice. The total strength of the 25 divisions on which her peacetime regular army is based is given as between 300,000 and 400,000 men. In early 1950, there was a reorganization

of the Army owing to the shortage of equipment, so the figure would now, of course, be less than that.

It is officially stated that the maximum mobilization strength of the country is 1½ million, and it is boasted that 44 divisions could be mobilized within 36 hours, and that in a matter of days, this figure could be raised to at least 2 million front-line effectives. In a national emergency, to this figure could be added the native military strength of Spanish Morocco, which is estimated to be about 150,000 men. These figures, however, are all theory. There are obviously more factors to be considered in a general mobilization scheme than mere numbers of men available.

Conscription exists in Spain, and it is estimated that about 250,000 young men reach military age every year and are called to service. These conscripts serve for 3 years in the armed forces with, of course, certain exemptions for various reasons.

They are called up usually at the age of 21, although students and others training for professional or trade careers may be deferred. At the age of 27, they are relegated to the first reserve battalions, and at 33 they are relegated further to the second reserve battalions. At 39 they are released from military obligations.

It could be assumed then, that, in an all-out mobilization of the nation such as Great Britain had during the last war, at least 4 million men could be raised and fitted into her war machine. These are very formidable numbers in relation to the total population of the country which is estimated to be about 28 million.

In Spain, the soldier has always had an honorable place in society, and owing to the popularity of military service as a career among the better-educated classes, the Army has always been over-officered. Top-heavy officers' and senior noncommissioned officers' cadres have always been a

prominent feature of the Spanish Army. This, on the face of it, may not be such a bad fault as it seems at first, taking into account the general military character and "military mindedness" of the population, which would, in the case of an emergency, produce large numbers of reservists and recruits.

### Officers' Training

It is estimated that a total of about 10,000 cadets are commissioned every year—not all into the regular army, of course. Students are allowed to finish their studies before being called up, as has been mentioned, and the *University Militias* (Officers' Training Corps) are organized into units corresponding to the different arms in the service, such as infantry, signal corps, cavalry, or engineers. The candidates then serve for a year in the ranks of the regular army, followed by 4 months as a sergeant, and then a further period as a subaltern officer.

The length of this last period varies, depending on whether they intend to make the Army their career.

Those selected to become regular officers are trained first of all at the General Military Academy at Zaragoza. From there, students are sent to the various specialist training schools according to their selected arm of the service—infantry to Toledo; cavalry and tanks to Valladolid; artillery to Segovia; engineers to Burgos; and law and staff work to Madrid.

There is a staff college for which officers compete for places. Successful officers complete three separate courses there, a preliminary one and two more of a more specialized nature. Also there is a senior staff college where senior officers are trained and examined for further promotion, such as colonels to brigadier generals and brigadier generals to divisional generals. Ranks throughout the Spanish Army correspond to those in other European armies.

Deserving a brief mention in this military survey are the civil police, who are recruited and organized along military lines. Their estimated strength is about 250,000. Many of them are armed with small arms and are highly disciplined—especially the civil guard—which is commanded by seconded Army officers.

Breaking down the Army into its component parts, it is estimated that at least 65 percent of the personnel are infantrymen of the guerrilla type. The next largest land force is the artillery of which there are 60 regiments.

There are 20 cavalry regiments—mostly mechanized to some slight degree—14 regiments of engineers and 2 of signal corps, plus the usual small units of quartermaster corps, medical, veterinary, and transportation corps.

Next let us consider the arms and equipment of the Spanish forces. Nearly half the national budget of Spain is devoted to the armed forces, but even so, owing to the acute poverty of the country, the Army is very poorly equipped by modern standards. In the first place, Spain cannot afford to buy modern arms and equipment in large quantities. In the second place, even if she could, many of the democratic countries would refuse to sell her arms or war material on principle. So she has had to buy where and when she could. The obvious answer to this was that arms, armor, munitions, and military supplies had to be manufactured in Spain itself. She has made a good attempt at starting these factories, but as yet their contribution, compared with that of any first class power, is negligible.

In the infantry there are five types of rifles and four kinds of machine guns in use. The ammunition problem here can be imagined. In the artillery there are in use at least 12 types of guns, most of them being anything up to 20 years old, and few being later than 1944. There is only one completely equipped tank division, and

most of the armor in use throughout Spain came from pre-1944 Germany. Lack of spare parts and trained personnel keep the mechanized forces weak. Spain has no modern tanks, artillery, or engineering equipment, and so far as is known, no radar.

To sum up briefly on the state of her arms and equipment, it can be said that she is still at the "rifle and machine gun" stage, and while such armament might possibly be considered to be sufficient, taking into consideration the terrain of the country, for home defense, much technical training would be needed before Spain could successfully stand up to a first class power.

### Morale and Discipline

Of the state of morale of the Spanish Army, it is difficult for an outsider to judge. Rumors come filtering through of a "ragged and ill-disciplined" Army, and are made much of in an unfriendly press, but they cannot be treated too seriously. On the other hand, Spanish official reports declare that morale has never been higher. "Ragged" the Army certainly is compared with, say, the well-equipped and well-dressed American forces, but the economic situation of a country has much to do with the way she dresses her troops.

About the state of discipline, it is even harder to generalize. The Spaniard is more individualistic and consequently more difficult to handle than, for instance, the less imaginative Teuton. He is also of a different temperament. As near as can be assessed, the discipline of the Spanish Army approximates closely that of the French, in that it is more "democratic" to our way of thinking, than the more rigid Prussian model. As to which is the more effective under active service conditions, there are advocates for both sides. Much depends, I think, both on the standard of leadership and the basic material.

The Air Force, or Army of the Air as

it is called, was reorganized as an independent service in 1939, and has now an estimated strength of about 30,000 men. Of aircraft, there are about 1,000 of all types in service, of which about 300 are fighters. They are mostly, with perhaps a few exceptions, pre-1940 German and French types. So far as is known, there are as yet no jet aircraft in Spain. Expansion of the Air Force would present many problems, and it would take a long time to train it up to the standard of that of a first class power. The chief drawback would be the time it would take to train the technicians required to maintain the aircraft in the air.

Considering the length of the Spanish coast line, the Spanish Navy is extremely small. Although there is a strong martial spirit in the country, there is, in spite of the past glorious naval tradition, comparatively little enthusiasm for service in the Navy. It is nowhere near as popular as the Army.

The total strength of the Navy is estimated to be about 20,000 men. It consists of 6 cruisers, all pre-1931, 18 destroyers with another 18 under construction, and a few small craft, such as mine sweepers, mine layers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. The deduction drawn from this picture is that the Spanish Navy could at the best play only a token part in any future hostilities.

### Communications

In considering the Spanish war potential, internal communications must not be left out. By our standards they are poor and would adversely affect any mobilization scheme. Spain has an area of just over 190,000 square miles, compared with Great Britain's 88,550 square miles.

The total length of roads of all types in Spain is about 80,000 miles, compared with 177,000 miles in Great Britain. Of these 80,000 miles, only about 44,000 are fit for trucks, while less than 14,000 miles

have macadamized surfaces. The main roads, or "circuit roads" as they are called, radiate outward from Madrid, like the spokes of a wheel, toward the coastal towns. The secondary roads are very poor and are out of the question as far as any large-scale movement of trucks is concerned.

General Franco was considerably hampered by the poor state of the roads during his campaigns in the Civil War, and is fully aware of this drawback and is doing his best to improve them, but he is restricted and limited by economic factors.

From a military point of view, the railroads are far worse than the roads, there being only about 11,000 miles of track open for traffic, compared with Great Britain's over 30,000 miles. Again, the lines radiate from Madrid to the coastal towns. The railway is mostly single track, double track being exceptional. The rolling stock is old and can neither be replaced nor repaired by native materials. Coal, which previously came in large quantities from Great Britain, is now very scarce, and the local coal is of very poor quality.

### Recent Events

Having looked briefly at Spain, let us consider some of the more recent events which will put us more fully into the picture. During the recent world war, the chief democratic countries, that is America, Great Britain, and France, strongly disapproving of the Spanish form of government, had as little to do with that country as possible. Since the end of the war, however, and the rise of the ugly menace of communism in Eastern Europe, the American attitude toward Spain has changed slightly, although that of France and Great Britain has remained the same. In spite of strong protests from France and Great Britain, overtures have been made to Spain and some measures of economic aid have already been granted by America.



When asked in January 1951, whether Spain would be willing, given modern arms and equipment, to put forces under General Eisenhower's command, General Franco indicated a preference for direct collaboration with the United States of America rather than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). America, ignoring both France and Great Britain, had talks with General Franco. In July 1951, a party of United States Senators visited Spain, and General Franco boasted that he could raise an army of 2 million effectives, were he given equipment and supplies. But later, General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, put the figure at between 300,000 and 400,000, evidently bearing in mind the many limiting factors to mobilization in that country.

Talks held in Madrid in July 1951, by Admiral Sherman of the United States to discuss the use by American forces of Spanish naval and air bases, in return for military aid, were only described officially as "exploratory."

In August 1951, a United States Survey Team visited Spain to inspect Spanish bases. This team also reported on the state of the Spanish Army. It stated briefly, that it found the Spanish Army to consist of about 250,000 men, grouped into 22 weak divisions. This statement confirms the figures previously quoted to some extent. Its report on the state of equipment and arms bore out what was known and suspected. It also stated that small arms were plentiful in the Spanish Army, but that all its other equipment was that which was left over from the Civil War, and was a varied assortment of Italian, German, French, and Russian origin, which was to say the least, miscellaneous. The American Survey Team also said that in their opinion the largest military maneuver that could be undertaken was that of battalion strength.

In September 1951, it was announced

that a number of Spanish officers of infantry and armored units would be sent to America for a 6-months' training course with the American Army.

The object behind these American overtures is undoubtedly the fact that she wants naval and air bases in Spain, presumably on the same lines and on the same conditions as she has bases in other European countries, Great Britain included—bases manned entirely by United States personnel. The bases, most frequently mentioned by popular rumor, that America desires are Cadiz, Cartagena, Ferrol, Santa Cruz, Barcelona, Madrid, and Seville.

On the other hand, General Franco is undoubtedly anxious to get military aid and equipment for his forces, but at the same time he does not seem anxious to have any foreign troops in Spain. Perhaps he still vividly remembers some of the problems foreign troops on Spanish soil presented during the Civil War, or perhaps he just thinks that by hanging on, he may get a better bargain. Whatever his reason is, so far he has not agreed to the American request.

Briefly, that is the picture that Spain today presents to us. Not a particularly encouraging one if we are looking to her to become our future ally, especially as we have our own economic and rearmament problems to handle.

### War Potential

Let us now examine one or two of the more important factors that should be considered when analyzing the Spanish war potential. The most prominent of these is Spain's strategic position. America fully realizes the value of this and is apparently prepared to sink any politically ideological differences that may exist between the two countries to make use of it.

Naval and air bases in Spain would enable NATO to control the Mediterranean more effectively. This is of particular im-

portance as the problem of control of the Mediterranean is causing anxiety, as the whole pattern of the defense of the Middle East is very much in the melting pot at the moment. Established bases in Spain would make the whole pattern of the defense more complete and would weld together the land-mass of Western Europe into one bloc. Airfields for long-distance bombers, as well as facilities for their fighter escorts, would seriously add to the difficulties of an aggressor and broaden the front operating against him. Also flying conditions are much better in Spain than they are in many of the NATO countries. There are no long periods in winter when aircraft cannot take off owing to bad weather, such as there are in Great Britain, for instance. This in wartime would be an important advantage.

Another important factor is that of manpower. Spain's large regular army, with the reserves she boasts of, and the possibility of her being able to mobilize, with certain limitations up to 2 million men to form the framework and backbone of her war machine, certainly give food for thought, particularly as manpower seems to be rather a problem with some of the NATO countries. Some of these countries have not been able to reach their target, chiefly through not having enough men to fill the divisions that they should have ready to meet any emergency. There is no doubt that on the face of it, excluding the factors of time, equipment and training, the number of divisions that Spain could produce to fight in Europe, compares more favorably with any other west European country.

#### Limiting Factors

But there are several limiting factors to these large numbers, not the least of which is the state of the internal communications of the country, which would severely limit the numbers of men who could be trained and maintained at one

time. Set against this well of manpower, is the disadvantage that any Spanish force would not only have to be re-equipped, but would have to be trained in the use of modern weapons and tactics. This could not be done in a day.

Looking back, it has been estimated that about half the supplies we sent to the Soviet Union at such great sacrifice to ourselves at a critical period during the war, were neutralized, not by the Germans, but by the Soviets themselves, through not being familiar with them. This could well happen in Spain. She might demand, and be given, large quantities of vital war material, radar, guns, aircraft, and armor, and not know how to use or maintain them. In which case such material would be criminally wasted, and, moreover, any reverse suffered by Spanish arms through depending on such modern equipment in battle, would badly upset their morale.

The ideological aspect must also be considered. There is no doubt that the present Spanish regime is bitterly anti-Communist, and as we are led to believe, so are the majority of the Spanish people. How strongly General Franco is entrenched, and how great is his influence in his own country, are not only matters of conjecture, but are bordering on the political, which has no place in this purely military article. It is sufficient to say that he boasts that should it come to a fight against communism, the whole country would enter it wholeheartedly, and there would be no "underground" or "fifth column" problem to contend with, as France might have in similar circumstances. These are the opinions attributed to General Franco himself and are freely quoted in Spain by its people.

But the fact remains that as long as Spain remains neutral, there is an uneasy gap, almost a vacuum in the pattern of Western European defense. Spain is a poor country and unrelieved poverty is the breeding ground of communism. Should

the present Spanish regime weaken or change, there is the possibility of a change in the political outlook in that country, and with it, as a reaction to the present totalitarian rule, might come into power a government sympathetic to Communist ideals.

### Fighting Qualities

In war the quality of the material is very important. Mere numbers alone are not always sufficient, and indeed, if they are of poor quality, they are often a drawback, so perhaps a word about fighting qualities would not be out of place. The individual bravery of the Spaniard is unquestioned, and there are countless incidents of heroism that occurred during the Civil War, on both sides, that more than amply confirm this. But it is generally agreed that the Spanish soldier is, first and foremost, a guerrilla fighter. Indeed, the Army training emphasizes this aspect, and he is trained primarily for this purpose.

A guerrilla fights well only in one place, that is at home. Transport him to another country miles away, and he immediately loses his incentive and his background. There is little doubt that all Spaniards would fight valiantly and determinedly on Spanish soil, in defense of their own country against any invader, but the question to be considered is how would Spanish divisions, even properly trained and equipped, behave in Eastern Europe, even though strongly imbued with anti-Communist ideals.

The only yardstick we have for comparison is the Spanish Blue Division, which fought against the Soviets in 1942-43, as part of the German forces. Once away from home their morale and fighting ability deteriorated rapidly, and they were little match for the Soviets. But it must be said on their part, that they were fighting on Soviet soil against Soviets who were fanatically defending their home-

land, while they, the natural guerrillas, were fighting away from home and as part of that efficient and cold-blooded German war machine. There is, of course, no reason why the Spaniards should not be trained up to, and even beyond, the standards of the former German Army, but it would take time, and much, I think, would depend on the material of the officer class.

### Possible Courses

Finally, we come to speculate on the probable role that Spain may fulfill in the near future. It is always difficult to prophesy future events, but it can be fairly safely assumed that there are three probable courses open to her. First, she can join NATO unreservedly (that is assuming that differences can be ironed out and the other countries concerned are prepared to admit her as an equal). Second, she can remain strictly neutral, as she is now. Third, she can come to some private arrangement with America and grant the use of certain bases to United States troops in return for military aid for her armed forces. There is a fourth course which, while the present regime is in power, cannot be seriously considered, and is that of becoming sympathetic to or allying herself with any Communist power.

The first probable course, that of unreservedly joining NATO may, of course, happen. America may dangle tantalizing bait in the shape of loans, technicians, trade agreements, material, and so on in sufficient quantities and on such generous and friendly terms as to induce General Franco to throw his sword in with us. Any objections that Great Britain and France may have to this may be smoothed out by American pressure and negotiation. Again, this is more doubtful, as while Spain is turning to America as from sheer economic necessity, Franco and the Spanish people have not yet forgotten the unfriendly attitude of both the British and French governments. Spain cannot forget

that it was British and French pressure that caused ambassadors to be withdrawn from Madrid after the war. True, relations are bettering as time goes on, but only slowly, and as yet they cannot be honestly described as cordial.

The second course, that of remaining neutral, may continue. Spain is only slowly recovering from the devastating effects of civil war and has no desire to be dragged into a world conflict and so run the risk of being ruined completely. Neutrals in any war usually prosper from a commercial point of view, as Spain found to her benefit in 1914-18, and given a completely free choice, there is no doubt that she would prefer to remain aloof from any future conflict. Her economic recovery has for some time been restricted by a semi-blockade by the democratic countries and she wants to resume trading operations as soon as she can to recover some measure of her former prosperity, but at the same time she does not seem to be keen to enter into any sort of commitment.

But the issue is not as simple as that. Against this easy going course of neutrality, there is the shadow of communism rising in Eastern Europe and threatening to engulf the world, Spain not excepted. General Franco has as much cause as any other man in Western Europe to know and fear communism. He recognized it in its early stages and actively fought against it during the Civil War. So, although it is possible that Spain may continue her attitude of strict neutrality, there is no doubt that General Franco is fully alive to the dangers, and does not want to be caught on the hop. If, hoping for the best, he waits until he is attacked, his Army will still be ill-equipped and he will obviously be in no position to put up more than a token resistance.

The third course, which seems to be the most probable, is that of coming to some agreement with America and allowing her to have the use of certain air and naval

bases in return for economic and military aid. The reluctance on the part of Spain seems to be the objection to having foreign troops on Spanish soil. But General Franco cannot have his cake and eat it. America is no fool, and is obviously not going to put quantities of vital and specialized equipment, such as radar and jet aircraft, into untrained, and to their minds, untried hands. That would be too much of a gamble.

### Advantages

An advantage of this course to General Franco would be the fact that he would only have America to deal with, and he need not have any more to do with Great Britain and France than would upset Spanish public opinion. By allowing America to have bases in Spain, he would, he realizes, associate himself with the pattern of Western defense in Communist eyes, but that should not bother him unduly, as there is little doubt how the Communists view him and his regime. In return for the leasing of these bases, he would get the war material he so badly needs and would be able to build and train his armed forces. Then should Spain be attacked, he would be able to put up an organized resistance with some degree of success.

What is Franco waiting for? He wants arms and equipment, and he wants them badly. Why he is holding off for so long is a matter of opinion, either he is hoping to get a better bargain or he is hoping that the Communists will lose the "cold war" and fade back into obscurity again. There is, of course, the rumor that General Franco is anxious to "fit in" some of his overnumerous officers, and that the Americans are not over anxious to have hordes of Spanish officers, with no technical knowledge and little, if any, experience of modern warfare, cluttering the place up, standing on their dignity, and that negotiations have bogged down on this point.

## The Soviet Soldier and His Loyalties

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in "Die Deutsche Soldatenzeitung" (West Germany) 23 July 1953.

"EACH American soldier has a truck; ten English soldiers have a truck between them; the German infantryman carries a pack; but Ivan carries a small sack with bread and turnips with him, and lives a week on them."

This, in substance, was the saying among the soldiers in the last war, and it was not particularly exaggerated. Since then, the picture has changed but little. At most, differences are now more clearly defined: differences, that is, in the equipment of the Soviet elite units—of certain armored units and, above all, of the elite combat troops of the Ministry of State Security forces (MGB), the former People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)—and of the line units for the massed frontal attacks of the "Ivans." How do they live? What do they have? What do they think?

### Sixteen Hour Day

"Ivan" has very little to move him to laughter. It begins with a post card: "Citizen Ivan Ivanovich Ivanosky will report at 0600 of such and such a date, at the office of the Draft Board. One suit of clean underwear, and a spoon to eat with will be brought along." Every year, 750,000 Soviet citizens receive a similar card.

The uniform they give him is extremely shabby—but Ivan does not notice this so much, as he hardly knows, or is accustomed to anything better. He receives two pairs of baggy knee breeches—one pair black, of a coarse wool mixture for the winter; the other of greenish, cotton khaki. In addition, there are two Soviet blouses—again one heavy, and one for summer wear. If Ivan should ever be promoted, then, of course, his uniform will, by degrees, become much better looking. Around his feet,

he wraps strips of cloth—stockings or socks are available for officers only. And then the crowning piece: broad, heavy boots of rough black leather, the toes of which are flattened out by much wearing. The more creases these shoes have, the prouder Ivan is, for the accordeon effect is regarded as especially smart.

Thus, Ivan begins his 24 months of prescribed military service—which often enough, becomes 48 or 60 months, without his being able to do anything about it. At 0530 comes reveille! This is followed by morning calisthenics, the daily obligatory shave, breakfast—a large plate of *kasha* (thick barley gruel), six thick slices of black Russian bread, and unsweetened tea. Then he cleans his spoon by wiping it on the arm of his uniform, sticks it in his boot, and training begins.

From 0700 to 1100, there is field training: especially difficult training in the field, often with the use of live ammunition, even in small exercises—and quite frequently, men are wounded. At the present time, technical training with weapons occupies an especially important place. Ivan must be able to handle and take care of all of the most important types of weapons, vehicles, and equipment.

The midday meal is, day in and day out, the same, monotonous, overly greasy food that is rich in starch, and deficient in albumen.

The afternoon goes by like the morning: outside duties, political instruction, the cleaning and mending hour, and care of weapons. At 1800, there is an equally frugal evening meal. In the evening, there is often *lishnoe vremia* (free time). During this period, Ivan may write letters or, once a week, go to the soldiers' theater. He may also, together with others in the

large room in which, as a rule, as many as 60 men are quartered, amuse himself singing ballads and *kastushki*—lively 4-line choruses. But often the evening is devoted to “indirect training”—a voluntary engagement in additional political schooling, discussions, work, and military training.

Sundays are service-free. In the Soviet Union there are—barring the interference of the political leaders—passes to be had to the neighboring cities. In occupied countries, however, this is not so—for Ivan might soak up some anti-Soviet ideas. Strong beer is not obtainable in open sale—only in the officers’ messes—and, he can not afford vodka, for he receives only 30 rubles pay a month and out of this he must pay for his sewing kit, his cleaning materials, and other items of necessity.

At 2300, the day has run its course, a day which, as a rule, comprises 12 hours of training but which, many times, may be extended to 16 hours, especially when the political commissars or the commanders of the unit are overly zealous or seeking promotion.

### Disciplinary Punishment

If the training is weighing heavily upon Ivan, the highly refined disciplinary punishment meted out finishes the job, for it is based on the ancient principle of “divide, then dominate!” Amount and severity of punishment are regulated by a form of sliding scale, based on service grade, and thus are largely a matter of arbitrary choice. As a private, for example, Ivan is given, for the same offense, a more severe punishment than if he were a noncommissioned officer. And the regimental commander metes out more severe punishment for the same offense, than does the company commander—which Ivan’s simple mind feels to be a crying injustice, although for centuries it has been drilled to see, not only absolute power, but abso-

lute justice in all in authority. But, *Nichevo!*—What can one do!

And then he shrugs his shoulders when, for example, his comrade, Maxim Maximovich is sent to a Siberian Prison Camp for 10 years because he told something or other, of little consequence, to a Soviet civilian about his unit. Or like the time when his sergeant major lost his service pistol, and was given 4 years for it; when an unexcused absence of a short period—about 2 hours overstay on a pass—brings 10 years; or, also, when unintentional failure to salute—which after 1918 had been done away with as typifying the hated Czarist military oppression—drew 5 days of punishment with the labor service.

A large number of Ivans desert. Of the many thousands of deserters who have come to Germany and Austria in recent years, the majority named this disciplinary punishment as the reason for their flight.

### The Soviet Officer Corps

If anything shows that the Soviet society bears the most marked class characteristics conceivable, it is the composition and standard of living of the officer corps of the Soviet Army. Along with the higher “Party Intelligence” and “Corps of Experts,” who, today, are firmly established, the officer corps is the third supporting pillar of the Soviet community, and this community rewards it lavishly. This does not apply to reserve officers, and it is only with the rank of colonel and above, that the career officers are accorded special recognition. In the lower grades, the officer may, for example, wear a black lambskin cap, but even the regular Army captain keeps aloof from the world about him to a degree that is unknown in other countries.

The advantages begin with the pay and include the Czarist uniforms, glistening with gold, that have been re-introduced, on down to the countless orders with which Stalin was accustomed to adorn deserving



and highly approved marshals and generals. These orders often possess a high intrinsic value—for example, the Order of Lenin of the highest class, gives the holder 30,000 marks. And the advantages may be considered to find their culmination, in a material way, in the enormously reduced prices of the *gostorgof* (the officers' stores which are stocked, in an echeloned manner, with goods in accordance with the service grade of those authorized to buy there); and in a non-material way, with the rigorously enforced order that the Soviet subordinates, today, instead of simple *Da!* (Yes!), must say, *Tak tochno!* (Yes indeed, most obediently!); and in place of the Russian *Nyet*, (No), they must say, instead, *Nikak nyet!* (No, by no means!) in reply to orders—and this in a country where the population, otherwise, is becoming more and more careless in its speech!

### The Battle for Power

It is entirely clear, that future developments will depend on how the Soviet Army conducts itself. But who is the Red Army? Who leads it? Number 1 man, at the present moment, is Marshal Nikolai Bulganin. He was Stalin's right hand man. For several years, he commanded all the forces west of the Soviet border. But he is a member of the Soviet secret police (GPU). He started in the military officers' corps of the NKVD, not in the Army.

The man to whom everyone looks has allowed himself to be pushed into the background. He is the former Czarist officer, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Alexander Vasilevsky. At 54 years, he is still young, and in a non-Bolshevist country, could have a future.

One of the most outstanding men, possessing a "military mind," is the man who, in the minds of the people, won the war for the Soviet Union—Marshal Georgii Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin. If the Soviet Union should become a military

state empire, then he will come to the front. One man who will serve everyone, and whom all will need, is the present chief of the General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovsky—young, elegant, courteous, but determined, and of a high intelligence. He is the man in the Army, who best knows the leading military men of the West, and their ways of thinking.

If one looks for action on the part of the Army, it will come quickest from an impetuous, fearfully active, and rather impatient man, who is well known in Germany—Lieutenant General Vasilii Zhukov, the real conqueror of Stalingrad. He is said to be the leader of an emphatically national, radical, younger officers' corps, which is tired of the many misunderstandings in the country.

All other marshals and ranking generals of the Soviet Army are, in contrast with these, colorless and of no consequence.

### Attitude of Officers

How does the Soviet officer corps feel about the present situation? It is safe to assume that these men are satisfied with their present positions, and that they will fight to retain them at any cost. There is no group, however, which does not have its own ideas and desires, and which may some day try to put these into effect.

To think militarily, is to think strategically. To think strategically, means, above all, to be ready on time for any conceivable development. It is a sound assumption that the West will fight a preventive war. Therefore, plans are surely prepared for this eventuality by the strategic planners. In addition, these strategic planners, most likely, have prepared their own personal plans.

Among the questions facing the planners are these:

1. Should the attack be launched against the external threats first, and then, after these have been eliminated, carry out the necessary purges within the country?

2. Should they wait for the attack, give ground, draw the adversary into the depths of the vast Soviet expanse, and count on time, on politically attritional fatigue, and the as-good-as-certain, crude political mistakes of the enemy's occupational policies?

3. Should they wait for the greatest surprise of all—a change over to the side of the West?

4. Should they defend the Motherland to the bitter end in spite of everything? Or should they, by means of sabotage, hasten the fall of the regime, with all of its defects?

#### The Soldier's Course

And whom will Ivan follow? What is the meaning of the artful double talk of the policies of the one in power; the rumors which circulate of secret opposition on the part of this or that general, this or that clique? Actually there is little to all this. The *Muzhik* will march for-

ward or backward just as he is ordered.

If, however, one day, there is no longer any one there to order—will he, then, raise his hands, and wave the *propusk* (pass) dropped from the airplane, guaranteeing him good treatment, and prisoner's rations?

Perhaps even before this, he will stand, grinning in the ditch, along the highway, with hands in the air, full of confidence in what the West may already have promised him by loud-speaker, or radio. It is to be hoped that the same mistakes will not be made then, that we Germans made after 1942. It is to be hoped that the warning will be heard which an old Russian scientist, a German diplomat, gave to the Americans years ago:

"It is to be hoped that the United States will not repeat, if they eventually have to fight the Soviet Union, the mistake of unconditional surrender. Fight always only against the Soviets—never against Russia and the Russians."

## Geopolitics and the Philippines

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Cornelio T. Villareal in "Philippine Armed Forces Journal" April 1953.

WHEN a treaty of defensive alliance was signed by the Governments of Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, little attention was paid to it in our country. But this was one of the only two remaining links that needed to be forged to complete the chain of global defense of the free world against the insidious and aggressive forces of international communism. The other one is the extension of the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty to include Indonesia, Malaya, and the countries bordering the southeastern part of the Continent of Asia along the underbelly of India to the Suez Canal. Spade work on this project has already been

started by Prime Minister Churchill and United States Secretary of State Dulles.

There is much hope that the ANZUS will be enlarged along these lines. India, heretofore adamant in her neutrality, is showing signs that she will cast her lot with the free world. Initially India is anti-Communist, and since the foreign policy of a nation is simply the expression of her domestic policy, there appears no doubt that she will come in in due time. Egypt, another neutral, may soon come in too. She has some problems with Great Britain now, among which are the disposition of the Sudan and the determination of the status of the Suez Canal. We can hope

that these questions will be resolved to the mutual benefit of the nations concerned, and when that is done, the free world will have encircled the Soviet Union to the point where she will have to think twice before plunging into a world war.

### Soviet Sphere

I have mentioned only two of the links in the free world's global chain of defense against Communist aggression. Now let us project our minds from the top of the globe and view in perspective all the land mass area of the earth and its surrounding waters.

Here we see the Soviet Union in relation to all the nations of the earth. We can see her occupying a sphere of power and influence from above the Arctic Circle, projecting to the Bering Strait, then down through Kamchatka, Manchuria, North Korea, the whole Chinese mainland to the shores of the China Sea; then along the borders of Indochina, Burma, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and the Middle East states of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey; then to the borders of Greece, Yugoslavia, a part of Austria, Eastern Germany, then along the Baltic Sea to the borders of Finland and back to the Arctic Circle. All these occupy a compact land mass—more than one-sixth of the globe—capable of striking most of the other five-sixths from any direction.

This Soviet area possesses the potential and actual capability of subverting the remaining areas.

### Defensive Treaties

What has the non-Soviet world done to protect itself against this threat? I have already mentioned the ANZUS Treaty and the treaty of alliance between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. These are the more recent regional defensive arrangements forming the final links in the chain of defense that rings the Soviet Union. Earlier, in 1948, there was the Treaty of

Rio de Janeiro entered into by 21 countries of both the North and South American Continents. This takes care of that sector of the Iron Curtain across the Arctic Circle. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 1949 was a further extension of this defensive line, and extends from Norway through the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, France, Portugal, and Italy and is now interlocked with the defenses of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.

For all practical purposes, Spain is already within the NATO sphere. On the Pacific Ocean side of the Soviet Union are the unilateral defense pacts of the United States and Japan, the Philippines and the United States, and the tripartite pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which is now being extended to Egypt within the reaches of NATO.

The people of the Philippines should see the facts affecting their security. Congress owes this to them, and must so inform them, so that they may see the logic and the correctness of action in bolstering our armed forces.

### Soviet Potential

We have seen the sprawling and far-flung territory which the enemy has under its absolute control. Let us now see how much in manpower and matériel the Soviet Union can muster and throw into one supreme, or piecemeal effort to control the whole world.

The Soviet Union has an estimated standing army of 2½ million men excluding an air force of 500,000 persons with 50,000 planes, and a navy of 500,000 men with about 22 major ships, 40 to 45 destroyers, 350 to 400 submarines, an undetermined number of smaller ships, and 2,000 planes. Her manpower potential, excluding those of the satellites in Europe, runs from 18 to 20 million trained reserves.

Communist China, by far the largest satellite of the Soviet Union, has an estimated standing army of over 2½ million men, an air force manning 5,000 planes, and a navy of 21,000 men. Her manpower potential, consisting of all males from the ages of 17 to 25 who are subject to basic military training, and all males between 20 and 45 years who may be drafted for military service at a moment's notice, numbers from 20 to 25 million.

### Free World Force

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, consisting of 14 nations, has a potential standing army of 2 million men ready for combat, the equivalent of 25 divisions. Another 2 million men are in reserve and can be mobilized in any emergency to defend Europe. This excludes a half million potential which West Germany may be authorized to mobilize as her contribution to the European Army.

NATO has 3,500 planes, plus the Sixth Fleet of the United States consisting of 70 ships, including 3 aircraft carriers and 13 destroyers. It has 7 airfields in Norway, 7 in Denmark, 13 in the Netherlands, 14 in Belgium, 41 in France, 35 in West Germany, 1 in Luxembourg, 1 in Tripoli, 1 is being built in Turkey, and there are an undetermined number of air bases in England. Add to this, the undetermined manpower and matériel of the 20-nation signatories of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and we have a rough estimate of the defenses of the Western Hemisphere.

No data is yet available on the manpower and matériel potential in the regional defense of the ANZUS Treaty group extending to the Suez Canal, but we can imagine the tremendous force in defense of freedom which can be generated from this region once the political barriers to this project have been hurdled by the nations involved. While no military commitments have been made by the United States in this region, except with Aus-

tralia and New Zealand, quite a number of them are already getting United States military supplies, besides receiving Mutual Security Agency and Point Four assistance. So there is great hope that through the careful efforts of the United States and other members of the United Nations, this sector will be built to bolster the defenses of the free world.

### Far East Defense

The line of defense running from Alaska, and the Aleutians, through Japan, Formosa and the Philippines is the one which concerns us most. How does this sector stand concerning the Communists on the Asian mainland?

We have no available data on Alaska and the Aleutian group, but we can rest assured that this being a United States territory, it is being well fortified by that country.

Japan has an estimated standing army of 110,000, with a navy manned by 35,000 men with 300 vessels, and an air force of 1,500 planes manned by 25,000 men. Approximately 800,000 Japanese youths reach the age of 20 annually—a little more than 50 percent of whom are male. Taking 20 years as the minimum and 45 years as the maximum draft age, Japan has a potential strength of 9 million men. Most of these are over 33 years of age and are veterans who are available for immediate mobilization. A minimum of United States ground forces are presently stationed in Japan. There are a number of United States air and naval bases in addition to those maintained by the Japanese Government.

Formosa has an estimated 600,000-man standing army, 35,000-man navy manning 210 assorted ships, and 8 air bases maintained by 92,000 men, with 500 planes. Practically all able-bodied male citizens here had been drafted into the Nationalist Army. But the manpower potential of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek includes

his active followers on the mainland, estimated to number over 16 million men who are presently engaged in guerrilla operations against the Chinese Communists.

### Philippines Activity

We now come to our own country, at the foot of the Alaska-Aleutian defense group of the United States. We have a standing army of only 56,240 officers and men. We have 3 air bases, 173 planes, and 39 ships of various classifications. Recently we added to this, 4 amphibious planes and 700 motor vehicles as an implementation of our military assistance pact with the United States. We have a manpower potential of 100,000 20-year olds and 15,000 ROTC cadets. The United States is maintaining only two naval bases and one air base as her share in our military bases agreement.

Stalin is dead but there is no assurance that the plan he laid down for the Communist conquest of the world will not be relentlessly pursued. The signs are even more ominous, for the leadership in the Kremlin is now endowed with a fanatical zeal to even surpass the successes of Stalin. It is more wishful thinking to assume that Malenkov is less shrewd and ruthless than Stalin. It is a dream so much more to be desired than to be accomplished to think that the monolithic Communist dictatorship will dissipate into rivalries that will rock the Soviet Union into internal revolts. It is much more realistic, and much more consistent with our integrity and national defense for us to bolster our armed forces now against the day when our shores may once again be invaded.

There is no doubt in my mind that America stands ready and willing to help defend our land against any aggression, but America can only do so much. If you now recall the picture I have drawn on the far-flung defenses of the free world

against communism, you will see that America's military and economic assistance have been spread thinly among all her allies. The effectiveness of American aid relies greatly on the capacity and willingness of those who receive such aid to double or quadruple—out of their own resources—the aid which they receive. American aid—military or otherwise—is useless if the recipient nation does not contribute, out of its own labor and resources, a sizable and sufficient counterpart for such aid.

### Defensive Needs

Looking at the defensive needs of our sector in the global defense against communism, what we have contributed so far, in the form of men and matériel, is very weak indeed compared to the strength of the enemy that can be thrown in to land and perhaps hold this entire sector. I do not wish to alarm our people unduly but this is no time for beating around the bush. The capability of the enemy to undertake actual amphibious invasion of our shores is real and our people must be prepared to meet such a threat. In view of this the government expenditure to support the Philippines Expeditionary Forces to Korea was 20 million dollars annually. During the fiscal year 1950-51 the amount appropriated for the 10th Battalion Combat Team—the first combat team that we sent to Korea—was slightly less than 9 million dollars, which included the purchase of initial equipment and armament. In 1952, we appropriated about 6 million dollars, and during the current fiscal year we only appropriated slightly more than 5 million dollars. All in all, the total expenditure so far for our contingent expeditionary forces in Korea was approximately 20 million dollars.

A recent enemy intelligence estimate indicated the presence of a Soviet Pacific fleet lurking not far from Philippine waters. The fleet consisted of 2 heavy

cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 36 destroyers, 120 submarines, and 436 minor surface craft. This was complemented by Communist China's fleet consisting of 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 15 submarines, 105 minor surface craft and 10,000 motorized junks—capable of transporting 5 armies.

I am not overlooking the existence of the United States Seventh Fleet in the waters of Formosa, which undoubtedly provides us with a certain degree of security. The United States naval and air bases, here, no less than Formosa's own defense, lend us some degree of safety.

But in the event that the Communists decide to attack in force, these defenses will be inadequate to prevent the occupation of our shores. Indeed, in the event that Communist China decides to invade Formosa, she may have to invade the Philippines first to flank the islands. This invasion can be staged from Swatow, in southern China, and Hainan Island, pouring troops on the western shores of Luzon supported in a pincer movement by Soviet transports anywhere along the shores of Quezon or in the Bicol region. This excludes the possibility of invasion by paratroopers which we cannot afford to discount.

From this over-all estimate, we can deduce five specific capabilities of the enemy, thus:

1. Land saboteurs, enemy agents, supplies, and subversive propaganda for the Huks.
2. Conduct underwater operations against our merchant shipping.
3. Conduct guided missile attacks on any military installation or industrial center.
4. Disrupt shipping lanes by mining.
5. Support amphibious operations of the Chinese Communist Army.

### Conclusion

The attention of Congress has been distracted too long from the real and present danger that confronts this nation, by the officious concern of some of our leaders over our non-participation in the ANZUS Treaty.

Let us not get the Philippines involved in other treaties that other regions are arranging to defend their sector. The Japanese peace treaty is one that directly concerns our national security. Rejection of this treaty will not only isolate the Philippines from this defense sector but will also weaken Japan's position in resisting internal and external Communist pressures. It is known that this country will be lost once Japan is drawn into the Communist orbit.

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If we are going to continue to exist, obviously we must defend ourselves when attacked. In the modern world even more than in ancient times the emphasis is on intelligent preparation for that defense. In fact we have gone so far scientifically that it is plain to all of us that mere defense, in the old sense, is not enough, because our frontiers are world-wide and almost the only defense left to a nation that relies on its industrial productive power is offensive striking power.

*Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson*



## Syntax

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Warrant Officer N. F. Clarke in the "Australian Army Journal" October 1953.

UNDER this somewhat forbidding title the textbooks tell us that syntax is concerned with the construction of sentences and go on to expand the subject in the puzzling jargon which seems to be especially favored by the grammarians. This does nothing to whet the student's appetite for more and often produces reaction against a subject which is an important element in the art of oral and written expression.

Language is the first and greatest of the social bonds, and for this reason alone it might well take precedence over every other study, quite apart from the fact that it is the basis of most known studies. Misunderstanding of language is among the chief of the world's woes. In a country like Australia, it is normally forgotten that English is not the only language in the world: this is not to say that the ability to speak a variety of languages necessarily makes the speaker any wiser. The inhabitants of small countries are obliged by circumstances to learn several languages, which is, in effect, learning a new set of symbols, for language is artificial and a matter of convention.

### Use of Words

The study of grammar is part of the study of the functions which go with the use of words. Words are audible and also visible indications of thought, although as used by many people, especially politicians, they are often practically devoid of sense. It is almost as impossible to define a word as it is to define a thought. Most educated people would consider themselves able to explain the meaning of a word: a little reflection may raise doubts. Defining the meaning of a word is rather like defin-

ing a man in terms of his viscera which adds up to the definition of a corpse: a "has been" rather than a human being. The word "water" can be defined in terms of chemistry and physics, but if we consider the phrase "water ripples," the word "ripples" can only be defined very loosely indeed. Here the incidence of light, the surface of the water, and a time factor are involved.

If "rippled" was substituted for "ripples," there is an alteration of meaning in the time sense. This gives rise to the question: is "ripples" to be taken as a different word from "rippled?" Much unnecessary classification is avoided by adopting the convention that there is only one word "ripple" which is modified in practice by the speaker or the writer. A word may not only possess a variety of forms but also a variety of meanings: a kettle "sings," a bird "sings," and a man "sings."

Further, if we can judge by the controversies of learned men today, there is no guarantee that the same meaning will be attached to comparatively simple words like "freedom" and "democracy." However, in a well-constructed sentence an extremely vague word moves in a fairly restricted sense.

### Sentence Construction

Most languages are constructed of sentences which may consist of one word or 150, such as may be found in Burke's *Letter to a Noble Lord*. It is now the fashion to favor short sentences which certainly deters the speaker or writer from rambling among loose subordinates: a wearisome style to the reader and frequently an unintelligible style to the listener. On the other hand, an uninterrupted series of

short sentences in Mr. Hemingway's manner can become extremely irritating. The longer sentence which develops meaning balanced against shorter sentences which punch the points home make the ideal combination. A single word such as "come," "go," or "no" may be full of meaning, although a further context is implied. Questions and replies fall into this category: "Who is your favorite pin-up?" "Greer." "What, Garson!" This inevitably leads us to ask the question: "What is a sentence?"

At school we were led to believe that a sentence required a verb to function effectively as such; however, sentences without verbs are not uncommon. "More haste less speed" contains no verb. A strictly modern sentence: "The higher the temperature the more rapid the movement of the molecules" contains no verb. "Is" might be inserted but it is doubtful if the meaning would thereby be any clearer.

A verb may be understood in the saying: "Out of sight out of mind" but there may be no agreement as to what verb is understood. Indeed, the introduction of a verb might be positively confusing. It is perhaps for this reason that the verb may be omitted where the purpose of the sentence is to convey a universal truth. Sentences constructed with the imperative form of the verb have no formal subject, for example, "Come up and see me some time." Suppose one is supplied: "You come up and see me some time," may have a rather ominous significance; "Come up and see me some time, you," is distinctly disagreeable. It is possible that "you" could be inserted by way of emphasis, but threats are not usually associated with pronouns.

Newspaper headlines frequently omit subjects, for example, "Oppose Lotteries." Who is to oppose lotteries appears to be quite irrelevant. An act is not a sentence. "May look at kings" is not a sentence, but linked with "cats" it becomes such.

In ordinary written English both subject and predicate are formally expressed, therefore, it is announced that a sentence must have a subject and a predicate, the latter word meaning what is asserted or proclaimed. In order to vary the monotony of the subject-verb-predicate sentence an inverted construction may be used to emphasize the important member of a sentence, but the nature of the English language encourages extremely rigid ideas about word order upon which it depends if sense is to be extracted from sentences. It is for this reason that it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the precise meaning of some writers. Thomas Gray, who is considered to be one of the most learned of the English poets, wrote: "Now fades the glimmering landscape from the sight." His *Elegy*, by which poem he is chiefly remembered, is full of this kind of irregularity which is employed to obtain smoothness and rhyme. A good writer will use an abnormal word order not because he has to do so but because he wishes to do so. Gray is forced into this position. The word order is reversed in such a sentence as "Crack went the whip, out rushed the man" to produce a dramatic effect.

### Subjects

A sentence may not have a formal subject but it must have a notional subject, that is to say, something to think about. The same is true of both the predicate and object. The object may be the most important part of a sentence notionally, but, formally and naturally, it is part of the predicate. The predicate is commonly defined as: "that part of a sentence on which the action of the verb performs" but if we consider the sentence: "I feel sorry," we realize that what in fact is the object of the verb is really the subject. In the sentence: "I smell a rat," it can hardly be said that the rat is performed upon by the verb since it is probably quite unconscious of what is happening. In order that

there may be a formal subject, the verb must be transitive and the object may be said to limit or determine the action of the verb. "I saw her reading," is vague and general, but if an object were supplied it would be quite definite as: "I saw her reading a poster."

### Context

Sentences are not defined by any distinction of form but by intention, purpose, or meaning. The factor to be stressed in considering one or more words which may convey a meaning is context. The art of speaking and writing depends to a great extent on the amount of meaning which can be packed into a word in accordance with its context. Written symbols do not correspond to spoken symbols, for in the latter, meaning is often implicit in the tone of the voice, gesture, and physical environment. "It is raining," is a sentence which can be reduced to one word, "raining," which, in a given context, can be understood. It might mean, "Raining?" or, "Raining!" and its meaning would be clear provided it was supported by a physical context. Colloquial speech tends to be

briefer and more ambiguous than written communications. This does not mean that colloquial forms are wrong and written forms right, because provided both achieve their object without a diversion of attention either to bad pronunciation or spelling, both have their place. If an obviously colloquial form is written, it may divert the reader's attention from content to form. Frequently, however, colloquialisms are reprehended too severely, particularly in schools where, for some obscure reason, meretricious and pompous literary forms are unduly praised. If the Bible were translated into the literary style of leaders in the daily papers, it would make curious reading, for it must be remembered that the Authorized Version of the Bible was nearer to colloquial English than it is now. Except for the lyrical quality of his blank verse, Shakespeare wrote the language that seventeenth century Englishmen spoke. If in doubt about the mode of expressing thought, always argue from spoken usage to written usage and not the other way around: while the two usages are distinct, they are necessarily ultimately linked.

## Thin Green Lines

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major J. I. Purser in "The Royal Engineers Journal" (Great Britain) September 1953.

WE STILL do not take full advantage of the mine as a potential obstacle, because, despite the new laying drills, we have not yet entirely rid ourselves of the idea of a mine field being laid to a pattern, usually of a number of more or less parallel rows. It is this rigidity, this fixed idea of a pattern of continuous rows, which to my mind greatly reduces the possible effectiveness of a mine field.

The mine field has four characteristics which we want to get clear in our minds if we are to make the best use of it.

### Characteristics

It is first of all a double-edged weapon. While this, to some extent, is true of any obstacle, in that it cramps the style of both attacker and defender, the mine field can be a particular menace. Even though the defender knows where it is—or thinks he does from his map—it is not visible like a river and mistakes can, and do, happen. This fact may seem patently obvious but it is easily forgotten, particularly in the early stages of preparing the defensive position when the cry on all sides is often

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for mines and more mines. Once laid they cannot easily be picked up, so I think we want to be very careful before we start laying mines *within* the defensive position. However well we plan our counter-attack and counterpenetration tasks, it will be a bold man who will prophesy just how the battle will go. That cunningly-laid mine field on the flank or rear of a position designed to prevent its capture from that direction may well turn out to be the main obstacle in the way of any counterattack launched should that position be overrun.

The second characteristic is that the mine field can be laid practically anywhere and it can, and must, therefore, be made to fit the defense. To talk about having positions to cover the mine fields is completely the wrong approach. It is well known that one of the difficulties in defending a river line is that, in order to cover the river obstacle, the defenders are often forced to take up positions that are quite unsuitable tactically. The same must not be allowed to happen with the mine field. The greater part of the mine fields must, of course, be covered by fire, but this we can do, not by positioning the main lines of resistance, but by positioning the mine fields to suit these lines. When we come on to the desirability of having mines in depth, however, we may find that we shall want to have some positions forward in the mine fields, but these must be provided by our screens and not be our main defensive positions.

The third characteristic of the mine field is its ability to be concealed. I feel we have rather lost sight of this characteristic recently by going in for mines in quantity. I believe that any attempt to lay enormous mine field barriers is quite futile, because of the fact that they cannot be concealed. A large part of the value of a mine field is lost once its extent and disposition is known. Surprise is lost and the attacker can either take steps to avoid it or, more probably, assuming the mines

have been laid in the most advantageous place, make a plan to breach it. Furthermore the lay-out of the mine fields may also reveal the lay-out of the defensive localities.

It will be argued that the aerial photograph will always reveal the mine field. I think this is true only if the mines are laid in any sort of pattern because an aerial photograph always reveals anything unnatural; and there is nothing very natural about a regular pattern of mines, even if the pattern is confined to straight rows of mines with even spacing between mines. It is this regular pattern of little dots on the photo that shows. Irregular marks will probably not be noticed because there are invariably innumerable little scars and irregularities in any piece of ground, and these in addition to fences and hedgerows want to be utilized fully. Another disadvantage of the regular pattern is that, even if the mine field has not been spotted from the air, it will be very much easier to locate once the first vehicle has set one off. It is only a matter of casting around and finding one or two before the entire row can be located.

### Location

It is the inability to locate and define the limits of a mine field that make it so difficult for the attacker to handle. Suppose some tanks have been halted by mines. They may well be 100 yards apart. All the attacker can say at this stage with any certainty is that there were mines where the vehicles were stopped. Does he know the forward edge? Tanks may well have passed through the first rows unscathed. So to start with he must either allow a fair margin of safety on his side of the damaged vehicles behind which he must start clearing or else take the risk of losing some tanks right at the start of his apparently cleared lane. How far do the mines extend? It may be obvious to say that it is difficult to make a plan when

you do not know exactly what it is you have to do, but that is just about what the attacker is up against with a well-concealed mine field.


The last characteristic of the mine field is its actual value as an obstacle. We can say of a river, for example, that it is a complete obstacle: the only way to cross it is by building rafts or bridges. This is not so with the mine field. Although we can draw on our maps little green lines to represent the rows of mines (or more correctly little green spots in rectangles to represent mine belts), these rows are not complete obstacles. The fact is that

tangles and imagining that these will stop tanks.

Herein, of course, lies the weakness of the mine. It can only be overcome by laying enormous numbers, but this will rarely be possible because of limitations in time and labor. And as I have said to lay large numbers without any attempt at concealment is a waste of effort, as it removes the mine's great asset of surprise.

### Laying Mine Fields

Remembering, therefore, that the mine field is a two-edged weapon and that it



a mine field, even a thick one, acts only as a filter, and a very haphazard one at that. If we take a strip or row of mines with one mine every 3 yards, the mathematical effectiveness of the strip is about 30 percent, or, it will, on the average, stop about one in three vehicles. But, of course, it is essentially a matter of chance and any one particular strip may not stop any. Nevertheless, it is a deterrent to have a third of one's tanks immobilized during an attack, and this by only one strip of mines. If we remember, then, that the mine field is only a filter, we may avoid the snare of ringing our defensive positions with little green spots inside rec-

is only a filter, the problem is how to dispose them on the ground so that (1) they fit the defensive positions and (2) cannot easily be located by the attacker.

I will discuss the second of these questions first. It is obvious that we must make a start somewhere by having some sort of basic pattern and laying drill. To try and scatter a number of mines in a given area will be as difficult to do as it will be to form any idea of their possible effectiveness as an obstacle. It seems to me that the basis to work on will be an irregular strip containing, on the average, one mine every 4 yards. This gives it, by itself, a reasonable obstacle value of about

25 percent. It would be attractive to close up the mines to one every 3 or even 2 yards, thereby making it 50 percent effective. But there are snags to this: we may not have sufficient mines to give the field depth; they will be easier to find; and there is the danger of sympathetic detonation. However, we need not always be bound by this idea of laying them at a fixed average spacing, and if circumstances demand, we can increase or decrease the spacing.

The actual strip might look something like Figure 1.

This strip would be laid to conform to hedgerows, changes of cultivation, broken ground, irregular marks or patches in a field, and so on. It will, of course, be as stupid to lay them invariably along hedgerows as to lay them in straight, soldierly lines across fields regardless of natural features, as the enemy will soon tumble to this. The great thing is to have variety.

Strips may not be more than 50 or 100 yards long, sometimes less, nor need they be straight, as once again there is the danger of there being a discernible pattern. So we will make breaks here and there as shown in Figure 2. But it is still virtually a strip and there are no real gaps. (The continuous line down the middle represents the line that might appear on a 1/25,000 map to denote its position.)

Our mine field will be built up of a number of these strips laid in varying directions and of varying lengths. In this manner we can economize in mines, because, instead of having to lay a field (or belt) consisting of a fixed number of rows all one behind the other and of the same length, we are now free to curtail a strip or leave small gaps in those places where the mines might not be very effective (for instance, in places where it is apparent that tanks are most unlikely to go). Nor must we be afraid to leave what look like gaps in our strips. When all is said and done, a mine field can never be a solid

obstacle; it will always consist of more space than mines. It is quite logical, therefore, to have strips of mines covering off gaps in the strips in front, just as in the old rigid patterned mine field, we had mines covering off the spaces in the rows in front.

### Objections

I can see two possible objections to this method. One is the difficulty of laying. I do not think this will be quite so great, although true enough, we may not be able to lay them quite so fast this way as if we adopted a more straightforward pattern. But as I have tried to show, I believe that a number of mines well hidden will be far more effective than a slightly larger number unconcealed. Also, I think we tend to make too much fuss about laying drills, when really all we need to do, basically, is to give each man two mines and tell him to bury and arm them; and when he has done that, to do the same with two more.

The second is the question of recording. Once again I think we tend to make heavy weather of this and the need to be able to recover our own mines. I know it is rather important on training to recover the lumps of concrete that we lay when we know we are going to have to pay for those we do not. But in operations I wonder how easy it is going to be to recover our mines, should we have to, even supposing them to be laid in a simple pattern. Landmarks and datum points are quickly obliterated and I doubt if the record of a mine field made by one officer will be of much use to someone else months later. On the other hand, it is still possible to make a reasonable record—I have found that a sketch to a scale of 1/10,000 is a most effective means of doing this and can easily be made by enlarging a 1/25,000 map—and with this the officer laying should be able to recover the mines in a given area a few nights later if it is required to do so. For a

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period longer than this I think he would be unwise to trust to his own sketch, as with the ebb and flow of the battle, the enemy may well have superimposed his own mines on the original field.

We now have our basic pattern (which is really a misnomer as its aim is to appear as little like a pattern as possible), and we can take a look to see how best to fit these strips into the defensive lay-out. There are clearly hundreds of solutions,

mines and wire. Fields of fire vary from 100 to nearly 2,000 yards in some places. The main road running north and south lies in a slight valley, with on the left (as we look at the sketch) a ridge, which is likely the main tank approach, running through the left forward battalion position and on to the reserve battalion. The right forward battalion is also on a slight rise, but not such a prominent one as the others. From some points in the reserve




FIGURE 3.

and I am only going to indicate a line of thought that might be used.

Figure 3 shows a regimental combat team defensive sector, with the enemy depicted at the top of the sketch. Localities are shown down to companies. To avoid confusion only the major roads, tracks and woods are shown, but we must imagine that the terrain is gently undulating with variations in height up to about 50 feet or so in places, and that it is fairly well hedged and fenced, and where suitable, full use will be made of these to hide our

position good shoots can be had up the slight depression on the left of wood "A."

### Defensive Field

We must first ensure that the enemy, following up our withdrawing covering force, cannot readily jump the position via the main road, so we will lay a fairly compact mine field astride it and in good view of our forward localities. As the road will have to be well cratered, we cannot expect to achieve much surprise here except possibly in the first encounter.

Some of these strips link up with those close to the battalion positions; others, it will be noted, run parallel to the road and toward the enemy in order to catch any of his vehicles that try to get off the road into the fields to gain cover. The other minor road will be similarly treated.

The enemy's intelligence will very likely have indicated the general area of our defensive position, so he will quickly start probing on either side of the main road. He will doubtless try to get up into the woods "C" and "D" as a start, so we will lay a few mines in these areas to deter him. We must not forget that these mines may well be missed by the first vehicles moving in the area and their effect not be felt until later. Also, even if these mines are not covered by fire, every tank temporarily immobilized is in our favor, as it has to be re-tracked and made mobile again. There is also the effect on morale of knowing that there are mines about.

The forward battalion positions must have mines within range of their own small arms and antitank weapons to deal with those tanks that will inevitably get around or through any outer belts of mines that are laid, and they ought to be sited thickest where we think the enemy is most likely to come or where we would least like him. They will not necessarily ring the positions in a continuous belt. The rear edge of these strips should not be too close. If we keep it about 300 or 400 yards away, we shall, in addition to having room for our wire, be able to strengthen our area with more mines later on during the course of the battle when opportunity and more mines permit. In this connection we do not want to regard the mine field as something static which, once laid, is finished. It can be added to night after night. A small party of 10 can go out and lay 20 or 40 mines in a night (quite possibly more but it will depend entirely on who dominates no-man's-land)—a strip 80 to 160 yards long. But

the farther out in no-man's-land they have to lay them, the more difficult it will be, and we will have to keep this in mind when deciding on our priorities; it may be desirable to lay those nearest the positions first, but if we do this, we may never get the opportunity to lay others farther out.

The main tank approach is the next thing to be considered—the ridge running south from between the woods "B" and "C." In passing, woods are not necessarily tank obstacles—in fact few are. They will often form excellent assembly areas from which to debouch. On this piece of ground we want to make the enemy very mine-conscious. To do this we will lay the mines in great depth, but not necessarily in great density. The same number of mines laid in a narrow or deep belt will take the same eventual toll, the only difference being that the effect will be more gradual.

This is not necessarily a disadvantage. If tanks run into a narrow dense belt, a number of them will be immobilized more or less at the same time, and if the effect is great enough, will cause the attack to be halted. The tanks that are still running will be withdrawn and a new plan made. If, on the other hand, the effect is a gradual whittling down, it will be very difficult to decide whether to call it off or not, and the decision may be made to go on until the time comes when it is clear that there are not enough tanks to press home the attack effectively. By this time it may be very difficult for the attackers to extricate themselves before our own antitank weapons have taken a good toll of them. The enemy will probably try to turn his immobilized tanks into pillboxes and reinforce them with infantry. For this reason we want to adopt an aggressive policy of sending out tank hunting parties at night (with engineers) to destroy these disabled tanks, or at least to prevent the enemy from recovering or repairing them. The more isolated the tanks are on the battlefield, the easier this will be.

### Flank Protection

Finally we must consider the flanks. We know that the enemy will try to locate and attack along the boundaries between positions. The mines here will obviously have to be laid in conjunction with flanking formations, and they should be both dense and deep.

We have now laid about 10,000 mines in the area shown on the sketch; some of these are outside the regimental sector, but in the sector there are about 7,000 or 8,000. In the small size of the sketch, it is impossible to show the mine strips in detail. Each line represents a continuous line like the one running through the strip illustrated in Figure 2, with mines on an average of every 4 yards. From the enemy point of view the mine field is virtually 2,000 yards deep across the entire front. The only marking that will appear will be along the rear edge. Gaps will be recorded rather than mined areas, and to the defenders the entire area will be regarded as a mine field with certain recognized routes for patrols or outposts.

### Protection of Field

How are we going to prevent the enemy from lifting those mines that have been laid well forward? This is not easy, but we must remember that he cannot see our mines like we can as little green lines on the map. To him the whole area is a potential mine field, and a big undertaking to clear. If he only clears lanes or sticks to those tracks which by experience he has found to be devoid of mines, he will deny himself freedom of maneuver. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on such a passive policy, and we must have our screens forward in the mine field, armed possibly with some medium machine guns, but at any rate with light machine guns and rocket launchers, and with communications to enable them to call for artillery fire. This I think is the only case where we want to site positions to cover the

mines, and depart from our main principle of siting the mines to conform to the defensive positions. These screens will be very hard to maintain, and they will probably have to do without transport. This may, in fact, be a good thing as, unhampered by the difficulty of hiding vehicles well forward and of moving them through the mine fields, they will be more mobile and can shift their positions or extricate themselves more easily. Their tasks will be to make the enemy deploy early, report on his movements and harass his attempts to clear the mines at night or under cover of smoke. They must be prepared to fight all the way back through the mine field, delaying the enemy as long as possible.

The question of having a few tanks or heavy antitank weapons well forward as well is a difficult one. Clearly we would like to have some hard hitting guns well forward, but the difficulty may be to extricate them through our own mine fields, especially without giving away routes through the mine fields. On the other hand, it may be to our advantage to risk losing a few tanks if by so doing, they can account for more of the enemy's and delay his main attack.

There must also be close liaison between the gunners and the engineers in the matter of bringing down defensive fire. It is not sufficient to indicate a minebelt as being an area for defensive fire. The actual strip can be recorded as the defensive fire task (or at least its position known to the gunners), as this is where vehicles will be halted and where the enemy may either be engaged in looking for mines, recovering the vehicle, or forming a strong point around an immobilized tank as I have already suggested they might do. If medium guns can be used for this, so much the better.

Antipersonnel mines can help to make the enemy's task of clearing the antitank mines more difficult. But however well recorded their positions may be, these will

never be known sufficiently accurately to stop them being a menace to our patrols, and, as I have indicated, we want to be free to patrol aggressively in our own mine fields. They must, therefore, be laid only around the forward edges of the mine fields or in (to us) easily recognizable areas. In mass, their stopping effect is insignificant. They are largely a morale weapon. They will, however, hinder the attacker's mine clearance teams, although for this purpose I think a simple antihandling device (on the lines of the "mouse trap" mechanism) might pay better dividends.

### Summary

I have made no mention of wire. I think this is primarily a close-in obstacle, well covered by rifle and machine-gun fire, and possibly close defensive fire, although there may be occasions when it can be laid well out in areas where medium machine guns can get good fields of fire. I do not think it can be effectively used to hinder clearance of the forward strips of mines, and as, of course, it is well nigh impossible to conceal, its use might destroy the advantages gained by hiding the mines.

Finally, how is this mine field plan actually going to be made and the necessary orders for its execution given out? I think the point to make here is that the commander, not below regimental level, will say what areas he wants mined and what routes or gaps left open, and, in addition, indicate to what extent he wants the mines to be in depth or in narrow belts, whether he wants them primarily to

stop tanks altogether (if possible) or simply to hinder them, and to what extent he is prepared to allow antipersonnel mines to be used. The engineer will have to be with the commander during this planning because, apart from advising him on the resources available and the capability of utilizing them, he must be thoroughly conversant with the commander's ideas on how he wants to fight the coming battle, which areas he considers most important, how he proposes to use his screens, whether he wants tanks forward in the early stages, and so on. Once this general plan has been made and the engineer is quite clear as to what the commander has in mind, he can, I think, be left to carry out the details, using every possible means of laying the mines to the best advantage. On certain points of detail he will obviously have to be in very close touch with the forward battalions, the divisional armored units, and the artillery.

In summing up, to make the most of the mine, we must be quite clear about the mine field's characteristics which are: its potential source of embarrassment to the defender as well as to the attacker, its ability to be laid practically anywhere and to be well hidden, and its effectiveness on the lines of a filter rather than a solid obstacle. As to its employment, as I see it very briefly, the entire thing depends, if it is to be of any value, on the use of every ounce of imagination, subtlety and low cunning. If we do not do this—if we rely purely on brute force and blind ignorance—its effectiveness will be largely lost.

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**In fire power, mobility and ruggedness, our tanks are capable of outmaneuvering and outslugging, if need be, any other tanks in the world.**

*General J. Lawton Collins*

## Strategic Weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by S. Korda in "Front" (Yugoslavia) July 1953.

IF ONE evaluates carefully the military potential of the Soviet bloc, he will arrive at data which speak of its strategic weaknesses, of the fact that it has never been able (and certainly not today) to count on success in an attack of global proportions. For this reason, the Soviet leaders have resorted to seemingly small, apparently isolated, gradual aggressions, for the realization of their imperialistic aims. Of this sort, before the conflict in Korea, were: the occupation of the Baltic countries, the division of Poland, and the war with Finland. What she had need of in Korea was a "small type" war of the nature waged in Europe against the countries mentioned. Thanks to the resoluteness of the United Nations Organization, her aggression failed, and with it also, the prospects of success in every other similar, small, isolated aggression.

Usually one thinks of the principal military potential of the Soviet Union and her allies, as being constituted by their mass of human reserves. It is not difficult, though, to show that the advantage in respect to population, is not on the side of the Soviet bloc.

### Steel Production

Population figures are not a determining factor in the military potential of any country. Let us take, for example, the production of steel, on whose quantity also depend the figures relative to cannon, tanks, war vessels, and other similar items. The Soviet Union (according to the estimates of well-known economists) produces, today, around 30 million tons of steel yearly, and its Eastern European satellites, around 10 million tons which, altogether, amount to approximately 40 million tons. In contrast with this (ac-

cording to official data) Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Benelux produce around 47 million tons and the United States around 103 million tons.

In order to reduce the steadily growing difference between their industrial capacities and those of the West—differences which constantly and increasingly operate to the disadvantage of the Soviet bloc—the Soviet Union and her satellites would have to build new steel mills, new factories, new hydroelectric plants, and other associated units. All this requires enormous quantities of steel. Until the West began to arm itself, the Soviet Union was in a better position, for it was sufficient that she allocate but a minor portion of her steel for military production for her to be able to produce, for example, more tanks than the West. But when, with her aggressive policy, she forced the West also to begin the stepping up of its production of tanks, and especially after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the situation changed. For example, in 1951, the United States produced 960 tanks, but during the past year, the United States had a production of 9,600 tanks. But for the Soviet Union, in a peacetime period, a yearly production of 5,000 or 6,000 tanks would represent a great effort. The Soviet leaders, who must increase the military potential of the Soviet Union, can do nothing at the present time but withdraw a certain portion of the steel from that required for the construction of new equipment for the heavy industries, assigning it then for the production of a greater number of tanks—thus delaying and curtailing the creation of new capacities in heavy industry. This, it goes without saying, leads to a still greater lagging behind of the Soviet Union in industrial

capacity, in comparison with the United States. Caught in such a dilemma, the Soviet leaders will certainly make the attempt to replace their hitherto clearly aggressive policy with a new, diplomatic maneuver designed to lead the Western nations to again reduce their production of tanks and other weapons.

### Other Fields

And in the matter of aluminum, on which the production of planes depends, the situation is similar. While the Soviet Union in 1951 produced around 200,000 tons of aluminum (according to the actual estimates of aviation experts in the periodical *Flugverk*, a total of 140,000 tons) thus far, the United States has reached the figure of 705,000 tons and Canada 765,000 tons which, jointly, is approximately eight times greater than that of the Soviet Union. These figures do not include the other powers of the Soviet bloc.

In the production of oil, on which the mobility of the modern army depends, the Soviet bloc is definitely weak. In 1950, for example, the Soviet Union (according to figures released by the British Information Services) produced approximately 37½ million tons of oil. She was not able, therefore, to satisfy, in their entirety, even her peacetime requirements and, for that reason, took over a large share of the production of her Eastern European satellites, which amounted to approximately 5 or 6 million tons, and all the production of her occupation zone in Austria which amounted to 900,000 tons. In contrast with this, the United States in the same year produced 270 million tons of oil. In addition to this, the United States by virtue of membership in the Atlantic Pact, has at her disposal all the oil from Venezuela, which produces 78 million tons annually, as well as the oil from the Near and the Middle East, which (not counting Iran), amounts to 56 million tons, and also the oil production of a

large number of other friendly countries.

In the event of war, Soviet aviation alone, using the assumption of a minimum flight of one minute per day per plane (of which, at the present time, according to the statements of military leaders of the Atlantic Pact powers, there are around 20,000) would consume approximately 24 million tons of gasoline yearly. And if added to this are the enormous needs of communications, of motorized units, of the fleet, and especially of the machine and tractor stations, without whose labor the agriculture of the Soviet Union would be paralyzed, we can see that the Soviet Union would not have sufficient gasoline for any major military effort. This is also shown by the example of the last war, when the United States, at the request of the Soviet Government, had to provide Soviet aviation with one-third of its necessary requirements of gasoline.

### Armament Production

As a result of all this, the Soviet Union, in point of potentiality of weapons' production, is considerably behind the West. Until a few years ago, however, (depending on the type of weapon) it produced many more tanks, guns, and planes, than the Western powers: this was due to the simple reason that the Western powers after World War II quickly stopped their military production, while the Soviet Union continued to produce for military needs.

Knowing that their temporary superiority in armament which, in the event of a long, drawn-out world conflict (and it would, of necessity, be long) would be quickly lost as the result of the very powerful American and Western European production, the Moscow strategists, enthused over plans of conquest, have likely planned the conquest of Western Europe in order to obtain control of the steel production which, together with their own capacities, would come much closer to



equaling the production of the United States than it does at present. They would, at the same time, obtain a coal production 1.5 times greater than their present capacity.

### Soviet Policy

Although the conquest of Western Europe might have seemed possible several years ago, today it is not possible. The inconsiderate and aggressive policy which the Soviet Union has followed thus far, has, in the words of our comrade, Kardelj, been "a force for setting in motion all those processes in international life which have finally altered the balance of world power to the detriment of the Soviets." Western Europe is, today, capable of effective defense.

Not only would a few months be insufficient for achieving victory in a campaign against Western Europe, but such a victory could never be achieved, for the Western powers, exploiting their industrial potential to the maximum, are able to create still greater superiority of strength.

During the next to the last year of World War II, the United States produced 96,370 airplanes, and the British Commonwealth, 33,398, which altogether amount to close to 130,000 planes yearly. The same year, the Soviet Union produced around 30,000 planes. If we assume that the Soviet Union has succeeded in increasing its production capacity by half the former German production capacity, (which amounted to around 39,807 planes annually) then the maximum Soviet production in the interest of war and under the assumption that there would be sufficient aluminum and other necessary materials, would amount to around 49,000 planes yearly. This means that the United

States and Great Britain, with their allies, are able, in 1 year, to construct as many planes as the Soviet Union in 3 years. It should be pointed out that the Anglo-American planes are more extensively and better equipped with various electronic and other appliances and are more effective in combat than the Soviet planes.

The same is true of the production of tanks. While it is possible for the Soviet Union, with her own, and one-half the German, capacity, to produce as many as 39,000 tanks, thus far the United States and the British Commonwealth (we are not including, here, France and Western Germany) are able, in the event of war, to produce over 52,000 tanks yearly, armored with better steel, equipped with more powerful motors, and with more perfect interior arrangements.

### Summary

Here are the strategic weaknesses of the Soviet bloc as shown by only a few samples (although we would be able to enumerate many more: limited production of many other important raw materials, great vulnerability to air attacks of the backbone of the Soviet communications—the railway network, more convenient disposition of the American air bases, insufficient capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway, and many others).

The chief obstacle to eventual aggressive intentions by the Moscow bureaucratic caste is unity on the part of peace-loving people in opposing aggression, and the resistance of the enslaved masses of the satellite nations, which is becoming more and more manifest, and which contributes more and more to the weakness of the strategic position of the Soviet Union.

# BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER

**FORMOSA. A Problem for United States Foreign Policy.** By Joseph W. Ballantine. 218 Pages. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., \$2.75.

BY CAPT JOHN D. ANDREW, *USN*

Author Ballantine's background qualifies him to write on the subject of United States Far East problems. He was stationed in Formosa and elsewhere in the Far East as an officer of the United States Foreign Service from 1909 to 1946. From 1944 to 1945, he served as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and subsequently as Special Assistant to the United States Secretary of State.

From such an extensive foreign service background the reader could expect an authoritative presentation of the facts and a considered opinion as to how best to proceed in our relations with Formosa. Such is not the case.

Much that is pertinent has been omitted, and, in general, one is impressed only by the tenacity with which the State Department officials, present and past, defended their actions during the disintegration of our Far Eastern policy and the overthrow of the Republic of China. The author's reluctance to take a definite stand on many of the controversial points may be explained by this statement on page 200: "But it is clear at least that the modifications of earlier policy that were introduced, *especially after 1944* (italics added by reviewer) have not contributed to best serve American interests, and this modified policy has become inoperable in detail." One can only surmise as to who

originated such modifications. Possibly Ballantine's successor as Director of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, could answer that question better.

Part one of the book presents an interesting and informative collection of facts regarding the geography, history, and development of Formosa up to World War II; part two presents developments since World War II; and part three shows the present and the future, and deals less with facts and more with opinions. Only a well-informed reader can evaluate the facts presented by furnishing the many vital items which were omitted, but are necessary to a true appreciation of our stake in the Far East—of which Formosa is only a part. As a base from which to launch attacks against communism, be it Asian or imported, and as a bastion against further Communist expansion, Formosa is well worth supporting.

The Chinese Nationalist Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, may have deserved much of the opprobrium heaped upon it by this book and other works, but it is, nevertheless, the only alternative government for China capable of functioning as representatives of the free choice of free Chinese today.

The American public has resisted the changes in our Far Eastern policy which, until the advent of the conflict in Korea, seemed to be headed toward abandonment of Formosa and which even today, with a change in the administration at home, again appears to place far too low a value on Formosa and the cause it represents.

**THE DIPLOMATS, 1919-1939.** Edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. 700 Pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. \$9.00.

By MAJ DANIEL J. KERN, USAR

*The Diplomats* is a symposium on inter-war diplomacy, that is, the documented record of international foreign office achievements (which were unhappily few), and the failures (which were abysmal), between the two world wars. The contributions to this lengthy symposium have been made by 17 historians, including the two editors, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. As such, it is a book for study and endless reference, and not merely to be read.

Inevitably, *The Diplomats* chants the requiem for international diplomacy as it was known and practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its decline in prestige, and particularly as a skilled instrument in advancing the ultimate interests of a nation, is the burden of every chapter. In the face of total wars, aggressive totalitarianism, and a heightened, but often ill-informed public awareness, the withering of this once effective form of foreign intercourse is not at all to be unexpected. Parenthetically, if the clamorings against our State Department in recent years seem startling, or a phenomenon peculiar only to a rather vociferous republic, a sharp historical parallel, with its account of similar disgruntlement in Great Britain, is provided in the lead contribution by Dr. Craig, "The British Foreign Office," which points out that the decline in authority of that foreign office began with the war in 1914.

The editors refer to Sir Henry Wotton's familiar definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." While an aptitude for mendacity may still be considered a virtue, and indeed is under the amoral code of the totalitarians, proficiency in the boudoir arts, however indispensable to Wotton's diplomat in the days of the

courts, and of Talleyrand and Metternich, fell off as a prerequisite with the increase of the more democratic states. The forms that succeeded, say the capable ministry of a Charles Francis Adams at the Court of St. James, lost equally in efficacy abroad, and in favor at home, with the coming of this century's Period of Wars. Diplomacy now, it seems, is "waged," like war, more by the actual heads of states than by the officials designated for that function—compellingly so, for example, by Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau, after World War I; by Hitler and Mussolini at Munich; and by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt at Yalta.

This book can record but few real achievements by the diplomats over the period of years it examines. Diplomacy in its finest flower was a product of the absolute state, where the diplomat abroad could act absolutely for his monarch. As in the case of Sir Henry Wotton's devoted libertine, conditions furthering or demanding that capacity have long ceased to exist. The shaping of foreign policy in a shrunken world—of broken treaties, conflicting ideologies, sudden aggressions, instantaneous communication and of domestic mass influence, with its political pressures—has been assumed more and more by those into whose hands the force of events has thrust this appalling responsibility.

*The Diplomats* is highly recommended for continued study, less for its documenting the lamentable decline of a once noble function, than for its serving as a constant reminder of the grim facts of international life today. It is a threnody for that ministerial institution and its pomps, which a half-century of social revolution, war, and totalitarianism has rendered ineffectual, if not nearly obsolete; but it is also proof, since it is inescapably a dirge, that a barbarous age has sounded the knell of those measures short of war which one time could and did prevent war.

**OUR LOVE AFFAIR WITH GERMANY.** By Hans Habe. 247 Pages. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. \$3.00.

By MAJ KENRICK W. HACKETT, *Inf*

An "exposé" frequently attracts readers. *Our Love Affair With Germany* should find a fairly large public among the serious and semi-serious students of postwar Europe. Mr. Habe finds little to praise and much to criticize as far as United States policy, in and for Germany, is concerned. Our mistakes, as he analyzes them, stem from two fundamental errors. First, we have been inconsistent in our German policy, and second, we have supported the "wrong" people.

That the United States has altered its objectives in Germany between 1945 and 1953 is impossible to deny. Since the world political situation has changed considerably since 1945, it would seem to be the part of wisdom to change objectives. What we are attempting to achieve today bears no relation to what we thought we wished to achieve in the immediate post-hostilities period. There is no reason why there should be any relation between the objectives sought then and the objectives sought now. That we made mistakes, goes without saying. That they were as fundamental or as far reaching as Mr. Habe believes, is doubtful. As far as backing the "wrong" people is concerned—Who are the "right" people? The answer to that question will vary with individual prejudices and with the objectives sought. That we have backed some "wrong" people is a fact; that we have made a policy of backing "wrong" people is again doubtful.

Much of what Mr. Habe says is thought provoking. However, he concludes that unless we accept certain of his recommendations, our policy is bound to result in a renaissance of nazism and failure. This would ring a little truer if it were not apparent that Mr. Habe has a row to hoe. During his postwar experiences in Germany, he apparently made certain recom-

mendations which were not accepted by our responsible authorities. This seems to irk a bit and the difficulties he sees ahead for us are, in great measure, due to the fact that we did not follow his advice.

Mr. Habe has a pleasant style of writing and the reader will be kept interested. It is not a dull book. As an opinion, it is worth-while supplementary reading for those who wish a well-rounded picture of Germany today.

**POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD.** Edited by Walter H. Mallory and Joseph Barber. 233 Pages. Harper & Brothers, New York. \$3.75.

By LT COL DONALD L. DUFFEE, *Inf*

The *Political Handbook of the World* is a reference volume which contains much pertinent information about 88 governments in 86 countries of the world today.

This handbook, which is published once a year, contains essential political information on every country in the world: the composition of their governments; the programs of their political parties and their leaders; the leading newspapers and periodicals of the country, their political affiliations and their editors; as well as the organization, functions, and chief personnel of the United Nations and associated international agencies.

This present edition, the 26th year of this publication, is current up to 1 January 1953. Since that time, there have been several major governmental changes in such countries as France, the Soviet Union, Italy, Germany, and Colombia and there may be several more changes before the next edition is published; however, the reader can keep pace with the changes by reading his daily newspaper.

On the whole, the book contains much up-to-date, interesting material, and, although not particularly designed for the military reader, anyone interested in world affairs will find this handbook a must for his reference shelf.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE, 1941-1942.** By Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. 454 Pages. Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. \$3.25.

By MAJ GREY DRESSER, *Armor*

This volume is the eighteenth to be published in the multivolume series, **UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II**. The authors take the reader behind the scenes into the planning councils, the meetings of the American Joint Chiefs with the President, and the high-level international conferences where fateful plans and decisions were made.

It is the story of the War Department's plans and preparations, in 1941 and 1942, for the greatest of coalition wars. Presented are great issues in allied planning, the difficulties faced by General Marshall and his assistants, the calculated risks taken, the attempts to persuade other high government officials and organizations to agree to a particular course of action, or to adjust their own plans when operations in the field or deliberations in Washington or London did not come out as they hoped or expected.

The history covers the principal steps from autumn 1938, when the planners first took into serious account the possibility that the United States might become involved in a world-wide war, to late 1942, when the decision was made to invade North Africa. Author Matloff is now preparing another volume covering the strategic planning for the period of 1943-44, when the tide of war was definitely turning in allied favor.

The book contains a revealing chapter describing significant episodes in Anglo-American and Soviet collaboration in the year following Pearl Harbor. It sheds light on the nature of the "strange alliance" in the critical months before Stalingrad when the Soviet Union was fighting with her back to the wall.

This volume will be of particular interest to the military reader since it deals with top-level military planners, how their decisions were reached, and how these decisions affected the lives of over 1 million American troops who were overseas by the end of 1942.

**ASIA AFLAME. Communism in the East.** By Dr. Ebed Van der Vlugt. 294 Pages. The Devin-Adair Company, New York. \$6.00.

By LT COL JACK F. WILHM, *Armor*

This book consists of a diagnosis of the cause of the present situation in Asia, a prescription for possible cure of the illness, and a prognosis for the recovery of the patient. The illness is, of course, communism; the patient, Asia. Dr. Van der Vlugt is well qualified to write on the subject, having spent many years in Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and he is an authority on Asiatic affairs.

This book is not a military history of the actions and skirmishes which have taken place in Asia. Rather, it is a careful analysis of the political, economic, and psycho-social conditions which prevailed in Asia and the resultant use of these conditions by the Communists. Asia is considered first, from an over-all viewpoint, and then country by country to give a comprehensive picture of the factors which must be recognized if the Western World is to combat successfully communism in Asia.

Although the author feels that military action is an undesirable, last-resort measure, he does recognize the possible need for such action. He indicates that the West cannot hope to defend all the danger spots, and therefore, they must take steps to enable the people of Asia to assume a major share in their own defense.

*Asia Aflame* should prove especially interesting to the military man who has served, or contemplates serving, in Asia. Its chief value appears to be as a ready reference for the soldier-diplomat confronted with Asiatic problems.

**A HISTORY OF PORTUGAL.** By Charles E. Nowell. 259 Pages. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York. \$4.50.

By LT GEORGE ENJUTO, *Inf*

There are many people who think that the path of the sun is the normal course of life and events. Men are born and rise to the zenith of their destiny, only to disappear into darkness.

Apparently, the great nations follow a similar path: Persia, Greece, Rome, and many other civilizations—too far away in the night of time to show their distant glow—have departed, leaving behind sometimes their cultures and traditions and other times, only ruins and dust.

Portugal had her moment of greatness, but her decline has been slow. The Portuguese people do not seem to admit the validity of this fatalistic theory. They believe that they still have something to offer, and I am inclined to concur with them and author Nowell.

In his book, *A History of Portugal*, Mr. Nowell demonstrates that he knows the Portuguese people and their history, and that he loves both of them. That is one of the reasons why his book is good.

The reader will find here not only a chronological sequence of historical events, but also the *whys* and the *hows*.

Being a good exposition of the history of Portugal, it is, at the same time, a good, explicit, critical study. The reader will get to know Portugal—the old and the new—through the eyes of a sociologist and an artist.

This book was not written for the specialist solely, it was written for those who want to get a clear picture of Portugal's history without going to the trouble of learning Portuguese. Books on this subject are not easy to find in the United States.

The book is well documented and written in a fluid style. It is easy to read and should be of value to all persons interested in this type of study.

**FIREARMS IN THE CUSTER BATTLE.** By John E. Parsons and John S. du Mont. 59 Pages. The Stockpole Company, Harrisburg, Pa. \$2.75.

By LT COL THOMAS O. BLAKENEY, *Armor*

This is a short, well documented, and extremely interesting story of the weapons used by Sitting Bull's warriors and General Custer's troops in the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

Individuals interested in firearms—and all soldiers should be—will find an hour's delightful reading in this beautifully printed pamphlet.

The authors are experts in the field of old firearms. Their primary purpose was to "nail down," once and for all, the facts concerning types and relative superiority of United States Army weapons to Indian weapons in 1876. Paintings showing the wrong weapons, and so many false claims that certain old firearms were "used in the Custer Massacre" prompted the authors to record accurate information. This pamphlet contains authentic descriptions and pictures of the weapons used by the 7th Cavalry, the Sioux, and the Cheyenne.

*Firearms in the Custer Battle* is a must for the gun collector's library.

**THE LONG WAY AROUND.** By Pat Frank. 221 Pages. J. P. Lippencott Co., Philadelphia, Pa. \$3.00.

By IVAN J. BIRRE, *Ph.D.*

A master story teller records his observations and experiences as a United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency movie script writer in Seoul. While not a military book in the usual sense, *The Long Way Around* deals with the humaneness of our military policy. The reader is left with a comfortable feeling, not only of the basic justice of our policy, but also of its inevitable triumph.

**FLAGS OF THE WORLD.** Edited by H. Gresham Carr. 209 Pages. Frederick Warne & Co., Inc., New York. \$10.00.

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
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